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Abstract 
 
The music and film content providing industry asserts that unauthorised 
widespread Online Service Provider (OSP) enabled use of their works has played a 
large part in the factually evident decline in unit sales of the industry’s essential 
products such as CDs and DVDs, and has thus also allegedly diminished revenue 
and profits. In this regard, content providing industry legal recourse against OSPs 
takes two forms. The first is to claim primary copyright infringement, and the 
second to establish third-party copyright liability for the infringing acts of an OSP’s 
users. The choice is dictated by the specific facts in individual cases. The latter 
important and complex case law based category, which applies to a spectrum of 
OSP connections to infringements, some more direct than others, is specifically 
treated in this thesis.  
This thesis examines the, it is argued, inadequate case law based operation of UK 
third-party copyright liability. By firstly comprehensively studying UK copyright law 
as it pertains to OSPs, including primary liability as well as exceptions and 
limitations, UK third-party copyright liability is suitably extrinsically defined. Its 
intrinsic operation is then analysed. Severe deficiencies having been found and 
explained in this regard, a basis for reform is sought by conducting a similar 
examination of US third-party copyright liability, said law being more developed. 
Thus, a mirrored approach to the preceding UK analysis is taken in the analysis of 
US copyright law; carefully defining third-party copyright liability and ensuring 
overall systemic compatibility. Having established the need for reform and having 
provided a second compatible but more developed source, both strands of third-
party copyright liability are compared and contrasted and entirely novel changes 
to the UK concepts are proposed for legislative adoption. The reformulations allow 
for apposite future risk analysis by market actors, resulting in greater legal 
certainty for all parties concerned.  
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PART 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
A. The Technological and Industry Context 
 
Before elucidating the particular legal context and structure of this thesis, 
including its corresponding methodology, sources and limitations, it is important to 
first outline the industry and technological context involved so that the hypotheses 
are understood and it may be appreciated why particular legal, but also political 
and societal questions are posed and treated throughout this thesis.  
 
I. The World Wide Web 
 
The common denominator pertaining to almost all aspects of this thesis is the 
World Wide Web, meaning the public Internet. This is a medium which most 
people in industrialised nations have become not only accustomed to, but use on a 
daily basis; the effect being that commercial, social and private aspects of the 
relevant populaces’ lives are driven to a relatively large extent by this technology. 
The referenced general uptake and permeation coincide with the technology’s 
evolution from what can be described as a functional and sophisticated but 
unappealing card index to the current, still evolving, colourful omni-purpose media 
and content environment.  
As such, it is only natural that this medium is being exploited in numerous ways by 
Online Service Providers (OSPs), which has led to friction and sparked litigation by 
opposing industries. In this regard, it is prudent to define what is meant by an OSP. 
An OSP is an undertaking marketing goods and/or services on the public internet.1 
This definition is an umbrella definition, that may include what some may refer to 
as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that generally, mainly provide access to the 
                                                          
1
 See Wikipedia, Online Service Provider at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_service_provider, accessed;20 December 2011.  
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World Wide Web,2 although this is a commonly understood and relatively clearly 
delineated subset.3 This is the case concerning the music and film industries, which 
are of special interest for this thesis, and for the purposes of which, without 
prejudice to commercial differentiation, are generically termed the “content 
providing industry”. Without wishing to pre-empt the discussion below of certain 
legal aspects, it is this litigation, or to be more specific, the liability of OSPs in 
particular contexts that this thesis evaluates. 
II. The Content Providing and Using Industries  
 
In delineating the industry context, borrowing from Templeman LJ in C.B.S. Songs 
Ltd. v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc., that OSPs: 
Create and market sophisticated services which enable individual members of the 
public to transmit, receive, record and reproduce sounds and signals in their own 
homes. The [content providing industry] transmits and records entertainment on 
an enormous scale. Each industry is dependent on the other. Without the public 
demand for entertainment, the [OSPs] would not be able to [market] their 
[services] to the public. ...  Although the two industries are interdependent and 
flourish to their mutual satisfaction there is one area in which their interests 
conflict. It is in the interest of the [OSPs] to put on the market every facility which 
is likely to induce customers to [use the services provided] by the industry. It is in 
the interest of the entertainment industry to maintain a monopoly on the 
reproduction of entertainment.”4 
The above quote has been modestly modified, as indicated, to adapt it from, 
originally, the electronics industry, to the OSP industry. This fact serves to highlight 
that, despite the friction between the opposing OSP and content providing 
industry being particularly acute in an electronic medium such as the Internet, 
such friction concerning the content providing industry is not a new per se. When 
Amstrad was heard in 1988 the technology at the centre of the litigation was twin 
double speed tape recorders, yet the observations concerning the symbiotic and 
                                                          
2
 E.g. BT Group Plc, see http://www.bt.com/,accessed;20 December 2011.  
3
 See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Internet Service Provider, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/746032/Internet-service-provider-ISP, 
accessed;20 December 2011.  
4
 [1988]1 A.C.1013,1045-1046(UKHL). 
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sometimes contentious relationship between the content providing industry and 
technology remains valid. Some commentators have identified a “Digital 
Dilemma”, referencing the fact that whereas digital technology and the Internet 
induce effortless instantaneous dissemination of information across national 
boundaries, both also severely impact on the ability of copyright holders to exert 
or maintain exclusive rights.5 In other words, whereas a heretofore unimaginable 
potential for global distribution at virtually no cost has come into existence, the 
prevalence of works which are the subject of such is threatened due to the 
prejudicial effect on copyright holders by dislocated pecuniary recompense. This 
particular, currently OSP driven problem, is the latest instalment in what have 
been termed the “Copyright Wars”,6 which for the content providing industry 
began with piano rolls.7 
As noted, the content providing industry argues that the evolution and exponential 
growth of OSP service uptake, making use of unlicensed works, has to a very large 
extent negated the industry’s ability to control reproduction and dissemination as 
once guaranteed by statute. This is important, it is argued, due to the fact that 
these exclusive rights previously ensured profitability linked to the sales of 
particular units, for example CDs and DVDs. As referenced, this loss of control and 
alleged revenue has sparked litigation over the uses of technology and services 
causing such. In the previous electronics driven era, the content providing industry 
famously took legal action against the manufacturers of videotape and tape 
recording equipment, at a time when such represented the pinnacle of efficient 
reproductive and disseminative technology.8 Today such are being replaced by the 
Internet and OSPs. Whereas it may validly be observed that the content providing 
industry is in economic decline,9 some commentators have questioned whether or 
                                                          
5
 A.Peukert,‘A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network Environment’,148,in A. 
Strowel,‘Peer to Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in Copyright Law’(EE,2009). 
6
 Recently coined again by Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars, (OUP 2009). 
7
 See White-Smith Music Publishing Company, Appt., v. Apollo Company,209U.S.1(1908). 
8
 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,464U.S.417(S.Ct.1984) and Amstrad 
(n4). 
9
 IFPI, ‘Digital Music Report 
2011’,5,http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2011.pdf(28May2011). 
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to what extent this is due to unauthorised dissemination of works by OSPs, such as 
P2P networks.10 
The OSP industry counters arguments that unit sales11 are dropping with the 
contention that copyright is being used to justify what may be termed “upside 
down business models” which are alleged to be “anti-consumer, anti-competitive 
and anti- innovative”.12 What is meant thereby is the content providing industry’s 
alleged attempt to “change the internet into a vehicle for the greatest form of 
vertical monopolisation ever seen, even though the benefits from a pull approach 
to marketing are ... obvious and are grounded in common economic sense.”13 The 
content using OSP industry therefore suggests for the content providing industry 
what it views as consumer driven, to a lesser extent unit based, and to a greater 
extent access based business models, as the solution to the industries problems 
which are, allegedly, to be preferred to litigation.  
The opposing OSP industry generally contends that ‘creative’, ‘responsive’ and 
technology driven models making full use of the Internet’s potential is required. 
This is currently referred to as an emphasis on “monetisation of access to 
content”.14 Cynical observers might note that to achieve such the content 
providing industry must necessarily, at least in the first instance, work together 
with the OSP industry, thereby creating new middlemen to satisfy this new 
consumer driven business model. Moreover, when it comes to infringement of 
copyright by certain very large OSP actors, most notably Google and affiliated 
companies, the industry has recently asserted that whereas the social and 
economic value of creative content protected by copyright is admitted, the 
services it provides are equally as valuable using the same or similar frames or 
reference.15 
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B. The Legal & Structural Aspects 
 
Having highlighted the nature of the opposing industries’ areas of particular and 
partially fundamentally conflicting business interests, how these are dealt with in a 
legal context in particular as examined by this thesis, may be turned to. This 
discussion then leads on to an explanation of the particular focus of this thesis 
within the broader general legal context of the “copyright wars”, including the 
objective, hypothesis, methodology, structure, sources and limitations. 
 
I. The General Legal Context  
 
Over the years, the content providing industry, most notably the music industry, 
has shifted its litigation strategy in response to the alleged negative impact of OSP 
linked infringement of copyright.16 Previously, two primary targets were both the 
enabling OSPs and later, on a large scale in the US, the users. In recognition of the 
fact that pursuing users is undesirable for below mentioned reasons, this strategy 
has, it is alleged by the industry in the US, abated somewhat.17 This is contested by 
advocacy groups.18  
It is however common ground that the content providing industry still pursues in 
certain instances individual primary infringers of copyright, for example in file-
sharing cases - particular file sharers such as Joel Tenenbaum. However, more 
importantly for this thesis, at no point in time did the industry stop seeking to hold 
OSPs liable for the infringement of copyright by their users.19 This strategy stands 
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unquestioned until this day and splits into instances of primary, and, what is 
referred to throughout this thesis as third-party copyright liability (3PCL); why this 
is the case and the exact scope will be discussed in the following Parts. Whether an 
OSP may be held liable on a primary or third-party basis depends on the specific 
facts of particular cases, and as a general rule, the extent of the involvement of the 
OSP. This will be precisely delineated in the following Parts.20 
The reason behind this particular litigation strategy, especially concerning 3PCL, is 
that the OSP provides a focal point as compared to the multitude of primary 
infringers, and is likely to have ‘deeper pockets’. Some cynical observers will no 
doubt moreover note that it is also in the content providing industry’s interests not 
to be perceived as suing customers. Posner J in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 
termed suing individual infringers a “teaspoon solution to an ocean problem” 
suggesting that “the law allows a copyright holder to sue the contributor to the 
infringement instead, in effect as an aider and abettor”, which was preferable from 
a content providing industry point of view.21 Moreover, commentators such as 
Ginsburg have termed OSPs the “principal economic actors”; whether this view is 
to be agreed with remains open, since the view could be taken that the users of 
OSPs’ services in this regard could also be termed such.22 Nonetheless, the very 
fact that there is a debate as to which, the OSPs or the users, are the “principal 
economic actors” evidences also the logical and monetary importance of the OSP 
in what may be termed the infringement chain. 
 
II. The Focused Legal Context 
 
1) Objective 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.copfs.gov.uk/News/Releases/2011/05/First-Person-Scotland-Convicted-Illegal-
Music-File-Sharing (29May2011). 
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Cir.2003). 
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(2008). 
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The aforementioned allows it to be stated in context that the more narrowly 
focused legal objective of this thesis is to, in particular, analyse 3PCL in the UK, 
with a view to assessing its relative qualities. Particular attention is paid to legal 
certainty and operational effectiveness, striking a balance, where possible, 
between the above mentioned industry interests. It is also the objective of this 
thesis to provide solutions for problems encountered and enumerated in the 
analysis. 
 
2) Hypotheses 
 
The primary aim/hypothesis of the UK legal discourse is to argue and prove that 
3PCL in the UK is in need of reform. The secondary aim/hypothesis is to argue and 
prove that UK third-party copyright liability can be beneficially reformed by 
employing compatible concepts borrowed from US third-party copyright liability, 
which should be adopted in legislation.23 
 
3) Methodology 
 
a) Overview 
 
3PCL in the UK is initially defined extrinsically by an examination of UK copyright 
law as it pertains to OSPs; including primary liability as well as exceptions and 
limitations. Thereafter it is defined and analysed intrinsically. Deficiencies are 
highlighted and the case for reform presented. To provide the means for reform, 
recourse is had to a tailored examination of US law. The arguably most important 
copyright jurisdiction, in terms of economics, commerce and litigiousness, namely 
the USA, is thus analysed in a similar fashion to the preceding UK based analysis; 
defining US 3PCL extrinsically within the copyright law corpus and then analysing it 
intrinsically. Throughout the examination of US law, comparisons are made to 
corresponding UK law to ensure that there exists a valid functional comparison 
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between both jurisdictions, which allows for and leads to a final assessment that 
incorporates proposals for reform. 3PCL, being central to this thesis, is compared 
separately and proposals for reform and legislative adoption are made 
successively. 
 
b) The Comparative Discourse 
 
The core comparative conclusions and proposals concerning 3PCL in Part 4(D) are 
an integrated continuation as well as a substantiated logical development from the 
aforegoing Parts generally, but in particular the final conclusion to Part 2 proving 
the primary hypothesis as well as the 3PCL conclusions in Part 3; but naturally also 
in Part 2 B(IV) and C(III).  
This is because the examination and comparison of the two jurisdictions’ 
surrounding aspects to the central issue of 3PCL serves just such a purpose; 
namely, it places the central theme into context and ensures that liability in both 
jurisdictions is compatible to the extent that it may be validly compared.  In other 
words, the preceding overall examination offers a sense of the jurisdictions’ 
functioning both generally as well as in OSP contexts, and thus the context in 
which 3PCL; it ensures that a thorough investigation has been conducted 
precluding the existence of any impediments which would affect the operation of 
3PCL to such an extent that a comparison would be either invalid, improbable or 
incomplete if not referenced. Reference is made to the section conclusions in Part 
3 and their equivalent in Part 4(C), establishing a sufficient similarity of operation 
of 3PCL in both systems.  
This particular approach aims to preserve the value and validity of what is a well-
known fact; comparative law is often used as a successful aid to legislation and law 
reform.24 Whereas, as de Cruz points out, the practice of enacting worthwhile laws 
stemming from foreign places harks back to the Greeks and Romans, he also notes 
that the English Law Commission is also tasked with incorporating such "whenever 
this is seen as facilitating … performance".25 In comparative law terms, both the UK 
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and US are part of the same system; the English common law system, which makes 
the instant comparison easier and parallel comparisons likely more valid from the 
outset.26 However, it has been put that the US legal system is "an example of 
English law being transplanted into a legal and constitutional set up which is 
radically different from the common law homeland"27 – which is why, inter alia, 
this thesis treats the differences with great respect – and analyses in particular the 
impact of the federal nature of the US at the outset in Part 3.28 This aids in avoiding 
the pitfalls in comparative legal analysis.29  
In terms of the comparison itself, it can broadly be stated that this loosely follows 
Kamba's three main stages; (a) the descriptive phase; (b) the identification phase; 
and (c) the explanatory phase, in Parts 2 – 4.30 The important aspect in this regard 
is that these stages have been carried out, that the discourse met the objectives 
(here the research questions), particularly in Part 4.31  
Before launching into comparative analysis, discussion and conclusion of 3PCL in 
both US and UK contexts with the ultimate aim of providing proposals, it is worth 
briefly restating the problem being treated. As the discussion of 3PCL in the UK 
including the conclusion to such in part two will highlight, there are several areas 
for discontent.  
The overarching criticism is that there are too many inconsistent, at times 
contradictory, open ended definitions and justifications deployed in a treatment of 
both authorisation and joint liability in the UK. This has two primary effects. The 
first is an unacceptable level of legal uncertainty that impacts negatively on 
industry risk assessments, whether undertaken by the content producing or 
content using industry. The specific impact on industry risk assessments on the 
part of the content producing industry can further be split into two categories. The 
first is that certainty in this context allows individual actors to contemplate the 
risks associated with particular, both new and old, forms of online dissemination of 
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works, to the extent that abuse and copyright infringement can be controlled at 
source. The second, if to a certain extent overlapping, category concerns the direct 
appraisal of outcomes of legal action against targeted OSPs – as useful in both an 
initial cost-benefit analysis as well as the fundamental importance to both pre-
action negotiation and settlement. Concerning the impact of the cited legal 
uncertainty on the OSP industry, it may be noted that to a certain extent it is 
analogous and partly the inverse to that of the content providing industry. Firstly, 
there are negative impacts on the development of nascent OSP services, 
embarking on the provision of which exposes OSPs to un-quantified legal risk in 
this respect, arguably chilling innovation, given the potentially fatal damages 
awards that affect not only particular business divisions but the entire 
undertaking.32 The second, again to a certain extent overlapping, category is the 
mirror image of the above mentioned content providing industry’s litigation 
related assessments. 
The second primary effect is of a systemic nature, and will be identified in the 
conclusion to the UK Part. It is that given the nature and scope of the problem, it 
raises constitutional concerns, despite factoring in case law driven aspects of the 
UK legal system. Given the crucial importance of the field of business that OSPs are 
in, in terms of future economic growth and technical as well as social 
infrastructure, 33 judicial flaying around is unforgivable as is the seemingly ad-hoc 
partial adoption of foreign legal concepts, descriptions and factors. 34   
It is clear that given the impact the state of the law is having on the market actors 
as well as not only users, but society at large, a legislative revision is called for. 
The above problems justify the reassessment of 3PCL in the UK, to a large part 
drawing on the experiences in the most important copyright jurisdiction in the 
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world, namely the USA, which has benefited from extensively developed case 
law.35   
 
4) Parts Outline, Sources and Limitations 
 
(a) Parts Outline 
 
UK copyright law is examined in Part 2, US copyright law in Part 3 and general 
conclusions but also specific 3PCL comparisons and reform proposals are 
presented in Part 4. 36 The parts very much build on each other. In terms of the first 
hypothesis, this is mainly concluded in Part 2, Chapter D(VII), but also, inherently, 
when concluding the second hypothesis in Part 4, ChapterD. 
Whereas both parts include 3PCL extrinsic/intrinsic analysis, Part 3 already 
includes comparisons,37 for the above referenced purposes, naturally excluding 
3PCL which is, given its importance, reserved for Part 4.38 This separation also 
allows for the clear inclusion of detailed proposals for reform.39 It will be observed 
that this thesis develops organically and is interwoven. The findings of the extrinsic 
and intrinsic analysis of UK copyright law validate and prompt both the analysis of 
US law, as well as the final comparative conclusions and proposals.  
 
(b) Sources & Limitations 
 
It remains to be added that the sources consulted are broad for each jurisdiction; 
they range from the leading specialist copyright practitioner works, focused 
industry specific works and articles to government and industry reports. In terms 
of limitations, it must be stated that the comparison of both jurisdictions inures to 
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the sole benefit of the establishment of 3PCL proposals for the UK and the 
examination and comparison of other aspects of the copyright systems exists to 
validate and support arguments concerning the requirement and formulation of 
such. Every effort has been made to keep the thesis up to date as of June 2011.  
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PART 2 – UNITED KINGDOM 
A. The System of Copyright Protection  
 
Copyright is an institution built on intellectual quicksand.40 
 
This Part will examine the current status of third-party OSP liability in the UK, 
taking into account not only legal aspects, but also relevant commercial and 
political considerations, as well as technological facets as they relate to and aid 
said examination. In doing so, a logical and cumulative approach is taken in 
carefully constructing awareness of the requisite problem areas. It follows that the 
reader will first briefly be guided through the spirit of copyright in the UK; this 
includes a familiarisation with relevant protectable categories as well as the 
requirements for bringing a work within one of these. This approach will then aid 
not only an understanding the following examination of the rights attached to the 
various categories of works in question, but is also imperative since it reflects the 
approach taken in litigation, as outlined below, and thus much more than 
incidentally ties in with the practical nature of this thesis.41 For the rights attached 
to certain categories influence the ways in which OSPs can be held liable for their 
acts or omissions in relation to the protected categories of works. 
 
I. Statutory Regime 
 
Under UK law, copyright is a creature of statute. Many UK lawyers, or those 
dealing with UK copyright law, reflect on the passing of the Statute of Anne in 1709 
with great pride, this having been the first CA in the world. This fondness was 
arguably however tempered briefly for approximately 5 years from 1769 with the 
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King’s Bench decision in Millar v Taylor,42 which held that a perpetual common law 
“copy-“ right coexisted with the Statute of Anne - until the House of Lords 
overturned said ruling in Donaldson v Beckett (1774),43 by expressly holding that 
copyright was the deliberate creation of the Statute of Anne and as such was 
henceforth exclusively defined as statutory property. The effect of Donaldson v 
Beckett was that common law copyright after the commencement of the Statute 
of Anne was annulled in all but unpublished works. The CA 1911 in turn abolished 
any common law copyright subsisting in unpublished works.44 This means that 
copyright at common law, as we would now refer to it, and as it had existed prior 
to said enactment, was finally laid to rest as such but simultaneously, seemingly 
already following a trend, resurrected in a much expanded form by repeat 
codification in 1911. At present, the governing statute is the Copyright Designs and 
Patents Act (CDPA 1988) which came into force on 01 August 1989. 
1) The Dominion of EU Law 
Copyright in the UK is also subject to EU law. A number of EU Directives which 
harmonise copyright laws  have a direct effect in the UK.45 This means that any 
citizen of a Member State of the European Union may sue that Member State 
before the national courts for non-compliance with an EU Directive. The UK is 
required to be compliant with any and all EU Directives, usually by the dates set 
forth in the Directives themselves. This means that the UK must implement these 
Directives into national law in a manner deemed appropriately compliant. The 
European Commission or other Member States also have the option to sue or take 
action a Member State for non-implementation. Normally in the UK EU Directives 
are transposed into national law by statutory instruments (SIs). It should perhaps 
also be noted that to date there is only one Council Regulation which has 
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implications for copyright law.46 Council Regulations do not have direct effect in 
the UK, or indeed any other Member State. Furthermore, the Treaty of Rome 
contains several provisions relating to the free movement of goods, agreements 
which restrict or prevent or distort competition, and the abuse of a dominant 
position by undertakings in a particular market which have effect on copyright law 
in the UK.47 
2) Relevant International Law 
Copyright in the UK is to certain extent regulated by international agreements 
which the UK has entered into and implemented, which aim to ensure cooperation 
and legal uniformity between the signatory states. There are three primary 
international agreements namely the Berne, Universal Copyright Convention48 and 
TRIPS. These agreements have been subject to a number of amendments over the 
years. For example, Berne was last revised as specified in the Paris Act of 1971. 
Naturally, it will be remembered that the WIPO Treaties of 1996, which the UK is a 
signatory to, also modify Berne.49 The UK is also a member of several other 
important international copyright conventions and agreements, which there is 
however no need to delve into.50 
Copyright has been admirably described in preparation for CDPA's predecessor, 
the 1956 CA, by the Gregory Committee on Copyright Law in 1952 as being; 
[A] right given to or derived from works, and is not a right in the novelty of ideas. It 
is based on the rights of an author, artist or composer to prevent another person 
copying an original work. There is nothing in the notion of copyright to prevent 
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another person from producing an identical result (and himself enjoying a 
copyright in that work) provided it is arrived at by an independent process.51 
The Whitford Committee artfully stipulated that: 
A writer writes an article about the making of bread. He puts words on paper. He is 
not entitled to a monopoly in the writing of articles about the making of bread, but 
the law has long recognised that he has an interest not merely in the manuscript, 
the words on paper which he produces, but in the skill and labour involved in the 
choice of words and the exact way in which he expresses his ideas by the words he 
chooses. If the author sells copies of his article then again a purchaser of a copy 
can make such personal use of that copy as he pleases. He can read it or sell it 
second hand, if you can find anyone who will buy it. If a reader of the original 
article is stimulated into writing another article about bread the original author has 
no reason to complain. It has long been recognised that only the original author 
ought to have the right to reproduce the original article and sell the copies thus 
reproduced. If other people were free to do this they would be making a profit out 
of the skill and labour of the original author. It is for this reason that the law has 
long given to authors, for a specified time, certain exclusive rights in relation to so-
called literary works. Such rights were recognised at common law at least as early 
as the fifteenth century.52  
What the Committee made clear is that copyright attaches only to expressions and 
“not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation on mathematical concept of 
such.”53 
The nature of this property right is such that it is exclusive and allows the owner of 
said right to take certain actions as regards his right. More specifically s.2(1) CDPA 
stipulates that the benefits of being  an owner of copyright are that one has the 
exclusive right to perform respective restricted acts. 
Yet before examining the acts which are restricted i.e. the acts specified in Chapter 
2 CDPA 1988, as dealt with below, it is worth defining copyright more narrowly. It 
has already been noted that copyright is a property right; this holds true for all 
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copyright works, of which there are several different kinds. Works in which 
copyright may subsist include original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, 
sound recordings, films or broadcasts and the typographical arrangement of 
published editions.54  It however bears repeating that this thesis will only look at 
those categories and rights relevant to phonographic or cinematographic works. 
It must also be borne in mind that the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 
1996 give a person publishing55 for the first time, a previously unpublished work, 
after the expiry of copyright protection, a property right known as a Publication 
Right. Said Publication Right is, according to the regulations, equivalent to 
copyright. The publication right expires at the end of the period of 25 years from 
the end of the calendar year in which the work was first published and the 
publication right attaches to literary, dramatic, musical, artistic works or films.56 
Having briefly highlighted which general categories of subject matter are capable 
of harbouring a copyright work under CDPA 1988 and the Copyright and Related 
Rights Regulations 1996, it is now worth delving into the subject matter of 
protection in more detail. This examination will include other requirements for 
copyright protection where relevant; namely the fixation, originality and qualifying 
conditions.  
 
3) A Compact Taxonomy of Works in the UK 
 
The scope of copyright has steadily grown in terms of new categories in tandem 
with technological advances and the endeavour to safeguard such.  
 
                                                          
54
 These are the categories in CDPA 1988 s.1 (1). 
55
 Publication is defined in the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2967) 
S.16 (2) as being; (a) the issue of copies to the public; (b) making the work available by means 
of an electronic retrieval system; (c) the rental or lending of copies of the work to the public; 
(d) the performance, exhibition or showing of the work in public; or (e) broadcasting the 
work or including it in a cable programme service. 
56
 Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2967) S.16 (6) and (7) 
34 
 
1) Literary works 
 
Literary works are described in s.3(1) CDPA 1988 in inclusive terms as being any 
work that is not a dramatic or musical work, which is written, spoken or sung. This 
category specifically includes tables, compilations, databases, computer programs 
and preparatory design material.57 
 
2) Dramatic Works 
 
The CDPA 1988 does not define dramatic works beyond the definition in s.3(1), 
namely that the category "dramatic work" includes a work of dance or mime.  
A literary work cannot be a dramatic work or vice versa. A cinematographic work 
can be classified as a dramatic work. A dramatic work can be distilled down to a 
work that must include action of some sort, which may or may not be 
accompanied words or music.58   
 
3) Musical Works 
 
The statutory definition of musical works started with s.3(1)(d) CDPA 1988 and is 
limited to music without words or action that would accompany it by being sung, 
spoken or performed. 
 
In Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd, Patten J noted that the CDPA 1988 does not 
define music in the definition of a musical work.59  
Whilst the words which are sung in a musical piece did not form part of said piece 
in Hayes v Phonogram Ltd, Blackburne J cited  Baker J in Williamson Music Ltd v 
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The Pearson Partnership Ltd;60 ‘the human voice can constitute a part of the 
overall orchestration of a musical work, much like a musical instrument in a band 
or an orchestra.’ 61 
 
i) Fixation of Literary, Dramatic and Musical Works 
 
In order for copyright to subsist in a literary, dramatic and musical work, it must 
take material form. This provides proof of the existence of the work. It is irrelevant 
by whom62  and how the work is fixed, beyond the requirement noted above, that 
a literary work must be written, spoken or sung. 63  Fixation inherently also defines 
the moment at which a work will enter the public domain. 
 
The ‘Assumption’ of Fixation: Sound Recordings, Films and Broadcasts 
 
The CDPA 1988 does not specify any requirement of fixation for the categories of 
sound recordings, films and broadcasts; these categories imply an element of 
material fixation.  
 
ii) Originality Requirement for Literary, Dramatic and Musical Works 
 
The CA 1911 first introduced a statutory requirement of a modicum of originality. 
Prior to this, it was held in Walter v Lane, 64 decided under the Literary Copyright 
Act 1842, that a very low level of originality was required. It was held in Express 
Newspapers Plc v News (U.K.) Ltd,65 by Browne-Wilkinson V.-C., that even under 
the CA 1911 Walter v Lane might have remained good law. 
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It is well known that copyright can only subsist in the expression of an idea and not 
the idea itself - “idea/expression dichotomy”. As such, the requirement of 
originality will only relate to the expression of the idea/thought and not the 
thought itself, as held in University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press 
Ltd.66 
Two requirements 
Under UK law there are two aspects to the originality requirement; (1)the work 
must originate from the author directly; meaning that the work for which 
authorship and thus originality is claimed must not be copied from elsewhere,67 
and;(2) more than negligible effort and skill must have been expended in the 
creation of the work.68 Thus, there is no precise measure as to what labour skill or 
judgement might be required.69 
There is currently no requirement for originality for sound recordings, films and 
broadcasts, because they usually contain other works. 
 
Berne Convention 
 
In international law, under the Berne there is no requirement for originality per se. 
Rather, it is implied - as a result of an author's own intellectual efforts, and only in 
that sense original to that person. The Berne members have applied this standard 
in different ways. Most notably in the US, in Feist Publications Inc v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co, it has been held that to be worthy of protection an author's 
work must have an element of creativity to be original.70 This arguably ensures that 
only the expression and not the idea is protected.71  
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EC Law 
 
Until recently, the harmonisation of national copyright laws in the European 
Community has been driven by two Directives; the software72 and database73 
Directives. Both emphasise the necessity that the work is the author's own 
intellectual creation in relation to the originality requirement. The CDPA 1988 was 
not amended to reflect this requirement, except concerning databases.74 The 
recent CJEU case Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, (as well 
as the reference) 75 adopt the Berne standard of originality, namely “the author’s 
own intellectual creation”. The CJ’s judgment can be said to be an additional 
definition under UK law, one that is given substance through a compatible body of 
centuries old well developed ratios.  
 
4) Sound Recordings 
 
Sound recordings76 may be recordings of any sound, and often distinct from the 
copyright in any compositions (most likely protected as literary, dramatic or 
musical works) that are the subject of the sound recording. The definition in the 
CDPA 1988 is a technology neutral definition, and contrary to previous Copyright 
Acts "recording" is also not defined. The precise meaning of “sound recordings” is 
explained in s.5A77 and is straightforward.78  
 
Film Soundtracks 
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Film soundtracks are included in the definition of recordings. 79 
 
5) Films 
 
S.5B CDPA 1988 defines films as ‘a recording on any medium from which a moving 
image may by any means be produced’.  
 
6) Broadcasts 
 
The protected category of ‘broadcasts’ is, in the interests of convenience and logic, 
examined in depth below.80 
 
4) Formalities/Registration 
Following the Copyright Amendment Act 1842 works generally no longer had to be 
registered before publication, as originally required by CA 1709 (Statute of Anne).81 
Reference is made to Part 3 and issues with copyright registration in the US, which 
allows the right holders certain benefits in litigation both procedurally regarding 
proof and concerning the types of damages available.82 
 
5) Term of Copyright 
 
Once a work has been created, and the species of work has been determined, the 
date of creation/first exploitation or death of the author will have to be identified. 
The exact date will be important due to the fact that successive Acts have changed 
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the statutory periods of protection, yet they have generally not done so 
retrospectively. Generally, the periods of protection have been extended. 83 Most 
Copyright Acts until recently repealed their predecessor acts, leaving only 
transitional provisions. However, the Duration Time Directive meant that the 
Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995 (the Duration 
Regulations) which took effect from January 1, 1996 require the author or other 
such interested parties to examine not only the traditional transitional provisions 
of the CDPA 1988 but also the effect the duration regulations have had. 
For the purposes of this thesis only two time periods will be of particular relevance 
given the limitation to online infringement. The first time period begins on or after 
1 August 1989 but before 1 January 1996. For this period the relevant provisions in 
the CDPA 1988 as amended, will be relevant as well as the CDPA 1988 as originally 
enacted and transitional provisions contained in regulations 12 to 16 the Duration 
Regulations. The second period of relevance will be works that have been created 
on or after 1 January 1996 for which, fortunately, only the CDPA 1988 as amended 
need be considered. 
 
a) CDPA 1988 as originally enacted 
 
The CDPA 1988 as originally enacted provided for all literary, dramatic, musical and 
artistic works a period of protection lasting until the end of the period of 50 years 
from the end of the calendar year in which the author died, and for sound 
recordings, films, broadcast and cable programs a period of protection last until 
the end of the period of 50 years from the making of such work. 
 
b) The Term Directive/Duration Regulations 
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Sections 12-15 CDPA 1988 were amended concerning works published after 1 
January 1996. The Directive extended the period of copyright protection to a 
period of 70 years after the death of the author, and harmonised the method of 
calculation of the period of protection. It also afforded protection for works of 
non-Community nationals.84 The Duration Regulations also had retrospective 
effect for three categories of works that were existing/made before 1 January 
1996 namely to existing works, yet these are of marginal relevance to this thesis.85 
 
c) Sound Recordings 
 
i) Sound recordings made on or after 1 August 1989  
 
Copyright subsists in sound recordings made after commencement of the Duration 
Regulations on 1 January 1996 as well as retrospectively back until 1 August 1989, 
in accordance with s.13A(2)(a) CDPA 1988, until the end of the period of 50 years 
from the end of the calendar year in which the recording was made, or in 
accordance with s.13A(2)(b) CDPA 1988, copyright will last 50 years from the end 
of the calendar year in which it was released. 
 
d) Films 
 
i) Films made on or after 1 January 1996 
 
Films made on or after 1 January 1996 receive extended protection by the 
Duration Regulations, compared to the original position in the CDPA 1988. The 
copyright in these films is 70 years from the end of the calendar year in which the 
last of the number of designated persons died.86   Should there be no one falling 
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within these categories, the period of protection is fixed at 50 years from the end 
of the year in which it was made.87  
ii) Films made on or after 1 August 1989 but before 1 January 1996 
 
Under the old regime in the CDPA a film falling into the above time period would 
qualify for a period of protection of 50 years from the end of the year in which it 
was made,88 and if released during that time for a further 50 years from the end of 
the year in which it was released.89 This is of course subject to Duration 
Regulations Reg.15.(1) that, as noted above, copyright in an existing copyright 
work shall continue to subsist until the date on which it would have expired under 
the 1988 provisions if that date is later than the date on which copyright would 
expire under the new provisions.90 
 
e) Broadcasts 
 
Broadcasts are the only category of works for which the Duration Regulations did 
not require an altered re-enactment of relevant provisions in the CDPA 1988. The 
position is that currently copyright in the broadcast will cease to subsist at the end 
of the period of 50 years from the end of the calendar year in which the broadcast 
was made.  
 
f) Other aspects (limitations) 
 
The above categories are those which are relevant to this thesis. There are of 
course other regulations concerning other categories. These are however beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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6) Conclusion 
In terms of ground work, an essential taxonomy of works in the UK has been 
undertaken, which assists the thorough and logical ‘building block’ approach of this 
thesis; ultimately allowing for a more precise understanding of OSP liability. 
In terms of the wider context of this thesis, namely in particular the opposing 
industry interests identified and discussed in Part 1, it can be summarised that the 
categories of works which attract protection has multiplied in tandem with 
technological advances and that two views may be taken of this. The first view, as 
noted above, is that a precise statutory delineation of categories of works leads to 
targeted protection and legal certainty. The converse view is that a steady 
automation has been set in motion, leading to the arguably unquestioning 
categorisation and thus subsequent protection of new forms of subject matter. 
This view is compounded by the structure of the current legislation; such 
categorisation inherently lead to restricted acts being applied, whereas they do 
not automatically prompt a sufficient simultaneous consideration of exceptions or 
limitations.91 Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider theories of 
justification, at this juncture, these inevitably impact on both views.92  
 
B. Primary Copyright Infringement 
 
Having looked at the requirements of protection of relevant categories of works it 
now behoves to study exactly what this protection entails. Copyright has been 
classified as a statutory property right.93 As such it is an economic good that is 
licensable or assignable. Many commentators have however questioned this 
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classification, preferring other less "powerful" definitions.94 These criticisms have 
become more frequent and the critics of this classification more vocal, as society, 
due to technological advances, increasingly resembles that of an Information 
Society where information which is often copyrighted and accessed or 
handled/copied via digital means is increasingly becoming central to many aspects 
of private as well as commercial life. In fact, how copyright is classified will have a 
bearing on how it is looked upon and dealt with by legislators. It is for this reason 
that the classification of copyright as a property right is a main point of contention 
in what have been termed the "copyright wars" between competing industry 
interests, as referred to in the preceding Part. 
This Chapter will first delineate primary, secondary and third-party copyright 
liability, before discussing in detail the most relevant rights pertaining to 
infringement in OSP contexts; namely the communication to the public, making 
available and the reproduction rights.  
 
I. Delineation & Meaning of Restricted Acts 
 
A statutory property right in the form of copyright allows the owner of said to do 
various "restricted acts" concerning the protected work. It follows that others are 
generally not entitled to do such “restricted acts”. Should unauthorised persons 
however engage in such they will become liable for infringement of copyright. 
Before precisely delineating the meaning of infringement of copyright, it is 
important to note the procedure that is followed before such an action can be 
filed.  
It will firstly have to be determined whether the work falls into one of the 
categories of work in which copyright subsists. These categories have been studied 
and defined above in detail. The second criterion is whether the term of the 
copyrighted work is still ongoing. This has also been discussed, with reference to 
the relevant categories of works, in detail above. The third step will require an 
examination of whether; 
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1)  a restricted act has been committed with or without the authorisation of the 
owner of the copyright and/or 
2) an act of secondary copyright infringement has been committed with "guilty" 
knowledge. 
It should be noted in relation to the two categories above that the first concerns 
itself exclusively with the "restricted acts" and thus pertains to copyright in the 
"traditional" sense and thus primarily to primary infringement which under UK law 
includes what might in other jurisdictions, most notably the US, be called 
“secondary infringement”. The second category, however, does not concern itself 
with incursions into a copyright holder’s sphere of rights per se, in the sense that 
such acts of infringement arguably do not touch upon any of the copyright holders 
exclusive property rights. It has been suggested by some commentators that in this 
respect the second category of infringement could be said to constitute additional 
rights of the copyright owner.95 Additional, in this sense would mean additional to 
s.16 CDPA 1988, instead of merely pointing to s.96 CDPA 1988, which deals with 
the copyright owner's right to bring an action for infringement. It would indeed 
seem that, whether additional not, these rights are assignable. When assigned 
with a clause that gives the licensee the right to "to exercise any right which could 
be exercised by the copyright owner" these include the rights specified in ss. 22-26 
CDPA 1988.96  
Having noted the two categories of infringement, as specified in the CDPA 1988, it 
is now worth turning to the content i.e. the prohibited acts pertaining to these 
categories. Broadly, the rights of copyright holders can be split into "reproduction" 
and "performing" rights. The restricted acts can be said to be drawn from two 
areas of law, the first domestic and second international.97 The definition in s.16(1) 
CDPA 1988 includes the exclusive right to do the following; 
(a) copy the work (see section 17) ("the reproduction right"98); 
(b)  issue copies of the work to the public (section 18) ("the distribution right"); 
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(ba)  rent or lend the work to the public (section 18A) ("the rental and lending 
rights"); 
(c) perform, show or play the work in public (section 19) ("the public performance 
right"); 
(d) communicate the work to the public (section 20) ("the communication to the 
public right"); and 
(e) make an adaptation of the work or do any of the above in relation to an 
adaptation (section 21) ("the adaptation right"). 
In relation to the above it will of course be relevant that these are statutory rights 
giving rise to strict liability and therefore actionable without actual damage.99 
 
 
II. The Communication to the Public Right 
 
Within the category of primary copyright infringement, communication to the 
public is the most important category, since given its nature it has the utmost 
potential to apply in OSP related contexts. In examining the rights falling into this 
category, the legislative background is analysed, placing the current status quo 
into perspective and allowing a detailed analysis of the constituent elements of the 
umbrella term “communication to the public”; meaning broadcasting, making 
available and other communication to the public. Such detailed analysis includes, 
concerning broadcasting, analysing a shift by means of examining the previous 
cable programme right, and concerning making available, placing the right in 
context by means of jurisprudential consideration. Thereafter, having discussed 
the rights in detail, important uncertainties which potentially lead to increased 
OSP liability, are identified and discussed. Lastly, a conclusion provides a concise 
analysis of the state of the law as discussed, in particular as it concerns OSPs. 
 
                                                          
99
 CDPA 1988,s.16(2);older case law:Weatherby & Sons v International Horse Agency and 
Exchange Ltd [1910]2Ch.297,305. 
46 
 
1) Background 
 
In order to appreciate the complexity and problems that have been identified in 
this area it is worth briefly examining the relevant technological and legislative 
history is in this area, taking a chronological approach. 
 
a) The ‘old’ UK regime 
 
The most logical place to begin such an overview from a UK perspective is the old 
regime. The CA 1956 introduced the right to broadcast works to the public via a 
wireless service, which was later accompanied by the right of transmitting works to 
the public by cable services following the CBA 1984.100 This meant that broadcasts 
and cable programmes were defined and protected intrinsically as works, separate 
as such, from a performance right. Similar protection was initially afforded by the 
CDPA 1988 in that both categories were restricted acts. The element at the centre 
of the cable programme right, namely the “cable programme service” was defined 
as the transmitting of visual images, sounds or other information via a 
telecommunications system. The significance of this will be explored below, yet it 
may be noted here that it is thought that it also applied in Internet contexts.  
 
b) International Treaties (1996) 
 
The 1996 WIPO Treaties, namely the WCT and WPPT, can be said to be responses 
to the advent of the Internet, supplementing protection afforded by the Berne and 
the Rome Convention in this regard.  
Berne provided, concerning literary and dramatic, works for the right of 
authorising broadcasting and the communication to the public by wire and 
wireless means of such. The right afforded to dramatic, dramatico-musical and 
musical works merely pertained to the authorisation of communication to the 
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public in relation to the performance of such.101 The Rome Convention concerning 
remuneration for phonogram producers provided a restricted form regarding 
broadcasting and communication to the public of commercially published 
phonograms, leaving out such a right for general broadcasting or communication 
to the public altogether.102 
Art.8 WCT expanded protection for literary and artistic works by creating the right 
of communication to the public by wire or wireless means which includes the right 
of making available works to the public so that such may be accessed from a place 
and at a time chosen by individual members of the public. This subpart of “making 
available” has been termed by commentators an “on demand availability right” 
and was the most direct response of its kind to the internet related developments. 
Arts.14 and 15 of the WPPT expanded of the right of remuneration for phonogram 
producers to include in particular a right concerning the making available of 
recordings via an on demand service, to match the new WCT provisions. Whilst a 
general communication to the public right is however absent, a limited version was 
provided for television broadcasts.103 
 
c) EC Response (2001) 
 
One of the objectives of the EUCD was to give effect to the 1996 Treaties identified 
above,104 yet only to mention this aim would do the history leading up to the 
adoption a disservice: There were several milestones in the development of the 
Directive dating back to the mid 1990s, the very early days of the public 
commercial internet. The ‘harmonisation’ process was initiated by the 
Commission’s Green Paper of 1995 on Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society.105 This was followed by the introduction of an initial Proposal 
                                                          
101
 Berne;Art.11bis. 
102
 Rome Convention;Art.12. 
103
 WPPT;Art.13. 
104
 Copinger,(n91),7-118. 
105
 European Commission, Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, Brussels, 
19.07.1995, COM(95)382 final. 
48 
 
for the EUCD in 1997 as subsequently amended in 1999. Following the Common 
Position in 2000, the EUCD was finally adopted in 2001.106 
It will thus be clear that, as the later Implementation Report aptly acknowledges,   
the thinking behind the Directive originated in the early to mid 1990s. 107 As a 
result, it was designed as a counter-measure against the legal challenges posed by 
the “information society” at the time. It is almost trite to mention that the Internet 
has evolved into something very different than could have been imagined. The 
report thus acknowledges that  “the roll-out of such online content services as 
iTunes, and the rapid deployment of Digital Rights Management systems that 
existed largely in theory when the Directive was adopted, has resulted in a real 
rapidly growing and vibrant marketplace digital content services in Europe and 
elsewhere.”108 
Art.3(1) EUCD requires a general communication to the public right by wire or 
wireless means, which corresponds to broadcasting, and the right to make a work 
available to the public by wire or wireless means so that the work may be accessed 
by members of the public at a place and time of their own choosing.109 
The scope of this right has recently been delineated by two judgments. It may be 
stated that this right is broad. In Football Association Premier League Limited v QC 
Leisure (F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure),110 as discussed in depth below, the Court of Justice 
has stated that “Communication to the public” within the meaning of Art.3(1) of 
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Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as covering transmission of … broadcast 
works, via a television screen and speakers, to the customers present in a public 
house". The very same court had also determined in the earlier case Sociedad 
General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SL (SGAE v Rafael 
Hoteles)111 that "the distribution of a signal by means of television sets by a hotel 
to customers staying in its rooms, whatever technique is used to transmit the 
signal, constitutes communication to the public within the meaning of Art.3(1) of 
that Directive" – the court moreover deemed it irrelevant that communication to 
the public was occurring in hotel bedrooms.112 Both of these decisions flavour the 
discourse in the current section in terms of the perspective the CJEU takes. 
 
d) The Current Status Quo 
 
The UK communication to the public right was introduced pursuant to the EUCD, 
as explained above, in s.20 CDPA 1988, effective since 31 October 2003. The new 
right replaced the previous broadcasting and cable programme rights. It 
specifically includes/identifies two representative parts; a part incorporating 
reformulated versions of the previous rights,113 and a new “on demand”/making 
available right which relates to the Internet.114 It is the latter half of the 
communication to the public right, or aspects thereof, which are of particular 
interest to this thesis given its applicability in OSP contexts. Previous and current 
demarcation concerning broadcasting is however also pertinent, as revealed 
below.  
It is at this stage already very important to reiterate that the communication to the 
public right, despite including broadcasting and making available, also includes any 
other act which satisfies the conditions for being a communication to the public by 
electronic means. 
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The communication to the public right relates to all categories of works, except 
typographical arrangements of published editions. 
S.20 CDPA 1988 implements Art.3 EUCD and thus correspondingly was revised and 
substituted by SI 2003/2498, the implementing legislation. Art.3 EUCD was largely 
mirrored in its implementation, with the slight variance of referring to ‘by wire or 
wireless means’ instead of ‘by electronic transmission’ as in s.20 CDPA 1988, also 
including ‘by cable or satellite’ in its definition for broadcasts. This does not have 
an operational effect. 
 The EUCD Article is arguably ‘cleaner’ in the respect that it includes the statement 
that exhaustion will not occur by any act of communication to the public for 
making available to the public. However, Art.3 includes references to not only the 
right of communication to the public of works, but also the right of making 
available to the public of other subject matter. It will be recognised that reference 
to ‘making available to the public’ in the Title could thus confusingly be said to be a 
broader category, were it not for its use in Art.3(1) where it is defined as being a 
subset of communication to the public. Moreover, Art.3(2) refers to only  the right 
of making available in delineating the applicable categories of works.  
Having examined the background to the communication to the public right, its 
‘tripartite’ nature may now be analysed; looking at broadcasting, making available 
and communications to the public not falling into these two categories. Thereafter 
it will be explained why there is currently uncertainty as to the scope of the right in 
particular in the European context. 
 
2) The Broadcasting Right 
 
In relation to broadcasting, the current right is delineated, aspects of infringement 
explained and, lastly, the right is contrasted by reference to important aspects of 
the previous cable programme right. 
 
a) The Exclusive Right 
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As mentioned above, within the framework of the communication to the public 
right, broadcasts are specifically protected subject matter,115and care must be 
taken to separate such subject matter116 from the restricted act of broadcasting. 
The current definition of ‘broadcast’ is an electronic transmission of visual images, 
sounds or other information which is transmitted for simultaneous reception by 
members of the public and is capable of being lawfully received by them, or, is 
transmitted at a time determined solely by the person making the transmission for 
presentation to members of the public.117 Excluded from this definition specifically 
are any Internet transmissions unless these are simultaneously on the Internet and 
by other means, concurrent transmission of a live event or transmissions of 
recorded moving images/sounds being part of a programme service offered by the 
broadcaster at scheduled times.  
In respect of the above, this definition incorporates to a certain extent the 
previous definition of broadcasting by wireless telegraphy as well as the previous 
cable program service. The narrowly defined inclusion of specific Internet 
broadcasts, commonly defined as “streaming”, is a logical technological expansion 
of the classic definition of a broadcast by wireless means, such being close to the 
original subject matter in format. Moreover, it is exclusively the 
transmission/signal that is being protected. 
 
b) Infringement 
 
Definition of ‘Broadcaster’ 
Commentators have asserted that the definition of ‘broadcaster’, or the person 
potentially infringing the broadcast right, is not as clear as it should be.118 The 
current definition includes; persons transmitting the programme where such have 
any responsibility for its contents and, persons providing the programme which 
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had made arrangements with persons transmitting it as necessary for such.119 This 
is in contrast to the previous definition under the CDPA 1988 as originally enacted, 
which included persons; making the broadcast, broadcasting a work , including a 
work in a broadcast, where such had responsibility concerning any of its contents. 
Moreover, where other persons provided any elements of the programme and 
made arrangements required for transmission with another transmitting it, such a 
person was also included under the definition of broadcaster. 
References to persons “making” a broadcast or transmission have been dropped, 
which can be said to relate to the author of such. Currently therefore, it is possible 
that persons operating transmission equipment and those responsible for 
processing the programme into transmissions are covered, whereas those purely 
responsible for creating the programme content are not.120 In commenting it must 
however be remembered that the current definition of a broadcast includes both 
wireless and cable transmissions, unlike the previous definition, which was aimed 
at wireless broadcasts by telegraphy. 
Place Occurring 
In defining the place occurring, broadcasts may be split into wireless and the cable. 
Wireless broadcasts are currently made from the place where the programme 
carrying signals are processed into an uninterrupted chain of communication as 
long as such is under the control and responsibility of the person making the 
broadcast.121 This can be stated to be an “emissions” definition, which is a relevant 
since a broadcaster may incur liability for broadcasts originating in the UK, 
irrespective of whether the communication is actually receivable in a particular 
territory.  
Broadcasts by cable are not defined in this respect in the CDPA nor in EU 
legislation. It is therefore possible that the emissions theory and/or reception 
theory would be operable. 
                                                          
119
 CDPA 1988;s.6(3). 
120
 Exception;s.6A(3)(a) on satellite broadcasts. 
121
 CDPA 1988;s.6(4). 
53 
 
It remains to be added that rebroadcasting, meaning the relaying and 
retransmission of a broadcast is a separate act of broadcasting.122 
Given that the new definition of broadcasting incorporates the previous cable 
programme right, as mentioned, it is worth examining the latter. 
 
c) The Previous Cable Programme Right 
 
Previously Internet transmissions were capable of falling within the remit of the 
definition of cable programmes, and were thus protected under this category. The 
previous pre 2003 definition in CDPA 1988 s.20(c), somewhat circularly, defined 
infringement by broadcasting as broadcasting of a work or its inclusion in a cable 
programme service due to the copyright in either  a literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work, a sound recording or film, or a broadcast or cable programme. This 
meant that the content of the cable programme need not necessarily be protected 
by copyright for the cable programme right to apply. It is worth in this regard, 
referencing two cases to analyse the previous cable programme right. 
The first is Shetland Times v Dr Jonathan Wills123 which, as the name suggests, 
concerned the newspaper called “The Shetland Times” and a news reporting 
service trading under the name “The Shetland News”. The newspaper claimant 
brought suit against the news reporting service defendant claiming not only 
infringement of its reproduction right in newspaper headings, but also 
infringement of its cable programme right. It is worth mentioning in this regard, 
that firstly, the case being decided in 1997, reference was made to the CDPA 1988 
prior to the 2003 implementing amendments for the EUCD which, as mentioned 
above, amended the cable programme right. Secondly, Shetland Times was heard 
in the Court of Session’s Outer House. Lastly, Shetland Times concerned only an 
interim order and was thus not argued fully. 
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It was held124 that the defendants had infringed s.20 of the CDPA by incorporating 
on their website headlines taken from the plaintiff’s website. The plaintiff’s 
headlines were classified as cable programs made available on the plaintiff’s 
website within the meaning of s.7 CDPA 1988 and the defendants website 
operated as a cable programme service also with the meaning of s.7, with the 
inclusion of the requisite headlines constituting infringement under s.20 CDPA 
1988.125 
This approach was followed in Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd v 
Easyinternetcafe Ltd126 which concerned CDR burning facilities provided by 
Internet cafes at which customers downloaded materials onto private directories 
which then accessed by request and with consent by staff on hand for the 
purposes of burning the contents onto CDs. The claimants in this respect brought 
an action for a declaration that the service offered by the defendants in eight 
Internet cafes was unlawful since the defendants did not have licences to burn the 
claimants works onto CDs. The defendants argued that, despite admitting that the 
customers would be liable for infringement for unlicensed downloads of the 
claimants works, they themselves were not liable because a) the copying was 
involuntary and b) the act complained of constituted the making of a recording for 
private and domestic use of a “broadcast or cable program” for viewing or listening 
at a more convenient time, as permitted under the CDPA 1988 s.70 at that time.127 
With the remake, s.70 has since contracted with the reformation of the cable 
programme right. 
The above mentioned fact that Internet transmissions were once classified as cable 
programs and that such could be exempted for private and domestic use in certain 
circumstances is a very important and noteworthy fact for this thesis. This is 
because, as the Easyinternetcafe decision highlights, service providers and most 
likely also ISPs/OSPs would greatly benefit from the operation of such an exception 
since this would prevent 3PCL on their behalf. In this regard the content providing 
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industry has greatly benefited from the reformation of the cable programme right 
in this regard. 
In asking whether the previous model of classifying Internet transmissions 
including any private use exception should be a model that ought to be 
reconsidered, the judge’s analysis in Easyinternetcafe must be critically examined. 
In approaching the facts the judge in question decided to first determine whether 
the use had been private and domestic before considering whether or not the 
Internet was a cable program the purposes of the then s.70 CDPA 1988.128 In 
stating that it was impossible for the defendant to make out a defence in this case 
in this regard, the judge highlighted that despite the burden of establishing copies 
for private for domestic use falling on the defendant, said had not produced any 
evidence to support such a supposition. Moreover, the actions of the defendants 
in the copying exercise for commercial gain were deemed to be “fatal to this 
defence”. The judge stated: 
 The copying is done by the defendant and the defendant is not copying it for the 
purpose of private and domestic use. It is copying for purposes of selling the 
complete CDR for five pounds. ... It does not seem to me to be relevant that the 
person for whom it is copied is going to use it for private and domestic use. If one 
pursued that to logical conclusions that would mean that any material on the 
Internet can be downloaded by a commercial organisation and that organisation 
could sell that download material to a customer, provided the customer asserted 
that it was for his own private and domestic use. That, to my mind, is not the 
mischief intended to be covered by the section.129  
The judge thus emphasised the fact that in his opinion, the section was aimed to 
cover individuals who themselves make copies for private use.130 
Having rejected the private use exception to the cable programme right, the judge 
stated it was unnecessary to rule on whether the Internet is a cable program the 
purposes of s.70 CDPA 1988. He did however cite with approval the decision in 
Shetland Times and expressly stated in obiter that ‘therefore if this question had 
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arisen I would have concluded that the transmission of the material via the 
Internet would be a cable programme service within s.70 CDPA 1988’.131 
An important criticism of the Easyinternetcafe decision was penned by Kevin 
Garnett. Garnett first notes the similarity between the CDR service and a copy 
shop making photocopies at the request of the customer, where knowledge of 
what is being copied and for which purpose is irrelevant, given the strict liability 
nature of the tort in section 17(1) CDPA 1988 “copying of the work is an act 
restricted by the copyright” in the work. Garnet submits that by branding receivers 
of faxed information or Internet service providers as involuntary copiers the judge 
in Easyinternetcafe erred. Garnett notes that in both these cases the recipient is 
not a copier in any sense. “The copier is the person who is the proximate cause of 
the copy being made, which in its each case is the sender.”132 
Importantly for this thesis, Garnett sheds some light on how s.70 CDPA 1988 came 
to life. He notes that some of the reasons why the section causes difficulties133 is 
because it was introduced as an “afterthought” in a late stage in the Parliamentary 
procedure, thereby arguably not receiving the scrutiny it perhaps should have 
been entitled to. In terms of the spirit behind the section this is stipulated as being 
a legitimisation of the widespread domestic practice of the taping of television 
programmes for timeshifting (off air recording). Interestingly Garnett notes that 
the CA 1956 exempted the making for private purposes a recording of a broadcast 
or cable programs, yet this exemption did not extend to the recording of copyright 
works included in such transmissions. Moreover, Garnett notes that “the 
government chose, however, not to grapple with the equally widespread and 
unlawful practice of “home taping”.  
Thus Garnett agrees with the judge in Easyinternetcafe that it was not the 
intention of Parliament to introduce the wide exception argued for by the 
defendant, instead the widespread practice of off air recording was intended to be 
legitimised. At the same time the government also aimed to ensure compliance 
with the Berne three-step test, with a narrow exception. Concerning the issue of 
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the judge’s acceptance of the proposition that a neighbour copying for another 
neighbour would fall within this exception, Garnett advocates that the exception 
should have applied exclusively to the person for whom the copy is made, since a 
distinction on monetary terms was not supported by the section in question. 
 
3) The Making Available Right 
 
The specified subset of “making available” is examined in this section by first 
defining the right, then delineating its scope and lastly, placing the right into 
context by examining one of the most important recent UK cases. 
 
a) Definition 
 
The second specified restricted act mentioned in the communication to the public 
right, is making available a work to the public by electronic transmission, in such a 
way that members of the public may access it from a place and time individually 
chosen by them.134 This has commonly been termed an “on demand right” by 
commentators. The corresponding sections of the EUCD are Arts.3.2,3.3, which 
follow Art.8 WCT and Arts.10,14 WPPT. Such an electronic transmission may be by 
wire or wireless means. The difference between the above discussed broadcasting 
and the instant making available right is that the former only relates to 
transmissions at predetermined times for simultaneous reception by the public, 
whereas the latter may be accessed by a single members of the public that 
commence, or some commentators would say, access, the transmission at a time 
and place of their choosing.135  
 
b) Scope 
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Unlike in the preceding section concerning broadcasting, “making available” is not 
further defined in any relevant legislation. However, it is clear that the joint 
elements of electronic transmission and access to the public are partly aimed at 
OSPs. Commentators have argued that persons making available works to OSPs so 
that these may in turn make them available to the public, have thereby not 
themselves made the relevant work available to the public.136 Liability by such 
providers of material to OSPs is not in doubt since even where these persons 
would not be liable for “making available”, authorisation or joint tortfeasorship 
might be established as examined in the next chapter below. It may however be 
stated that in circumstances where an uploader uses peer-to-peer software and 
places files in a “shared folder” such will amount to making these available as in 
Polydor Ltd v Brown.137 In the context of this thesis it may therefore be noted that 
an OSP must make files posted on its service available to the public for a 
communication to the public act to occur. This is examined below in more detail 
concerning the interpretation of right in the courts.  
Infringement of the right of making available does, on one view, not require an 
actual transmission, only the potential on the part of the public to access the work 
in question.138 As such, infringements would continue to occur until access is 
disabled or the infringing work removed. It does not matter that, for example, 
infringing copies are only available to subscribers, since the definition of “the 
public” as elsewhere in the Act can be narrower than the ‘general public’ in 
common parlance.139 Moreover, as noted in Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation et al v Newzbin Limited140 by Kitchin J, the right of communication to 
the public should be understood in a broad sense, as EUCD recitals 23 and 24 
reveal. 
 
c) The Right in Context: Jurisprudential Consideration 
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Having looked at the construction and several pertinent points concerning the 
communication/making available to the public right, the claims in Newzbin argued 
under s. 20(2)(b) CDPA 1988 may be turned to. Naturally, before considering to the 
detailed areas of concern regarding the communication to the public right, the 
facts and circumstances in Newzbin must first be explained. This will be done in 
some detail for the simple reason that the case contains the single most important 
recent judgment in Part 2 on the UK, since it touches upon almost all of the main 
areas in which an OSP may be found liable for infringing copyright. Thus, the 
details that follow also provide vital information for infringement construction in 
the 3PCL chapter below, not least because many 3PCL cases hinge on the particular 
facts in each case.141 
 
The Parties & Claims/Defences 
Newzbin concerned an action for infringement of copyright brought by six makers 
and distributors of films against the operator of a website called “Newzbin” on a 
worldwide “discussion system” known as Usenet. It was argued that Newzbin 
indexes unlawful copies of films and displays the titles of said to its users; in doing 
so it provided a search facility which allowed its users to simplify the unlawful 
acquisition of copies of films. In its defence Newzbin argued that it operated in 
parallel to other search engines such as Google but was directed at USENET rather 
than the world wide web. Newzbin portrayed itself as being “content agnostic” 
and throughout the proceedings reiterated that the function of Newzbin software 
was to index the entire content of USENET. Newzbin also argued that wherever 
possible it provided hyperlinks to material with the result that in some instances 
the acquisition of unlawful material would not involve Newzbin per se. 
The claimants in this action relied on three theories of liability. Namely, 
authorisation, joint tortfeasorship and communication to the public. This fact is 
interesting and noteworthy in itself and will be analysed at a later stage. 
Communication to the public will be examined in detail following a introduction.  
USENET in Operation 
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USENET is similar, to the World Wide Web in that it allows users142 of said to 
upload content on what would be the equivalent of websites referred to in the 
case as “bulletin boards”. USENET is provided by interconnected servers which 
store content in a “hierarchy of newsgroups that are named to reflect their 
content”. The content in these newsgroups falls into two categories, text or binary,  
with binary the more content rich category which can include films. Uploading 
films this is often done by use of a mechanism known as RAR encoding. What this 
means is that a film will typically be split up into about 100 or so RAR files, which in 
turn will be split into about 50 or more messages each, each of which will be 
posted to the newsgroup on its own. The end result is that the single copyright 
work is being split up into at least several hundred different messages on a USENET 
server. A user who wishes to download a copy of a film must identify each and 
every one of those messages to be able to completely possess a copy of a 
particular work; these must then be correctly connected. 
 
Newzbin’s services 
Given the complexities of assembling copyright works such as films on USENET 
there is a market for services like Newzbin’s which facilitate such. Newzbin was a 
subscription-based service with two tiers, the first tier being premium members in 
the second-tier Basic members. Whereas premium members were able to 
download contents of files source using Newzbin, Basic members were only 
provided with a sample of what was available to premium members.  
The service which premium users subscribed to ran for 240 days and only applied 
to binary content. Kitchen J thus noted in Newzbin that the focus of the Newzbin 
facility is clearly on binary content.143 
A crucial element in the case was Newzbin’s development of what have been 
called “NZB” files. These files assembled all the information required to reassemble 
an original binary work. A single file could then be either saved or opened with a 
third-party application.144  
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Communication to the Public in Newzbin 
Whereas the claimants argued that the defendants had made available their films 
by electronic transmission so that the members of the public were able to access 
them from a place and at a time of their choosing, the defendants disputed that 
they themselves made these films available. The defence hinged on the 
characterisation of the service provided as a passive service, one that mainly acted 
as an intermediary providing links to sites from which the claimant’s films were 
accessible for download. In guiding his opinion on the scope of Art. 3 EUCD, Kitchin 
J considered Sociedad General de Autores v Editores de Espana (SGAE) v Rafael 
Hoteles SA.145 The case concerned the installation and use of television sets at a 
hotel. It was alleged that the hotel was involved in communicating to the public 
works managed by a relevant Spanish body responsible for the management of 
intellectual property rights in Spain. The Spanish Appeal Court referred several 
questions to the CJEU one of which asked whether the transmission of a broadcast 
via television sets to customers in hotel rooms would constitute communication to 
the public within the meaning of Art.3(1); another question asked whether the 
installation of television sets in itself in hotel rooms constituted such an act. In its 
reply the CJEU stated that the communication to the public right must be 
interpreted broadly and it follows that the transmission of a broadcast to the 
occupants of hotel rooms was indeed a transmission to a new public. 146  
It was summarised by the judge in Newzbin that “the Rafael hotel had intervened 
to provide its customers with access to the protected works; in the absence of that 
intervention customers would not have been able to enjoy those works; and the 
hotel had derived benefit from providing the service.”147 Naturally the CJEU held 
that the installation of television sets itself was not sufficient for a finding of 
infringement by communication to the public: 
While the mere provision of physical facilities, usually involving, besides the hotel, 
a company specialising in the sale or hire of television sets, does not constitute, as 
such, a communication within the meaning of Directive 2001/29, the installation of 
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such facilities may nevertheless make public access to broadcast works technically 
possible. Therefore, if, by means of television sets thus installed, the hotel 
distributes the signal to customers staying in its rooms, then communication to the 
public takes place, irrespective of the technique used to transmit the signal.148 
Kitchin J held that firstly, the defendant’s premium members downloaded the 
claimant’s films and did so at a place and at a time individually chosen by then. 
Secondly, regarding the question of whether these films were made available by 
the defendant, the judge considered the facts of the case to be pertinent in such a 
determination. Kitchin J again rejected the concept that Newzbin provided a 
service which was passive or just provided a link to a film of interest. The relevant 
part of the opinion therefore references the sophisticated technical and editorial 
system provided for the premium members to gather all the constituent parts 
required for the assembly of infringing works. Interestingly, Kitchin J stated “as a 
result, I have no doubt that the defendant’s premium members consider that 
Newzbin is making available to them the films in the Newzbin index. Moreover, the 
defendant has provided its service in full knowledge of the consequences of its 
actions. In my judgment it follows from the aforegoing that the defendant has 
indeed made the claimants copyright films available to its premium members and 
has in that way communicated to the public.”149 By way of immediate 
commentary, it may be noted that a person studying the judgement in detail might 
have wished for more details as to how the conclusion of infringement via 
communication to the public was arrived at. This particular part of the judgement 
leaves it to the reader to infer that the NZB files feature provided the crucial step. 
 
4) The ‘Other’ Communications to the Public Right 
 
The third aspect of the communication to the public right is the broader category 
of communication to the public not defined as broadcasting or “making available”. 
Commentators have noted that this category is extremely broad, but that that it 
may safely be said that it is limited by requiring an electronic transmission which is 
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made to the public, for example thereby excluding private communications. This 
category is discussed below in section 5(a). 
 
5) Uncertainty in the Scope of the Right: Possibly Enlarged OSP Liability 
 
The issue of uncertainty in relation to the communication to the public right is one 
of crucial importance for OSPs and therefore this thesis, in the sense that OSPs 
could be liable for the infringement of a general non-simultaneous communication 
to the public/making available right on the basis of third-party copyright 
infringement. This section therefore explains and analyses two aspects pertaining 
to this uncertainty, namely the definition in the UK of ‘other communications to 
the public’ as outlined above and the ambiguous European definition. 
 
a) Other Communication to the Public as Non-Simultaneous Transmissions 
 
There is currently a debate as to the precise definition or scope of the 
communication to the public right in respect of the third category mentioned 
above, namely the broad “umbrella right” of other communications to the public. 
The question is inter alia whether this relates to simultaneous or non-simultaneous 
communications. In other words, is it akin to the broadcast, or making available 
right? If the latter instance were to be the case, then the communication to the 
public right is really ‘only’ a making available right. In the first instance what speaks 
against this is that there would be no need to specify “making available” 
separately, as is done in both the CDPA and the EUCD.  
Moreover, commentators have observed that were the communication to the 
public right to be construed as a general making available right, downloads of 
material could possibly also be said to contravene such a right due to the fact that 
the element of communication to the public has disappeared, in particular when 
orienting oneself from Art.3(2) EUCD.150  This is also relevant to the aspect 
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examined immediately below, namely  the communication to the public right itself 
as a form of broad “standalone” making available right, without the need for 
subsequent communication to the public, since a downloader would in effect be 
initiating the infringement for himself.  
Generally, the emphasis would, if accepted, shift from liability for communication 
to mere liability for access, which would include, as mentioned, downloads. This 
would have the effect that the former protects the communication and the latter 
the content in its entirety. From a doctrinal perspective, a general “umbrella right” 
bearing the hallmarks of an “access right” has been criticised due to the fact that 
such a right would include all the information contained in a communication 
without reference to content, in effect abolishing any distinctions between form 
and content in a particular sphere that is or should be concerned with distinct 
subject matter protection and the distinct restricted acts pertaining to such.151 
Moreover, in effect, what in law drafting terms is clearly a sub-category of a 
‘broader’ right, as mentioned above, would illogically spill over, dissolving 
distinctions between different rights in the legislation. 
 
b) European Communication to the Public ‘reduced’ to Making Available  
 
Approached from another perspective, it may be added that at the European level 
it is not clear whether the right of making available merely requires such, or 
whether it also requires subsequent communication. This arises principally from 
the structure of Art.3 EUCD and in particular the possibly separate “standalone” 
nature of Art.3(2), which does not reference communication.  
Commentators have observed that it might be preferable to view “making 
available” as a “preliminary stage before communication will actually take 
place”.152 The result of such would be that the scope of the making available right 
would be narrowed and the aspect of the right protecting access and automatically 
the information contained in a work, would be lessened. As noted above, it has 
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been observed that a stand-alone making available right makes those liable for 
copyright infringement that provide works to OSPs, despite the fact that at this 
stage such as not been to the “public”. Hence it may again be argued that 
subsequent communication to the public should be considered. 
 
c) The Wider European Perspective 
 
Following the entry into force of the EUCD on 22nd of June 2001, Art.12 EUCD 
instructed the Commission to submit a review report to the European Parliament 
by November 2004. Said report was naturally the first report of its kind and was 
split into two parts. Part one provided an assessment of the impact of the Directive 
whereas Part Two analysed the actual implementation across the European 
Union.153 An examination is instructive regarding the uncertainty at EU level, but 
also concerning the UK; given that, irrespective of its need for implementation, the 
Directive is the decisive piece of legislation. It may also be noted that the CJEU 
decided references based on the Directive and not the national implementing 
legislation. This has notable effects. For example, within the current context, in 
connection with the definition of “public” in SGAE v Rafael Hoteles SL. Here the 
court stipulated that concerning the communication to the public right, whether 
the place this occurred was private or public was irrelevant, and that the right 
specifically could be violated/carried out in private places.154 Whereas the concept 
of “public” in the UK law, as mentioned, is wide, the definition in this particular 
context has previously remained unresolved at UK level. It likely that in related 
specific contexts this definition will further be definitively determined.155 
The question which the report raises in relation to the two possible views of the 
general communication to the public right is whether the communication to the 
public right also extends to subsequent acts of making available. The report 
identifies and explains that the problem thus: 
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 In general, it is debated whether the right is granted only up to the stage of 
making a work or other subject matter passively available to the public, or whether 
the right owner may also exert control over a subsequent act of transmitting the 
work to the recipient. The debate emerges from the fact that Art. 3, following Arts. 
8 WCT and 10 WPPT, may be interpreted to only cover the act of making available 
or in the sense of granting a general communication to the public right under 
which the “making available” constitutes only one element.156 
One of the alleged sceptics of a general communication to the public right, namely 
Austria, implemented the right in such a way as to cover only the making available 
right; without reference to communication to the public. Other Member States 
have implemented Art.3 EUCD more verbatim, thuis referencing both 
communication to the public and making available; not sidestepping the issue of a 
general non-simultaneous communication to the public category. As such it can be 
noted that in Austria, for example, uploading a work onto a Internet peer-to-peer 
file sharing platform, being the act of first “making available” is prohibited. 
Whereas secondary acts of communication to the public such as the transmission 
by downloading the work in question from the very same Internet peer-to-peer file 
sharing platform are excepted from liability under this cause of action.157  
The scope of Art.3 EUCD related legislation in other Member States having 
adopted a more literal version of Art. 3 or of the WIPO treaties, might nonetheless 
still be uncertain, and depends on whether the text in question incorporates into 
the general transmission right a subsequent transmission whether implicitly or 
expressly. This would mean that a download would be classed as a transmission 
covered as an act of communication to the public by virtue of falling under the part 
encompassing non-simultaneously transmissions.  
The courts in Member States have shown themselves to be divided. Most notably 
German courts158 have held that making available a protected newspaper and 
journal articles can fall under the communication to the public right, whereas 
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French courts expressly excluded downloading from the scope of the 
communication to the public right as it concerns doing so from a peer-to-peer file 
sharing system.159 It would appear that in France, the French presentation right 
does not include subsequent acts of transmission. 
 
6) The Relationship between Broadcasting and Making Available 
 
It is interesting to delve into the differences and commonalities of the 
broadcasting and making available rights. This may be done by reference to a 
recent German Federal Supreme Court decision, referred to as “Internet video 
recorder”.160 The defendant, in said case operated an online video recorder on the 
internet. The “recorder” allowed users to select various free TV programs from 
around 20 broadcasting stations in Germany. Each broadcast is first copied onto 
the defendant’s server. Paying users, who want to sign up for the service, can then 
select individual broadcasts and watch these at different times. This is done by 
allocating each user a specific space on the defendant’s server in which the 
broadcast is stored. In other words, each user has its own web space on that 
server. The claimant is a TV station that sought relief due to alleged violations of its 
reproduction, making available and broadcasting rights.161 
The first issue that presents itself is what the protected subject matter may be; in 
broadcast signals, or the actual work included in such a broadcast, e.g. film, may 
give rise to the restriction of act in this regard. The second issue is one of 
infringement. On the facts of the case, it was clear that the copying which had 
occurred on the OSP’s servers might infringe the rights holder’s reproduction right. 
Additionally, the restricted acts of making available and broadcasting, were alleged 
to have been infringed. 
Making Available 
                                                          
159
 Implementation Study EUCD,Part II,(n107) 6, citing High Court Le Havre, 8 December 2005 
(SACEM, SDRM v anon). 
160
 I ZR 216/06. 
161
 Ibid,[10]. 
68 
 
Concerning the making available right, several things were observed by the court. 
Firstly, concerning the fact that the OSP defendant offered the online video 
recording service via their website, it was held that there was an insufficient nexus 
between the OSP in the alleged acts of making available, due to the fact that it was 
the users that commissioned the service. The court stated in this regard that 
offering to record future content is insufficient. Secondly, it was considered 
whether the OSP had committed the restricted act of making available due to 
downloads and/or streams that had occurred. In principle, such would naturally be 
covered by the definition of making available. However, the German Federal 
Supreme Court held that such has not been “to the public”. The facts were such 
that each user has been allocated an individual copy, hence the earlier question of 
reproduction, of the broadcasts in question.162  
Broadcasting 
Concerning the broadcasting right, which requires simultaneous transmission, the 
court held that this is being infringed due to the fact that the broadcasts had been 
individually commissioned by the users. It interestingly equated the time-shifted 
on demand service with simultaneous retransmission. It is not surprising that 
commentators have questioned this line of argument. Such prefer the view that 
the non-simultaneous nature of the download is decisive. This is underlined by the 
fact that in economic terms the attractiveness lies in the time-shifted on-demand 
availability of user selected and commissioned reproductions.163 
Reproduction 
In respect of the above what remains is also the question of the à la carte 
reproduction. The question that presents itself is whether the OSP may avail itself 
of a limitation in this regard. Under German law private copying exceptions exist, 
and the OSP could avail itself of such were the service not-for-profit. 
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It remains to be added that a putative general communication to the public right 
was not discussed due to the fact that there was no communication to the 
“public”. 
 
7) Conclusion 
 
In concluding this Chapter on the communication to the public right, it is important 
from an OSP related perspective to note that the broadcasting right does cover 
certain Internet transmissions, where these are in effect a concurrent extension of 
wireless broadcasts. Yet, the current and revised definition of “broadcaster” can be 
said to be narrower than the previous definition in the CDPA 1988 as originally 
enacted.  
The cable programme right, and the exception as mentioned above, could have 
been useful for OSPs. The removal of such has changed the balance in favour of 
copyright owners and content producers. It follows that some might argue that the 
provisions on cable programme protection which were replaced with the 
distinction of copyright protection against communication to the public, including 
the making available right on the one hand, and the broadcasting right on the 
other, function quite differently by altering course and possibly providing the 
sweeping protection referred to above for interactive non-simultaneous 
transmissions. It will be remembered that the defining feature of a broadcast is the 
lack of an interactive element and the subject being protected is the actual 
transmission itself which may be visual images, sounds or information. This 
however still includes Internet communications where these are transmitted 
simultaneously. It follows that communicating a work by way of streaming is 
classified as a broadcast and does not touch upon the making available right in the 
UK. 
The arguably most important conclusion to this Chapter is that the uncertainty in 
the scope of the communication to the public right. As detailed above, this 
potentially yields an exponential growth in third-party OSP liability where other 
communications to the public, or making available itself, are defined without 
certain references to both inherent or subsequent “communication/transmission” 
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and wider “public”. The view of the right of making available non-
simultaneously/on-demand being satisfied by mere provision of access increases 
the scenarios of primary liability not only on the part of directly the OSP but 
especially the users, which in turn raises the spectre of 3PCL on the part of the OSP 
in connection with such. As indicated above, there are also certain non-commercial 
policy considerations involved in this discussion. Defining the area of uncertainty in 
terms of a pure access right detracts from the central tenet of copyright law, 
namely the protection of form and not content. Such an access right can be said to 
be born out of copyright-competition law wedlock, like its TPM cousins, into the 
realm of ‘para-copyright’, which brings with it conflicts beyond the primary remit 
of this thesis, for example the problematic intersection also with freedom of 
information.164 
 
III. The Reproduction Right 
 
The reproduction right is defined in s.17(1) CDPA 1988 as the exclusive right of 
“copying". To infringe this right there are two issues to be considered, the first 
being a sufficient degree of objective similarity165 between the copyright work and 
the alleged infringement and the second a causal relationship that this results from 
the fact that the copyrighted work has indeed been copied.166 The reproduction 
right relates not only to the entire but also to a substantial part of a work, to 
copies of the direct or indirect and to some transient or incidental copies.167 
 
1) Demarcation of Infringing Reproductions 
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There are two types of copying. The first is "literal copying" where all or an 
identifiable part of a copyright work is taken. One example of such would be the 
taking of a part of a picture, several sentences from a poem or book or a bar or 
two of the piece of music.168 Here, "the question whether [the defendant] had 
copied a substantial part depends much more on the quality than on the quantity 
of what he has taken".169 It can thus be said that regarding literal copying, a 
qualitative criterion can apply in such situations. 
The second type of copying often described as "altered copying" relates to inexact 
copying. An example could be a translation of any literary work, play or film. It will 
be necessary to determine which elements of a copyrighted work have been taken 
and then to ask whether their use amounts to a substantial part, as with the first 
category above. Commentators have noted that the temptation to take a 
restricted, element-by-element, view of similarity of the work and alleged 
infringement in such cases should not be yielded to, since this would result in a 
falsification of the premise upon which a final determination of substantial taking 
and therefore unauthorised reproduction would be founded.170 In Designers Guild 
Scott LJ supported this ‘cumulative’ approach, in particular where, absent direct 
evidence, inferences are to be drawn concerning copying and substantiality.171 
In the online arena, third parties mainly become liable for facilitating the literal 
(wholesale) unauthorised reproduction of music and film works by primary agents. 
This is logical, since the motivation and value, for the primary actor of infringing 
such rests in obtaining and using a perfect copy of an MP3 or recent cinema film. 
This is not to say that there are not some transformative uses such as sampling 
that might occur as a subset, which is why the above distinction has been drawn. 
 
2) Transient and Incidental Reproduction 
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One of the most relevant aspects of the reproduction right for the purposes of this 
thesis is transient and incidental copying, as this is quite likely to occur by 
electronic means. As already highlighted, s.17(6) CDPA 1988 states that copying in 
relation to any work includes the making of copies which are transient or are 
incidental to some other use of the work. Furthermore, s.17(2) CDPA 1988 
expressly states that reproducing the work in any material form includes storing 
the work in any medium by electronic means. 
The above clearly brings copies in computer Random Access Memory (RAM) into 
the remit of the exclusive right of the copyright holder. However, whether such 
copies infringe copyright or not depends on their nature and the process involved. 
A pertinent example of such a process would be the streaming of a broadcast over 
the Internet or similar medium, by an OSP. When a broadcast is streamed small 
data slices of the broadcast are buffered172 in computer RAM to provide a 
continuous, uninterrupted flow of data to the recipient. Can this be said to infringe 
a copyright owner’s right(s)? And who does the infringing? These questions are 
central to digital copyright. This thesis focuses on liability for OSPs which includes 
questions such as these. In this regard, it may be noted that liability for OSPs is in 
many cases concurrent with and indeed dependent on that of users or primary 
infringers, whether factually, procedurally or legally. Given that OSPs have been 
styled “Gatekeepers” by some in the content producing industry, liability for some 
of the normal business activities of OSPs, which include transmission of files in 
certain instances is indeed a spectre to be taken note of.173 
It has been suggested in Australian Video Retailers Association Ltd v Warner Home 
Video Pty Ltd,174 an Australian case dealing with the streaming of a film, that due to 
the size of the data slices in the buffer at any one time, it cannot be said that the 
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work being transmitted is copied either as a whole or that substantial parts of the 
work are being copied.  
An important case in this area is Football Association Premier League Limited v QC 
Leisure (F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure), which was decided in the High Court, with 
references on the interpretation of EU law decided on by the CJEU (Grand 
Chamber).175 In the current instance it is particularly relevant to the question of 
incidental or transient copying and the infringement of the reproduction right. 
The claimants in this action brought three conjoined actions against various 
defendants of the alleged infringement of their copyright in various artistic and 
musical works, films and sound recordings. The first claimant, the F.A.P.L., was 
responsible for the filming of ‘Premier League’ matches by the BBC and Sky. 
Following the filming of each match the work was modified and a "world feed" 
signal was created in which the F.A.P.L. owned various copyrights and 
subsequently licensed these. The copyright owner and others subsequently 
initiated three actions against foreign broadcasters and broadcast recipient 
publicans. The foreign broadcasters in the first two actions supplied non-UK 
satellite decoder cards to receive the broadcasts in question in the UK, thus 
allegedly enabling buffer copies to be made in the decoders.176  
In answering the important question whether copies of a substantial part of the 
copyright works were made in the decoder boxes, Kitchin J described the action 
taking place in the decoder in detail, separating video from audio data, and 
explaining that the decoder assembles data for about 160 milliseconds before 
rewriting.177 The judge in determining whether a restricted act had occurred thus 
also posed the question whether these data fragments ought to be considered 
individually in terms of amounting to a substantial part of a copyright work or 
whether they should be considered collectively.178 It was held that the fragments 
amounting to 160 ms worth of data, or four frames, do not constitute a substantial 
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part of film work. Naturally Kitchin J referred this point to the Court of Justice for a 
final determination, which confirmed his view.179 It was also noted by Kitchin J that 
the video slices do not hold any inherent value, other than part of the whole 
work.180 They should also not be characterised as photographs, as defined in 
s.4(2)181 and prohibited by s.17(4) CDPA 1988, because they form part of the 
film.182 Furthermore, it was held that “it is a restricted act to make a transient copy 
of a substantial part of the work. In other words, the substantial part must be 
embodied in the transient copy, not a series of different transient copies which are 
stored one after the other in the decoder box".183  
It is noteworthy that Kitchin J relied and referred to Australian Video Retailers 
Association Ltd v Warner Home Video Ltd, for this part of the judgement.184 
Before going on to look at whether s.28A CDPA 1988 afforded a defence, Kitchen J 
summarised his findings regarding transient copies by concluding that across the 
board, whether it be in the decoder or on the television screen, as claimed by the 
claimants, substantial parts of the films, musical works and sound recordings were 
not copied within the meaning of the reproduction right as specified in the CDPA 
1988. Importantly, however, the judge differentiated the position regarding artistic 
works i.e. the graphics, devices and logos added to the firm in the production 
process discussed above. Regarding these, Kitchin J held: "I accept that these are 
reproduced in full within one frame of the broadcast signal in the decoder and as 
seen on the television."185 
Noting the above, and equating the streaming in Australian Video Retailers 
Association with the decoder buffering in F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure as regards the 
buffer copies made, it is worth noting that it is argued by commentators that the 
streaming of films should be differentiated from the streaming of music, so far as 
the substantial taking is concerned, in that only a few notes can amount to the 
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main melody, or essence of the work in question.186 For example, Larusson has 
thus argued that in cases where the main melody of a musical work has been 
offered and therefore temporarily copied in one sequence, an infringement could 
have taken place under s.17(1) CDPA 1988.187 Two things should be noted in this 
regard. The first is that in F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure, Kitchin J indicated, as noted above, 
that concerning the buffer copies in question, the musical works were not 
reproduced. Secondly, it is entirely doubtful whether the main melody of any 
musical work can be reproduced in one sequence, in one buffer copy, given the 
diminutive, almost always millisecond, nature of the transient copy. 
 
3) Little and Often 
 
Yet before moving on, it is worth noting that some commentators have argued 
that the school of thought which disapproves of the exoneration of transient 
copying should reap the intellectual fruits of the theory of liability for copying of 
"little and often".188 Under this theory the requirements for substantial taking, is 
satisfied by the repeated and often systematic copying from the same work. It is 
however submitted that the utilisation of this theory to achieve the goal of 
bringing transient copies within the realm of copyright infringement by 
reproduction, is a complete distortion of both the original theory and the 
commercial reality of the technological process taking place; the theory of "little 
and often" originally arose mainly from the publication in newspapers or similar 
instruments of small amounts of proprietary information such as in Trade Auxiliary 
Co v Middlesbrough, etc Association, where the claimants published approximately 
400 commercial transactions on a weekly basis that were conducted in the UK and 
where the defendant was held to infringe due to having repeatedly copied details 
of approximately 4 such transactions as they related to a smaller geographic 
area.189 It is thus not surprising that Kitchin J ruled in F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure , that 
concerning transient copies, for liability to arise a transient copy as such must 
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represent a substantial part of the work in question, and not the sum of, or a train, 
of transient copies as a whole.190  
 
4) Substantial Taking  
 
S.16(3) CDPA 1988 states that copyright in a work will be infringed if "the work as a 
whole or any substantial part of it" is copied. The doctrine of substantial taking, 
injects an equitable element into the law of copyright. Namely, that even where a 
defendant does not copy a work in its entirety, or does not copy the work 
precisely, he will in some instances nonetheless be held accountable for unfairly 
appropriating the benefit of the effort, skill and labour which went into a works 
creation as held in Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd.191 In 
Designers Guild Scott LJ stated the twofold requirement of objective similarity and 
the causal, original, ‘source’ relationship, between the copyright and infringing 
works or parts thereof in question. 192 
It has been suggested by Bently, who rails against shortcuts to a consideration of 
the taking, that courts should follow a rigorous approach in this regard.193 He 
proposes that the work in itself must first be defined by reference to three 
pertinent matters. The first is an assessment of the parameters of the work in 
question. Depending on the type of work, this could be relevant in terms of 
divisibility. Given that this thesis focuses on in part, musical works defining the 
parameters as noted in Hyperion Records v Warner Music, is indeed relevant.194 It 
was noted in said case that the copyright work is not a package of smaller 
copyright works, but that certain parts if copied may suffice for a finding of 
infringement. In this respect the interdependence of the parts could also be 
relevant as noted in Newspaper Licensing Agency v Marks and Spencer Plc.195 The 
second issue to be considered in this regard is the scope of protection afforded. 
The third category of delineation is that of the parts protected. To be protected as 
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part of a work; parts must be relevant to the work; ensure the work is original 
(despite a global appreciation approach being advocated); and not be the ideas 
behind a work. Only once a work has been defined in these terms should a court 
be willing to consider establishing liability for the taking of a substantial part, as 
considered against the copyright work itself. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The above section has delineated primary copyright infringement by distinguishing 
it from secondary copyright infringement in the UK. Secondary copyright 
infringement in the UK sense is further delineated below. The section thus 
examined the various restricted acts pertaining to protected works whilst focusing 
in particular on the communication to the public/making available as well as the 
reproduction right. These were focused on given their particular relevance to the 
infringement of film and music in OSP related contexts. 
The above discourse has explained the possibility of liability by OSPs, even where 
the actions of users of the services in question could be viewed as initiating a 
particular restricted act. In relation to the communication to the public right, 
which has its own conclusion above, this could be viewed as problematically 
merging strict liability with 3PCL.196  
Concerning the important aspect of transient reproduction the definition espoused 
in F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure in effect will squarely favour the content using/OSP 
industry, in that it very pointedly defines ‘substantial part’ concerning films, but 
arguably also musical works, narrowly, by requiring it to be embodied in any single 
transient copy and not a series of different transient copies, as will often be the 
case. 
 
C. Relevant Defences against Copyright Claims  
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Having in Chapter B, above, examined primary infringement of rights pertaining to 
the relevant categories of works examined in Chapter A, the logical structure of 
this thesis, and in particular this Part, is continued by a consideration of the 
defences available to OSPs, as relevant at this juncture. In litigation terms this is 
the natural order of things. Even during any pre-action protocols for Part 8 
proceedings in England & Wales,197 defences will and can only be considered once 
the requisite claims concerning restricted acts and infringement have been 
determined. The defences in this section, broadly speaking, split into Permitted 
Acts under the CDPA 1988, some of which are modified by European implementing 
legislation, and certain specific copyright exceptions in European implementing 
legislation. These permitted acts, which are not technically defences, but 
limitations that operate as such, like the exceptions specified immediately below 
are generally designed to counter-balance the monopolistic nature of copyright in 
favour of what is deemed to be in the public interest.  
 
I. Acts Permitted in Relation to Copyright Works 
 
Concerning “permitted acts”, it is firstly important to remember the requirement 
of substantial taking,198 may negate their applicability. Certain of the permitted 
acts which relate to primary infringement are indirectly relevant to OSPs owing to 
the theories of 3PCL,199 such as authorisation200 and procurement inducing joint 
and/or several liability.201 When a primary act of infringement is negated by a 
provision within the sections/regulations outlined below, cannot pose a risk to an 
OSP. Other provisions, such as s.28A,202 relate to primary infringement by the OSP 
itself. 
CDPA 1988 ss28-76 set out the acts permitted in relation to copyright works, the 
most well-known of which are; making temporary copies; research and private 
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study; criticism, review and news reporting; incidental inclusion of copyright 
material and making a single accessible copy for personal use. Due to the fact that 
48 exceptions are too many to cover in this thesis, and will in any event not all be 
relevant, those that do have some relevance will be identified and briefly 
examined. It is thus worth introducing s.28 CDPA 1988, which acts as a preamble, 
applicable to the following sections: The section makes clear that the acts 
permitted, as listed, may be done notwithstanding the subsistence of copyright 
and that they relate only to the question of infringement, as well as the fact that 
the following sections in the Act shall be construed independently of each other. 
 
1) Fair Dealing under the CDPA 1988 
The concept referred to as “fair dealing” in the UK is a relatively, in international 
terms, limited concept. It only relates to the sections/acts cited above; in broad 
terms, the three important limitations of non-commercial research or private 
study; fair dealing for the purposes of criticism or review and fair dealing for the 
purpose of news reporting. One of the most strikingly different jurisdictions in this 
respect is the US, where the concept of “fair use” is much broader, since it only 
provides guidelines and not exclusive categories.203 In 1977, the Whitford 
Committee’s recommendation that the UK’s fair dealing provisions be adapted 
along similar lines was rejected by the Government.204 
The fair dealing provisions as first introduced by the CA 1911 were not afforded an 
easy birth due to the fact that the phrase “fair dealing” had previously been used 
in relation to a judicial determination of substantial taking. This is evident from 
cases such as Wilkins v Aiken;205 as De Zwert notes, the current concept of fair 
dealing was unknown, Eldon LC referring to “fair quotation” and “legitimate use in 
the exercise of a mental operation”, and unsurprisingly noting that “fair” is 
relative.206  
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It must however be noted that a consideration of copying a work for private study 
did not arise prior to the 1911 Act.207 The above terminological strain led to a 
certain confusing interoperability by the two then intertwined issues.208  
The above fair dealing categories have been highlighted to convey a sense of the 
general provisions in the UK with a view to later comparison. It thus only remains 
to be noted that several of the provisions contained in the EUCD had a bearing on 
the CDPA. In particular, several articles caused the insertion of a requirement that 
the exceptions be for a “non-commercial purpose”: Art. 5(3) concerning research; 
Art. 5(2)(b) concerning private study and Art 5(3)(d) regarding criticism or review, 
required prior lawful making available to the public. 
 
2) The Applicability of s.28A CDPA 1988 
A determination of infringement of the reproduction right will, in many cases, refer 
to s.28A CDPA 1988, implementing Art.5(1) EUCD concerning the making of 
temporary copies. It states that copyright in various categories, other than 
computer programs or databases, but including sound recordings and films, is not 
infringed by the making of temporary copies which are transient or incidental and 
which form an integral and essential part of the technological process the sole 
purpose of which is to enable either; a) transmissions by an intermediary in 
network between third parties; or b) lawful use of a work which has no 
independent economic significance. 
In F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure, Kitchen J noted that the purpose of s.28A CDPA 1988 has 
been elaborated in Recital 33 to the EUCD as being to facilitate browsing, caching, 
transmissions by OSPs, provided such do not modify the information.209 It is 
therefore clear that both the Directive and s.28A CDPA 1988 attempt to carve out 
a "safe harbour" for intermediaries such as OSPs. This is important given the 
medium in which OSPs operate and the business models most employ.  
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a) The Four Elements of the Defence 
 
The High Court judgment in F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure very neatly summarises the four 
elements required for this defence to be operative and was confirmed 
(unsurprisingly, almost verbatim) by the CJEU210: 
i) the temporary copy must be transient or incidental; 
ii) it must be an integral and essential part of a technological process; 
iii) the sole purpose of which is to enable (a) a transmission of the work in a 
network between third parties by an intermediary; or (b) a lawful use of the work; 
and 
iv) it must have no independent economic significance.211 
In F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure, the High Court judge determined that the first two 
elements were satisfied, as discussed in the facts above,212 and that there was no 
dispute as to these. This was confirmed by the CJEU.213 Regarding the third 
element, it was noted that since lawfulness had been argued by the defendants, 
this hinged on the interpretation of the CA Directive, from which the claimants had 
argued that liability automatically flows. The CJEU determined that from the outset 
the acts in question were not intended to enable transmission in a network 
between third parties by an intermediary – thus it asked whether their sole 
purpose was to enable a lawful use to be made. It held this was so, for the 
purposes of Art.5(1)(b) since reception of broadcast ("picking up of the broadcasts 
and their visual display in private circles") is lawful according to EU and UK 
legislation.214  
The most problematic of the four points above, was the requirement of the 
absence of independent economic significance. Regarding the interpretation of 
‘independent economic significance’ the court referred to both the EUCD and an 
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Opinion of the Economic & Social Committee. Art.5(5) EUCD provides that 
exceptions and limitations ought to be applied "in certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder”. According 
to the Opinion of the Economic & Social Committee (September 9, 1998), as cited 
in F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure, the exception ensures incidental storage, e.g. 
intermediately on servers, the question being whether there was ‘independent 
economic significance’ to the use of the work in question, not going to its 
transmission. This meant however that: “Any reproduction that in effect is 
consumption of the work, such as the temporary copying of programmes or data 
into memory in order to use or access such works, for example the act of accessing 
on-line databases, should only be permitted with the rightholder's 
authorisation”.215  
The concept of independent economic significance is treacherous. It is at the heart 
of this exception and transient copying. It hinges on a policy guided view of what 
should or should not be acceptable. On one view, transient copies such as those 
made in this instance in the decoder could be seen as part of a process and 
therefore as having economic value, since otherwise the process could not take 
place. The other more limited view would be that the process should be broken 
down into its constituent parts. Only the independent economic significance of the 
transient copies themselves should be examined, irrespective of what their 
purpose is and what they result in. The former interpretation naturally yields 
economic significance whereas the latter does not. Perhaps the framers of the 
Directive intended the latter result, due to the inclusion of the word 
"independent". This would seem to suggest that the copies’ economic significance 
is to be assessed independently of the process as a whole. It is perhaps because of 
this dichotomy and the fact that it is currently based on European Union law that 
Kitchin J required guidance by the Court of Justice, which ruled that the acts of 
reproduction carried out in the course of a technological process make access to 
the protected works possible. It noted that "since the latter have economic value, 
access to them necessarily has economic significance".216 As to whether this was 
independent, termed a value beyond the mere reception of the broadcasts, the 
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court held this was not so.217 This means that the acts referred to fulfilled all of the 
conditions laid down in Art.5(1) EUCD and Art.5(5) EUCD and may thus be carried 
out without the authorisation of the copyright holders concerned. 
  
b) The Impact of European Jurisprudence 
In the context of considering the reproduction right which may be infringed by 
OSPs, it is worth examining recent European jurisprudence, in particular Infopaq 
International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening I&II.218 Infopaq has been referred 
to here as I & II since the same parties are again litigating in front of Danish 
courts.219  
Previously Cuttings Agencies bought newspapers or their equivalent, read and 
analysed said and cut out news items which certain clients desired. These were 
then sent either daily/weekly in a bundle to said. Nowadays this process is 
completed by electronic means, through several different of techniques. In the UK 
it is necessary to obtain a license from the Newspaper Licensing Agency.  
There is a similar system in operation in Denmark.  In Infopaq the relevant 
professional association of Danish daily newspaper publishers brought an action 
against the defendants, once it had become aware that Infopaq was scanning 
newspaper articles for commercial purposes without authorisation. The 
professional association argued that consent was necessary for the processing of 
articles using a five-step electronic data capture procedure. Infopaq, being a 
reasonably well-informed and circumspect undertaking, argued to the contrary 
that its data capture process which consists primarily of drawing up summaries of 
selected articles from Danish daily newspapers and other periodicals on the basis 
of subject criteria agreed with customers, fell within Art.5 EUCD. 
Without going into too much detail concerning the technical process involved, 
which is adequately summarised above for purposes of this thesis, the end result 
may however be instructive: 
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 4 November 2005 – Dagbladet Arbejderen, page 3: 
TDC: 73% “a forthcoming sale of the telecommunications group TDC 
which is expected to be bought”.220 
In the first case, the Court of Justice received 13 detailed questions, but returned 
only two answers. The questions were built up logically around the issue of the 
definition of an act of reproduction, the relevance of the context in which this 
occurs, the factors possibly affecting the transience of reproduction, the scope of 
the “lawful use” of Art.5(1) EUCD, and the criteria for “independent economic 
significance”.  
The European court, however, surmised, after answering the first question, that 
questions 2 to 12 were in fact single question; namely that whether the 
reproduction that occurred during the referenced data capture process satisfied 
the conditions in Art.5(1) EUCD, and thus whether the process was able to be 
carried out without the consent of the relevant rights holders. It  provided one 
answer to these questions and furthermore noted that in light of its answer it was 
unnecessary to answer the last, 13th question. The reason why these questions are 
mentioned in this way here is that it would appear that the referring national 
appellate court was displeased with this way of proceeding. 
The answers the Court of Justice sent to the national court were incisive. The first 
answer, relating to the possible act of reproduction as a result of the technical 
processing question, stated that extracting 11 words, storing and printing such 
comes within the concept of reproduction in part within the meaning of Art.2 
EUCD directive, if the elements produced are the expression of the intellectual 
creation of their author. However, a determination of such was up to the national 
court. The second answer, which may be regarded as being less pertinent, 
summarised that printing an extract of 11 words during the data capture process 
as in the proceedings could not be termed transient as required by Art.5(1) EUCD, 
and therefore required consent. 
Several things may be noted with regard to answer one. First of all, the answer 
very specifically refers to 11 words. It is not clear why this is the case, nor whether 
10 might suffice. Some commentators are likely to note in this regard that this is 
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just an unfortunate sample figure, especially bearing in mind that it is up to the 
national court to make a final determination on infringement. Most interesting and 
noteworthy, is the reference by the Cour de Justice to the concept of “the 
expression of the intellectual creation of the author”. The reference to this concept 
can be somewhat solidly termed to be the progeny of a civil law (continental 
European) copyright law system influenced mind. This is significant due to the fact 
that the ruling is binding on all Member States, and therefore also the UK.221 
However, originality as defined above could also be said to be drawn from the 
general scheme in Berne; e.g. Arts 2(5) and (8) which state that the protection 
afforded to artistic or literary works presupposes that they are intellectual 
creations.  
This standard has already been applied concerning the question of reproduction of 
a substantial part of the work in, for example, SAS Institute Inc v World 
Programming Ltd.222 Most importantly, however for this thesis is it has been 
confirmed that the scope of protection given by the EUCD is to be interpreted 
broadly, such as to include, for example 11 words. The European Court held that it 
is also possible that isolated sentences or certain parts of sentences might convey 
to the reader the originality of the newspaper article and thus the expression of 
the author’s own intellectual creation.223 
Commentators have stressed that reproduction of, “a part” as in the EUCD, or “in 
part” as in the 2009 Infopaq judgment, are clearly to be equated with the 
expression “substantial part” in the CDPA 1988. Both expressions refer to any 
“creative” part. Whereas courts determining questions of substantial taking must 
now refer to the civil law influenced test, commentators have also noted that the 
jurisprudence which developed the substantial part test is still applicable and that 
UK law has not changed in this respect.224 
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On 18 June 2010 in Infopaq II the Danish appellate court re-referred the remaining 
unanswered questions to the Court of Justice for the most part in unaltered form. 
At the time of writing the reference remains unanswered. 
Overall, putting these two cases into context, the impact of the answer to the first 
question referred is perhaps less than might be anticipated. Whereas certain 
commentators will argue that as a result of the holding that 11 words are capable 
of infringing the reproduction right, as set out in Art.2 EUCD, represents an 
extremely broad interpretation of such a right, in line with the Court’s stated 
approach,225 the operative part of the answer in question is the fact that it is for 
the national court is to make such a determination.  
Moreover, as noted above, the “expression of the intellectual creation of the 
author” standard is, some might argue, in the UK a mere reformulation of the 
prevalent originality and substantial part test.226 Thus it also remains doubtful 
whether the Court of Justice’s statement that Art. 5 is to be interpreted narrowly 
will affect UK jurisprudence to any significant degree, given the already finely 
tuned, and thus perhaps pro-rights holder approach in this country.227  
The Court’s statement that “the possibility may not be ruled out that certain 
isolated sentences, or even certain parts of sentences in the text in question may 
be suitable for conveying to the reader the originality of the publication such as a 
newspaper article, by communicating to that reader an element which is, in itself, 
an expression of intellectual creation of the author of that article” is arguably to be 
approached with equal caution and might be met with a raised judicial eyebrow 
this side of the channel, even if unjustifiably so, given for example early indications 
of a similar ‘back to the bare minimum/essentials’ approach concerning headlines 
in Shetland Times Ltd. v Dr Jonathan Wills.228 The Court’s statement is perhaps best 
viewed as an extension of its remarkable scrutiny of the issues at hand that has led 
to the infamous 11 word themed answer. It moreover adds little to the settled 
jurisprudence in the UK that originality already may reside in choice, sequence and 
combination of words, as in Walter v Lane. 
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II. E-Commerce Directive Regulations 2002 
 
The EC Regulations229 transpose the E-Commerce Directive into UK law. The EC 
Regulations provide a triumvirate of defences against liability for OSPs. It is 
noteworthy that these defences apply not only to liability for copyright 
infringement, but also other liabilities. The overarching justification for such broad 
defences is one of enabling information networks, referred to as “information 
society services”,230 within the internal market, without fear of redress, where the 
services provided fall into one of the three categories, namely, “mere conduit”, 
“caching” and “hosting”.  
The Recitals to the E-Commerce Directive make clear that despite the potential 
breadth of the defences there is an emphasis on limitation to technical processes 
and operation or accessing of communication networks for the sole purpose of 
making transmissions more efficient and which could be described as being merely 
technical, automatic and passive in nature. Arguably most importantly for this 
thesis, it is stated that this implies that the OSP neither has knowledge of nor 
control over the information which is transmitted or stored.231 This is perhaps 
contentious however concerning the hosting defence since said can potentially 
also apply when the OSP has knowledge of the information being provided, except 
that he does not know that it is unlawful.  
A uniting feature of all three defences is that they can concern both the 
communication to the public/making available right as well as the reproduction of 
works, whether transient or permanent, in a form of computer memory. As such, 
there is interplay with s.28A CDPA 1998.232  
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It is also worth highlighting that all three of the defences relate exclusively to 
pecuniary remedies and criminal sanctions. As such, the defences do not speak to 
injunctive relief. Whereas this is arguably logical, since an injunction is a lesser 
disincentive than the aforementioned remedies, it must nonetheless be observed 
that the prospect of injunctions is nonetheless likely to have both an operational 
and possibly downstream impact on the OSPs. OSPs will thus naturally need to 
provide measures for complying with injunctions as well as securing adequate 
representation to analyse both the scope and extent of such.  
On the other hand, content providers or those seeking such injunctions have a 
strong argument that given an OSP’s likely business model this is a legitimate 
expectation and business cost.  It may nonetheless be stipulated that injunctions 
serve in parallel capacities to those of 3PCL theories.233 Given this fact, it is logical 
that the remedies section in the 3PCL part below briefly analyses OSP exposure to 
such.234  
 
1) The Mere Conduit Defence 
The interplay between Reg.17 (Art.12 E-Commerce Directive) and s.28A CDPA 
1988, has been flagged as inappropriate by some.235  
Refreshing one’s recollection, Reg.17 states that OSPs that transmit information 
provided by a recipient of the service, or provide access to a communications 
network, are principally exempt from liability if they did not initiate the 
transmission,236 select the receiver of the transmission,237 or select or modify the 
information contained in the transmission.238 Expressly included in these acts of 
transmission are automatic (in the ordinary operation of the technology), 
intermediate (in the course of a transmission) and transient (limited time) storage 
of information; provided this is done only for the purpose of carrying out the 
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transmission in the communication network and where such information is not 
stored longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission itself. The 
definition of this defence in the UK Regulations mirrors that of the Directive.  
In terms of intrinsic guidance for interpretation for judges and lawyers alike, the 
Recitals to the Directive clearly specify that OSPs are only to benefit from the 
defences, in particular “mere conduit” and “caching” where OSPs are not involved 
either with the information being transmitted or modified. The exception to this 
would be technical manipulations to aid the transmission itself.239 Interestingly, in 
terms of 3PCL, the Directive states expressly that OSPs that deliberately 
“collaborate” with the recipients of their services, with the effect of their actions 
being illegal in nature, will not be able to benefit from the “mere conduit” or 
“caching" defences.240 
As mentioned above, the defence also relates to other torts/crimes and not just 
copyright infringement.241 From a copyright perspective, the contextual similarities 
between s.28A and Reg.17 have led some commentators to identify an overlap, 
which certainly exists.242 Other more aggressive commentators such as Larusson 
have attacked this position, suggesting that such is only arrived at by looking at 
both from afar, possibly without spectacles.243  
 
Deconstructing Larusson 
Given the requisite descriptions above there is an area of overlap between both 
defences, since there can be situations when both could conceivably apply. 
Larusson is wrong to state otherwise. This is however not to say that both 
provisions have the same aims or indeed scope. Furthermore, contrary to the 
reading of some commentators, it may be argued that where EC Regulations 
conflict with amendments made to the CDPA 1988 made as a result of the EUCD; 
the former do not automatically prevail due to the E-Commerce Directive 
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(Extension) Regulations 2004 merely because these were brought into force in 
relation to the Sexual Offences Act 2003.244  
Whereas it may accurately be noted that one of the main differences between 
both defences is the s.28A requirement of “independent economic significance”, it 
an interpretation of such could yield significant similarities with the spirit of Reg.17 
in particular as it relates to the length of storage in Reg.17(2)(b) when taking into 
account Kitchin J’s thoughts in F.A.P.L. v QC Leisure  concerning data slices. 
There are three other differences between the two defences. Reg.17 delineates 
the actual attributes of any transmission by an OSP in more detail, especially 
regarding the selection of the transmission and the length of its storage; whereas 
at the same time it also applies not only to literary works but also, importantly for 
this thesis, to sound recordings and films and also not only to alleged 
infringements of the reproduction right, but again importantly for this thesis, to 
the making available/communication to the public right. As such Reg.17 applies to 
a much broader range of liability situations for OSPs, which is not to say that it 
would ultimately yield the desired result. 
 
What this means in practice for OSPs 
In terms of the practical impact on OSPs it is worth reiterating that the defence of 
mere conduit applies to all actions taken by the service provider, that is to say the 
defence is not limited to transient reproduction, but will also cover; 
 a) the storage of infringing copies (if necessary for and the intermediate 
transmittal purposes of the service);245 as well as 
b)  acts of communicating works/making available works to the public. 
It is of course logical that the defence does not apply to acts by an OSP falling into 
the category of joint tortfeasorship, as hinted at in the above reference to recital 
44 and “collaboration”.  
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Interestingly, especially with a view to a later comparison to the US position 
however, any imputed or knowledge of actual fact that an OSP’s services are being 
used as a conduit for infringing material, is immaterial to the operation of the 
defence insofar as such falls short of the above-mentioned standard of 
“collaboration”/joint tortfeasorship.246 The impact of this is that the defence 
operates in the realm of primary liability for copyright infringement. 
 There is not, at the time of writing, in England and Wales, much case law available 
dealing with the mere conduit defence. Fortunately for this thesis however, those 
cases which have featured a consideration of such, despite predominantly dealing 
with torts of libel or defamation, are in a digital context and may be used to 
extrapolate principles of the legislation in action.  
In Bunt v Tilley,247 a claimant had at first instance sought remedies for defamation 
against six defendants, the first three being individuals and the second three their 
respective ISPs.248 This case was noteworthy because the defamation that had 
occurred on USENET notice boards, for the most part was not hosted by the latter 
three defendants, they only provided access.249 The judge in the High Court had to 
consider the operation of the mere conduit and caching defences, and accepted 
the definition in Gatley that caching is a ‘sort of halfway house between the 
transmission and “hosting”’.250 The learned judge agreed with the proposition that 
ISPs that only provided Internet access to individuals that used such access to post 
defamatory comments on the USENET message board in question, were able to 
rely on the mere conduit defence. Incidentally, the judge highlighted the 
difference between the classification of mere conduit and “hosting” by agreeing 
with Gatley that e-mail provided by an ISP that passes through said ISPs system 
would fall within the definition of mere conduit, whereas ISPs that operate web 
based e-mail services such as Googlemail and who thus store said messages on a 
more permanent basis until they are deleted by relevant users, fall within the 
category of “hosting”.251 The judge struck out the claims against the ISP applicants 
in accordance with CPR Part 3 and that there was ‘indeed no realistic prospect of 
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success on any of the causes of action’ and held the criteria under CPR Part 24 as 
fulfilled.252 
Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corporation.253 concerned 
claims regarding allegations brought by, Metropolitan International Schools, a 
large European provider of adult distance learning courses against three 
defendants, the first, Designtechnica, provides “news, professional reviews, and 
opportunities for public discussion”254 on bulletin boards online, the second and 
third defendants were Google UK Ltd and Google Inc respectively.  
Concerning the mere conduit defence, it will be important to note that Google’s 
liability for publication of allegedly defamatory “snippets” in its searches was 
examined. Despite the fact that the judge considered that Google would not be 
liable for publication and thus the E-Commerce defences would be of no 
relevance, Eady J noted in obiter that ‘it is unclear whether this protection would 
extend to a cached index, such as that of the Third Defendant, which is created 
automatically (by the so called “knowledge bots”) and in relation to the operation 
of the search engine.’ The judge also noted that in Austria recent amending 
statutory provisions have extended the protection in Art.12 of the E-Commerce 
Directive to search engines and that this was referred to in a Department for Trade 
and Industry consultation document in 2005. As such, it is respectfully submitted 
that some practitioner commentators were not entirely correct in their submission 
that Eady J doubted that the defence of mere conduit would extend to a cached 
index created automatically in relation to the operation of the search engine.255 
 
The E-Commerce Directive and thus the EC Regulations contain two other defences 
that OSPs may avail themselves of, already alluded to above, namely those relating 
to “caching” and “hosting”, these will be examined below.   
 
2) The Caching Defence 
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The first of the two further legs of the E-Commerce Directive /EC Regulations 
tripod that are of great import for UK OSPs relates to acts by OSPs that can be 
classified as “caching” as covered by Art.13 E-Commerce Directive; Reg. 18 EC 
Regulations.  
The purpose of the defence of “caching” was admirably defined by Eady J in Bunt v 
Tilly and is as stated above to protect and facilitate OSPs’ operations.256 
Reg.18, states that OSPs that transmit information provided by a recipient of the 
service are principally exempt from liability for automatic, intermediate and a 
temporary storage of information for the sole purpose of dealing with a 
transmission to other recipients upon their request more efficiently.257 There are 
however certain additional qualifications258 which the OSP must comply with, the 
most relevant of which, for the purposes of this thesis, are the requirements that 
the OSPs did not modify the information and that said acted expeditiously to 
remove or disable access to stored information upon obtaining actual knowledge 
for example where a court or other authority has ordered such removal or 
disablement.259  
The caching definition is tailored to its “half-way house” purpose and as such does 
not include the language in the mere conduit defence concerning the initiation of 
transmissions or selecting the receivers. The inclusion of such would have merged 
the definition of ‘mere conduit’ with that of ‘caching’.  
Reg. 18 closely mirrors Art.14 E-Commerce Directive. As such it will be relevant 
that Recital 43 reiterates that the defence is available where OSPs are “in no way is 
involved” with the information transmitted. It is stated, as noted above, that the 
requirement of non-modification of the information does not include 
manipulations of a technical nature taking place during the transmission as these 
do not alter the “integrity” of the actual information comprising the transmission.  
Commentators have observed that the most problematic aspect of the caching 
defence is the requirement concerning knowledge, or the lack thereof, by the OSP, 
in conjunction with the duty to act expeditiously to remove or disable access to 
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stored information. Some commentators have gone so far as to suspect that the 
UK Government was suffering from confusion between the different types of 
knowledge required for the caching and hosting defences and to what extent each 
requires “actual” or “deemed” knowledge, since knowledge of whatever kind of 
unlawful activity is in fact irrelevant to the purpose of the caching defence.260  
The UK Government inserted in Reg. 22, defining ‘notice for the purposes of actual 
knowledge’. As will be seen in later comparisons to the US, the definition of actual 
knowledge can be quite pivotal.261 The problem that some commentators have 
identified is that the instant regulation applies to both the caching defence 
(18(b)(v)) and the hosting defence (19(a)(i)) whilst specifying that in its 
consideration of whether a OSPs has actual knowledge, the court should take all 
relevant matters into account, in particular notices received by the OSP through its 
published details as mandated262 which include details of the a) sender; b) location 
and c) unlawful nature of the activity or information in question. There would 
seem to be in a contradiction between what actual knowledge is required for the 
caching defence and this section, since it seems to imply a broader frame of 
reference i.e. not just of the issues referred to in the above quote. It is in this 
regard submitted that Reg.22 was simply subject to a drafting error, since by 
adopting a purposive approach the interpretation of these two conflicting sections 
it is plainly obvious that they are aimed at different activities. The opposite view 
could be taken that Reg.22 could be read as being subject to the three subject-
matter categories of actual knowledge in Reg. 18, thereby allowing users or 
content providers to notify and OSP of a court or administrative order. If this 
contradiction is not amended, the content providing industry will no doubt wish to 
argue that Reg.22 provides a legitimate extension, and, expansive derogation from 
the caching defence. 
What this means in practice for OSPs 
Leaving the unsatisfactory situation concerning the extent of the actual knowledge 
requirement aside, the operability of the caching defence is perhaps the least 
problematic of the tripod of defences in the EC Regulations. Concerning the mere 
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conduit defence, there are few cases dealing with this subject matter. The 
consideration of one of the defendants in Bunt v Tilley hosting a USENET message 
board on its servers, on which posts remained for weeks at a time, including the 
ability to remove access to posts lead to a determination that this could not be 
described as caching, since this tended more toward the hosting end of the 
spectrum. Similarly, the judge in Designtechnica stated that the automatic and 
informational “snippets” produced by Google in response to searches by users of 
the search engine concerning relevant web sites, were likely to fall outside the 
defence, since the provision of such involved a process of selection and editing.  It 
is thus submitted that the courts apply a stringent test to the factor of 
modification in the caching defence. 
 
3) The Hosting Defence 
 
The “hosting” defence in Art.14 E-Commerce Directive is transposed in Reg. 19 EC 
Regulations. 
Purpose 
In Designtechnica, Eady J cites with approval Collins’ work, The Law of Defamation 
and the Internet (2nd Ed., 2005), concerning the purpose behind the hosting 
defence: ‘[It] is intended to apply to Internet intermediaries who store Internet 
content, such as webpages and bulletin board postings, on their computer 
systems’.263 There is an analogy of renting out space, which is no doubt where the 
term “hosting” came from. 
Definition 
The defence disclaims pecuniary and criminal liability if the OSP is compliant 
concerning the storage of information, which is provided by a recipient of the 
service. In particular two further requirements for the operation of this defence 
must be noted.  Firstly, the OSP question must not have, either; a) actual 
knowledge of unlawful activity/information, nor, b) where a claim for damages is 
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made, awareness of facts or circumstances from which it would have been 
apparent that the activity/ information in question was unlawful. Secondly, in 
circumstances where the OSP had obtained actual knowledge or awareness, it 
must have acted expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information.264 
Thirdly, for the defence to apply it is a requirement that the OSP did not authorise 
or control the actions of the recipient of the service.265 
Aspects concerning the definition and operation 
The above definition of the hosting defence raises several issues. First of all the 
meaning of “unlawful information” despite being pivotal throughout is one which 
is not readily defined; it is in the E-Commerce Directive referred to as “illegal 
information”.266 This encompasses intellectual property rights, but due to the 
nature of the EC Regulations having a wider ambit, also covers other types of 
information. Secondly, the second limb of Reg. 19 could be said to be somewhat 
loosely drafted in the sense that it refers to “such knowledge”, which most likely 
means “actual” knowledge, but this is not stated explicitly and must in turn be 
implied from the vertical latitude of the subsection. Moreover, Reg. 19(a)(ii) EC 
Regulations is also somewhat oddly drafted concerning the tense used by the verb 
“to act” in that it refers to “upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove award to disable access to the information”. It might be 
observed by some commentators that using the present tense in this context limits 
the duty of OSPs, since it inherently lessens the scope of the duty to act 
immediately. On the other hand it could be stated that the current wording implies 
an ongoing duty, for example also throughout the conduct of litigation. Also 
concerning this section, “expeditiously” is not defined. 
Lastly as has been noted above, the Regulations contain guidance concerning the 
definition of actual knowledge.267 It however remains to elaborate on the meaning 
of the interplay between actual knowledge and awareness. Actual knowledge in 
litigation terms is a more stringent standard than awareness from facts or 
circumstances. Furthermore, awareness of certain facts or circumstances is tied to 
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the requirement of apparentness of the unlawful nature of the acts or information, 
but can only relate to damages, which on one view might include other civil 
pecuniary remedies, but will purposefully exclude criminal liability/sanctions. 
Therefore actual knowledge must be proven by a claimant before the defence can 
be removed and criminal liability established. 
Whereas most responses during the consultation process on the implementation 
of the E-Commerce Directive made apparent that there was demand for 
clarification of the definition of what would constitute actual knowledge or 
awareness, some commentators such as Rushbrooke, were cited as explicitly 
stating that they saw no difficulty in leaving the courts free to give the words 
“actual knowledge” their normal meaning during litigation.268 Some commentators 
have noted that this approach of “let the courts clarify the issues” was adopted by 
the government and the government remained of the view that providing a 
positive definition that would risk creating loopholes that could be exploited to 
avoid liability inappropriately or by being too prescriptive about what could and 
what would not constitute actual knowledge would be undesirable.269 
Concerning the hosting defence, it must be added that Art.14(3) E-Commerce 
Directive expressly states that the hosting defence does not affect possible current 
or future procedures governing the removal or of disabling of access to 
information. What is referred to here is a form of takedown regime, as will be 
delved into in the US Part.270 This is a legalism to prevent an argument that given 
the defence there must also be an unequivocal right to host information. 
What this means in practice for OSPs 
One is reminded of the judge’s statement in Bunt v Tilley, as cited above, that ISPs 
providing web-based e-mail services will most likely be held to have hosted such 
messages. In the particular circumstances of the case, concerning USENET message 
boards hosted on one of the ISP defendants’ servers, posts were stored for several 
weeks to allow users to access said. The ISP in question had the ability to edit posts 
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on its servers. It was stated that such would fall within the category of “hosting”. 
However, due to the fact that the claimant had failed to comply with the notice 
provisions in Reg.22 EC Regulations,271 the claimant was not able to prove actual 
knowledge within the meaning of Reg.19(1)(A)(i) and thus the hosting defence was 
stated to be applicable on the facts.272 This shows the operability of the definition 
of actual knowledge in action, and that it is an important limitation that accrues to 
the benefit of OSPs and to the detriment of content providers or other similarly 
situated claimants. 
In Designtechnica, Eady J when faced with a consideration of whether the hosting 
defence applied to search engines services, the facts being noted above, stated 
that he considered it likely that for Google to the able to make use of the defence 
concerning “snippets” additional legislation would have to be passed. This can be 
termed a purposive approach to statutory interpretation as required by most EC 
legislation.  
The judge reached this decision following a serious consideration of the wider 
European and policy perspective in order to avoid coming to an interpretation of 
English law that might be viewed as inconsistent, despite his statements to the 
contrary.273 The judge first of all noted that the European Commission encouraged 
Member States to extend protection to search engines, noting the borderless 
nature of commerce online.274 Eady J then followed the developments in other 
Member States.  
No Monitoring in Electronic Commerce (mere conduit; caching; hosting) by OSPs 
Following on from the above, and importantly for OSPs, the judge in 
Designtechnica referred to several cases decided in European jurisdictions:  
Palomo v Google Inc. by the Court of First Instance in Madrid in its judgement of 13 
May 2009, rejecting liability by the defendant for offering search results providing 
hyperlinks to sites carrying the defamatory content based only perceived shift of 
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European legislation towards the exemption of “Internet intermediaries” from the 
obligation to supervise content, in the absence of actual knowledge. 
SARL Publison System v SARL Google France, by the Paris Court of Appeal on 19 
March 2009, where the claimant claimed “snippets” and hyperlinks provided by 
Google to the main site, as in the instant case, were defamatory. The court decided 
that Google did not have a duty to assess the lawfulness of the indexed website. 
Moreover the court held that where Google used indexing robots and did not 
create or host of the disputed information, the company was not under any 
automatic obligation to monitor. The court also was of the opinion that due to the 
rather large volume of information that the search operator and dealt with it was 
unable, even if desired, to analyse the content. 
In respect of the above, it is very relevant that OSP liability in connection with 
actual knowledge or awareness of the facts and circumstances is limited by E-
Commerce Directive Art.15 which prohibits the imposition of a general obligation 
on OSPs providing either mere conduit, caching all hosting services to monitor the 
information that is transmitted or stored, nor to actively seek facts or 
circumstances concerning illegal activity. Art.15 however in its second limb permits 
Member States to establish notification regimes for the benefit of public 
authorities where the OSP becomes aware of illegal activities/information or 
where OSPs are requested to provide upon request the identities of the recipients 
of the service provided by OSPs. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Given that permitted acts in relation to copyright material are at least in 
philosophical terms more important, if less noteworthy than the specifically 
crafted E-Commerce Directive exceptions, these will be concluded first. 
Permitted Acts 
The main relevance of the fair dealing provisions in the CDPA 1988 to this thesis, 
lies in the fact that where a potential direct copyright infringer/user’s conduct is 
accordingly entirely exempt from liability, it logically follows that any online 
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intermediary will also be exempt under common law theories of 3PCL. Having 
stated this, it must nonetheless be observed that OSPs may of course avail 
themselves of the fair dealing provisions where they are themselves direct 
infringers. The fair dealing categories are, from an international perspective not 
wide, also concerning the arguably most relevant category, namely, ‘criticism and 
review’ of a prior lawful making available to the public requirement.275  
Concerning s.28A CDPA 1988, the interpretation of said section is particularly 
problematic. This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, the concept of ‘independent 
economic significance’ can be stated to be open to interpretation shaped by 
particular policy or industry interests such as the content providing industry. This is 
clear from Kitchin J is statements in F.A.P.L v QC Leisure above. Secondly, as 
Infopaq I has shown, the definition of in part/substantial part is tied in with the 
test of ‘the expression of the intellectual creation of the author’, and possibly 
shrunk, negated, or  supplemented somewhat considering the reference to 11 
words in said judgement.276 Concerning the aspect of the technological process in 
question, and the transient copying, it was unsurprisingly held that printing during 
or at the end of the technological process would render Art.5(1) EUCD 
inapplicable.  
Concerning the direct effect of these points on the topic of this thesis, these 
problems may be readily transferred into the realm of OSPs and music/film. The 
problems concerning the concept of independent economic significance and the 
issues raised by Infopaq I mean that it can cautiously be stated that were these 
matters to be tested in a contentious setting it is likely that the content providing 
industry would find these particular outcomes less troublesome to any assessment 
of future claims for infringement or as indeed mitigating the operability of s.28A 
CDPA 1988 itself. 
 
E-Commerce Defences 
The very fact that the E-Commerce Directive defences came into being emphasises 
the importance of the OSP/ISP industry to the public interest. What is remarkable 
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in this regard is that at the time the defences were drafted, the internet and/or 
online services were in their infancy.277 
The purpose of this conclusion is not to repeat specific details, but rather to 
provide a brief general ex post facto analysis. Firstly it will be remembered that the 
function of all three defences is to provide defences concerning civil claims for 
damages (and probably similar remedies) and criminal sanctions. All three 
defences disclaim operability in relation to courts requiring OSPs to terminate or 
prevent infringement278or parties to applying to the courts for injunctions. In this 
connection, Art.18(1) E-Commerce Directive reiterates that Member States must 
ensure the availability of measures specifically including interim measures 
designed to end any alleged infringements and prevent further impairment of 
interests. E-Commerce Directive defences are not similar in nature to those listed 
in Chapter 3 CDPA 1988, above. Certain acts by OSPs would remain primary 
infringements, albeit ones to which there is an exception and thus a defence. 
OSPs must monitor their activities to remain in compliance with in particular the 
standard of actual knowledge or awareness, as noted above. Even where an OSP is 
within the scope of the EC Regulations, notice may be subsequently served and 
unless it is then acted upon, the effect of such on the OSP will be to lose the right 
to defend itself under the requisite defence, in respect of continuing or future 
infringements. Concerning the kind of notice, given the above mentioned 
discrepancies, this will differ between the caching and hosting defences. It will be 
remembered that the applicability of the defence of mere conduit does not hinge 
upon knowledge or awareness of any kind, as such, an OSP that knows or suspects 
that a customer is transmitting infringing information or works, will still be able to 
avail itself of the defence. As with all three defences, they will be dis-applied given 
the instance of any “deliberate collaboration”, which for hosting takes the form of 
authorisation or control. 
 
D. Third-Party Liability for Copyright Infringement 
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The categories of copyright works, primary copyright infringement and defences 
primarily applicable in this respect having been examined in Chapters A-C, the 
central element of this thesis, namely, 3PCL for copyright infringement may now 
be turned to. In this respect, such will be defined in the unique UK context, placed 
in perspective and compared with the general tort theories, and the two main 
constituent parts examined; namely authorisation and joint tortfeasorship. 
Thereafter, in keeping with the logical structure of this thesis, in the event that 
liability is produced, remedies will be examined. Moreover, the discussion will be 
supplemented by an examination of the DEA 2010, given its particular relevance to 
a crucial subset of OSPs. Lastly, a general conclusion will highlight relevant findings 
in relation to this chapter, and in particular 3PCL. 
 
I. Secondary Copyright Infringement Defined 
 
The provisions under the CDPA 1988 relating to secondary liability are ss.22-26. 
Reference is made to the above section on primary copyright infringement, which 
provides conceptual assistance by delineating its contents from secondary 
copyright infringement thereby orientating the discourse in this thesis. These 
provisions are stale in that they have little to do with modern OSP related liability 
issues, at least as they relate to the categories of works this thesis is covering;279 
they cover commercial acts relating to the importation of infringing copies into the 
UK, possessing or dealing with infringing copies, providing the means for making 
infringing copies, permitting use of premises for infringing performance and 
provision of apparatus for infringing performance. They are the only statutory 
categories of copyright infringement requiring primary acts of infringement.  
It must at this juncture be stated that this statutory construction is worthy of note, 
especially with a view to later chapters.280 The 1977 Copyright Committee 
(Whitford)281 recommended that persons authorising infringements should be held 
liable and that this was to be included in this section. It may therefore be argued 
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that the Whitford Committee was in favour of a logical expansion of the secondary 
liability section. 
The main requirement running through ss.22-26 CDPA 1988 for liability to manifest 
itself is one of “guilty knowledge” on behalf of the defendant. This requirement is 
present to ensure that traders that deal in infringing copies without suspecting 
such or having the wherewithal to ascertain such are not held liable. This could, on 
the side, be stated to be the antithesis to the distribution right, while bearing in 
mind that such traders may for example be liable for issuing copies to the public 
under s. 18 CDPA 1988. 
 
II. A Tort Law Perspective 
 
Torts may be delineated by reference to contracts, unjust enrichments and other 
events as proposed by Birks in his fourfold classification.282 Generally it may be said 
that for civil wrongs as a category the nature of the wrong gives rise to the 
remedy. A civil wrong may be defined as “a breach of the legal duty which affects 
the interests of the individual to a degree which the law regards sufficient to allow 
the individual to complain on his or her account, rather than as a representative of 
society as a whole”.283 
On a conceptual level Winfield also offers a distinction between tort and contract; 
namely that tortious duties are fixed by law, whereas contractual duties are based 
on the consent of the parties and the terms set out between them.284 Atiyah 
frames this in terms of referring to voluntary obligations for contracts, and 
involuntary obligations for tort.285 In most cases tortious duties are owed to 
persons generally, whereas contractual duties are owed to specific persons; 
whereas Birks notes that there is significant scope for overlap.286 
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Concerning intellectual property rights, infringement can in some instances be 
recognised as tortious despite the fact that breach of said rights is placed on a 
statutory footing; breaches thus not being torts at common law. Arnold (as he was 
then) notes that a precise delineation of the nature of intellectual property rights 
generally is however not available.287 Yet, as noted in PSM International Plc v 
Specialised Fastener Products (Southern) Ltd, fortunately for this thesis in terms of 
simplification, the infringement of copyright is always treated as a tortious 
invasion of a property right. 288  
 
1) Vicarious Liability 
It is accepted as a principle of law in the United Kingdom that a person is liable for 
torts committed by other persons where it can be determined that such were 
authorised or subsequently ratified. In this general tort law corpus “authorising” 
can be said to involve instigating another to commit a tort. Whereas classically this 
type of liability lies between an employer and employee it is not limited to the 
commission of common law torts. Vicarious liability can also be imposed for 
equitable wrongs and breaches of statutory obligations, as held in Majrowski v 
Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust,289 where an employer, the appellant NHS Trust, 
was held vicariously liable in damages under s.3 Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 (PHA 1997), due to the actions by one of its employees which amounted to 
harassment in breach of s.1 PHA 1997. It was held that unless the statute in 
question expressly or impliedly indicated that vicarious liability was not applicable, 
an employee that committed a breach of statutory obligation which sounded in 
damages while acting in the course of employment, could thus implicate the 
employer. It was however also stated that: 
A precondition of vicarious liability is that the wrong must be 
committed by an employee in the course of his employment. (...) If this 
prerequisite is satisfied the policy reasons underlying the common law 
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principle are as much applicable to equitable wrongs and breaches of 
statutory obligations as they are to common law torts.290 
It would thus seem that even concerning ‘ratification’ which is defined as “in 
effect, subsequent authorisation”,291 vicarious liability is generally not readily 
applicable or transposable into the realm of intellectual property, even where the 
employer-employee relationship substituted for that of an independent contractor 
or falls within the sui generis category of liability for negligent acts committed with 
lent chattel (mainly cars).292 
 
2) Joint and Several Torts 
 
Where torts are committed by two or more tortfeasors, these may be a) joint 
tortfeasors where the defendants are each responsible for a joint, tortious course 
of action which injures another; b) several tortfeasors which have caused the same 
damage; or c) several tortfeasors causing different damage.293  
Generally, theories concerning and developed by case law involving joint and 
several torts deal with relationships concerning agents/principals, 
employers/employees and independent contractors294  similarly in this regard to 
vicarious liability, mentioned in the preceding section above. However, 
interestingly for this thesis, liability as to joint and several torts in the general, non-
IP, field is not limited to instances such as these, where a pre-existing relationship 
is required for the operability of the instant theory of liability.  
Such liability may instead also be imposed in cases where there is no pre-existing 
relationship, as long as a concerted action can be identified. This would mean, for 
example, that one person instigated another to commit a tort, thus creating joint 
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tortfeasors.295 Situations where two or more parties can be identified to have 
respective shares in the commission of a tort, and these are done in the 
furtherance of the common design, this will also suffice for tortious liability to 
arise.296  
In terms of delineating this category of liability, it is thus logical that mere 
similarity of design on the part of independent actors, causing independent 
damage, is not enough; there must be concerted action towards a common end.297 
Therefore mere facilitation, as compared to actual procurement, does not give rise 
to liability.298 
It is in this connection reiterated again that commentators have observed that 
torts of all kinds may be joint. 
 
III. Authorisation (Unauthorised Authorisation) 
 
1) A Short History of Authorisation 
Whereas the current definition of authorisation of copyright infringement, as 
discussed in detail in the section below, has evolved from that accepted for the 
purposes of the CA 1911 i.e. to ‘sanction, approve, and countenance’,299  the 
situation immediately prior to and following the introduction of the word 
“authorised” with the CA 1911 is nonetheless instructive.300  
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The situation prior to the CA 1911, as exemplified by Karno v. Pathé Frères,301 
evidenced reliance on a statutory environment which negated 3PCL in 
circumstances where “a defendant who for reward gave permission to a third 
person to represent a play in breach of the owner's copyright did not "cause it to 
be represented," unless the person so representing it was the servant or agent of 
the defendant.”302 It will be observed that the operative element in the definition 
of 3PCL in was “cause” which was substituted with the word “authorise” in the 
1911 Act and given meaning by Tomlin J in Evans v. Hulton303 as well as Buckley LJ 
in Monckton v. Pathé Frères.304  
In Evans v. Hulton, Tomlin J seeking to fill the statutory right of the copyright 
holder to authorise certain acts relating to a work with the normal, ordinary 
meaning, had recourse to the Oxford dictionary which defined “to authorise” as 
“to give formal approval to, to sanction, approve, countenance”.305 Two things may 
be indirectly observed in this respect. The first is that it is noteworthy that the 
plain dictionary definition of authorisation was adopted in this manner, and 
continues to be used today. The second is that both the adoption of authorisation 
in this regard as well as the dictionary meaning accorded, as recognised in the 
Falcon v. Famous Film Players, represents a half-turn from the requirement of 
directions to another implicit in the word “cause”.306 Though not terminologically 
acknowledged at the time, ‘authorisation’ by the allowance for a finding of such on 
the part of the authoriser without authority can be termed ‘ratification’. The 
problem that arises however is that it is stated in Falcon, “a man who has no legal 
right to do an act himself may authorize another to do it, if that other believes that 
he is in a position to give him the legal right to do it, which was the case here.”  
This means that the definition “sanction, approve, and countenance” falls prey to 
the same problem in modern OSP contexts, with the theory of authorisation 
predicated upon, as will be seen below, of an ‘inducing’ grant of permission, 
namely that it is entirely unlikely that in situations factually similar to that in 
Newzbin, but arguably even in Amstrad, most direct infringers actually believe a 
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transfer of such a right or permission is vested in the purveyor and actually takes 
place.  
It is therefore submitted that it is regrettable that an illogical and impermissible 
state of affairs has been reached in the UK jurisprudence where this ‘inconvenient 
fact’ of a requirement of belief on the part of the direct infringer is ignored. Some 
commentators may well enquire whether in particular the High Court was free to 
make such an assessment, given clear precedent.307 Yet this similarity between the 
two definitions of authorisation in UK law is perhaps not surprising given Atkin LJ’s 
recognition in Falcon that his, subsequently oft quoted and relied on “construction 
of the word to “authorise”, predicated upon granting of permission, as examined 
above, “seems to have been the one adopted by Buckley L.J. in Monckton v. Pathé 
Frères, where he held that the seller of a gramophone record authorizes the use of 
the record, and by Tomlin J., (...) in Evans v. Hulton”.308 In other words, both 
definitions may be equated. These facets are explored in depth below. 
 
2) The Current Definition of Authorisation 
The current definition of authorisation of copyright infringement has evolved from 
that accepted for the purposes of the CA 1911 i.e. to ‘sanction, approve, and 
countenance’,309  to that approved of in Amstrad and Newzbin, citing Atkin LJ: 
[T]o ‘authorise’ means to grant or purport to grant to a third person the 
right to do the act complained of, whether the intention is that the 
grantee act on his own account, or only on account of the grantor.310 
It was held in Amstrad that in the context of the CA 1956 that the above grant or 
purported grant of the right to do the act complained of may be expressed or 
implied.311 It is furthermore of particular interest that the definition of 
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authorisation espoused in Moorhouse v. The University of New South Wales312 per 
Gibbs J: 
A person who has under his control the means by which an 
infringement of copyright may be committed-such as a photocopying 
machine-and who makes it available to other persons, knowing, or 
having reason to suspect, that it is likely to be used for the purpose of 
committing an infringement, and omitting to take reasonable steps to 
limit its use to legitimate purposes, would authorise any infringement 
that resulted from its use.313 
was met with what can be termed a “judicial shrug of the shoulders”. 314 
Likewise the definition in R.C.A. Corporation v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (High Court 
of Australia)315 approving a passage in Laddie, Prescott and Victoria, the Modern 
Law of Copyright (1980)316 per Kearney J,317 was refused as being stated much too 
widely in Amstrad: 
A person may be said to authorise another to commit an infringement if 
one has some form of control over the other at the time of infringement 
or, if he has no such control, is responsible for placing in the other’s 
hands materials which by their nature are almost inevitably to be used 
for the purpose of infringement.318 
The above could be termed an “inevitability” test, and it is interesting to see how 
Kitchin J’s judgement in Newzbin could, impliedly, be said to incorporate or reflect 
this standard to a certain degree. This will be looked at below, however it must 
first be noted that the definition of authorisation approved in Amstrad and also in 
Newzbin was the same as that propounded by Whitford J in C.B.S. Inc v. Ames 
Records & Tapes Ltd.319: 
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Any ordinary person would, I think, assume that an authorisation can 
only come from somebody having or purporting to have authority and 
that an act is not authorised by somebody who merely enables or 
possibly assists or even encourages another to do that act, but does not 
purport to have any authority which he can grant to justify the doing of 
the act.320 
To be specific, it was held in Newzbin that authorisation: 
 [D]oes not extend to the enablement, assistance or even 
encouragement. The grant or purported grant to do the relevant act 
may be expressly implied from the relevant circumstances. In a case 
which involves an allegation of authorisation by supply, these 
circumstances may include the nature of the relationship between the 
alleged authoriser and the primary infringer, whether the equipment or 
other material supplied constitutes the means used to infringe, whether 
it is inevitable it will be used to infringe, the degree of control which the 
supplier retains and whether he has taken any steps to prevent 
infringement. These are matters to be taken into account and may or 
may not be determinative depending upon all the other 
circumstances.321  
The above definition of authorisation can, as noted above, be viewed as 
incorporating the somewhat wider “inevitability” standard rejected in Amstrad. It 
is furthermore submitted that this definition contains at the very least a modicum 
of logical inconsistency, concerning the combination of the aforementioned 
standard and the stated “rejection” of enablement, assistance and 
encouragement. The disclaimer concerning determinativeness waxes thinly given 
the application, as discussed below, of this standard in the instant case. 
Before applying the stated definition of authorisation, Kitchin J in Newzbin 
examined the Australian law on authorisation. After noting the applicability of 
s.101 Australian CA 1968, the judge went on to briefly summarise two pertinent 
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decisions, namely Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd322 and the more 
recent Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (No. 3).323  
Cooper concerned a website which was run for commercial benefit and provided 
hyperlinks to popular sound recordings which could be downloaded easily. The 
essence of the case can be summarised as being that whereas the overwhelming 
majority of files were protected by copyright, the operator had a commercial 
interest in attracting users and furthermore did not take any reasonable steps to 
prevent or avoid use of said website for the copying copyrighted sound recordings. 
It was in fact alleged that the operator deliberately designed the website to 
facilitate such use and that disclaimers to the contrary were merely cosmetic.  
The recent decision in Roadshow concerned itself with the liability of an ISP in 
Australia for the infringement of copyright in cinematographic works by users 
employing Bit Torrent technology.324  The claim against the ISP was dismissed on 
three grounds, firstly because infringements occurred as a result of the Bit Torrent 
system and not the ISPs services and in this context it was relevant that the ISP did 
not control Bit Torrent; secondly, because the ISP did not have the power to 
prevent infringements; and thirdly because the ISP did not sanction, approve or 
countenance copyright infringement.  
It should be noted that an appeal was filed in Roadshow as of 25 February 2010 by 
AFACT (Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft), an industry action group, 
stating that “there were good grounds to appeal the decision” since “the court 
found large-scale copyright infringements, that iiNet knew they were occurring, 
that iiNet had the contractual and technical capacity to stop them and [that] iiNet 
did nothing about them”.325 However, as Swinson & Pearson have noted, “the 
decision to appeal is interesting given that the decision of Justice Cowdroy 
suggests that the applicants’ claim was wholly without merit – stating that “it was 
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impossible to conclude that iiNet has authorised copyright infringement”.326 In any 
event, on 24 February 2011 the Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) in 
Roadshow327  dismissed the appeal. It found that there was no authorisation by the 
defendant of the acts of infringement committed by the relevant users. It is 
unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the reasoning in depth, 
including the operability of the interesting safe harbour provisions discussed in the 
judgment.328 
 In respect of Cooper and Roadshow Kitchin J in Newzbin noted that they were 
decided differently because the facts in both cases were very different – but also 
that they were entirely consistent with the principles which applied in his case. 
To avoid the impression that the above represent the only cases in the UK on 
authorisation, it must be observed that there are numerous other cases dealing 
with this form of liability.329 Those cited above are however the ones most 
relevant. 
 
3) Application of Authorisation Liability 
It is worth at this juncture analysing one of the most recent and relevant decisions 
by the High Court in this area, namely Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation et al 
v Newzbin Limited.330 The facts were as above.331 
The claimants claimed that the defendants infringed copyright by authorising such 
within the meaning of s.16(2) CDPA 1988, namely, ‘copyright in a work is infringed 
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by a person who without the licence of the copyright owner does, or authorises 
another to do, any of the acts restricted by the copyright’. It may be worth noting 
already, before examining the claims of joint tortfeasorship below332 that these 
concepts are logically related in the sense that authorising another whether 
inherently or overtly and the concept of becoming a joint tortfeasor or having 
procured the infringing act, could be said to be a matter of degree. In practice, the 
grey area lying between the authorisation and the joint tortfeasorship or 
procurement of an infringing act is often crossed. Although it must in this regard 
would be remembered that “authorisation” of an infringement is distinct from the 
infringing act itself. Contrary to some commentators’ assertions, 333 this distinction 
is perhaps best highlighted and derived from the wording of s.16(2) CDPA 1988 
itself rather than cases such as Ash v Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd,334 or more 
recently, ABKCO Music v Music Collection International Ltd.335 For that wording 
itself suggests an independent act. It must in this connection, unsurprisingly, also 
be noted that the acts of a party’s servants or agents may render the principal 
vicariously liable. 
 
a) Comparison to Amstrad 
 
It is not surprising that Kitchin J in Newzbin cites Amstrad when going over the 
meaning of authorisation in the context of copyright infringement.336 In Amstrad 
the claimants famously objected to the manufacture and sale by the defendants of 
machines ‘offering [a] double headed copying facility [which] encourages, incites 
or otherwise facilitates the copying of pre-recorded and other cassettes containing 
copyrighted sound recordings and musical works’(in other words twin-tape decks 
operable at double speed when recording).337 
 
The Descriptions 
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In what is a beautiful parallel, Lord Templeman in Amstrad picks out two facts 
regarding the plaintiff’s conduct that mirror the claimant’s conduct in Newzbin, 
parts of which were cited by Kitchin J. The first relates to the description of the 
recording equipment ,‘now features “high-speed dubbing” enabling you to make 
duplicate recordings from one record to another record directly from any source 
and then make a copy and you can even make a copy of your favourite cassette’.338 
The above quote specifically advertises the copying and “high-speed dubbing” 
feature of the product. This aspect of the product was advertised to “home 
copiers” by Templeman LJ that is to say ‘members of the public who, by using 
Amstrad or other machines which were capable of making copies of sound 
recordings, can copy onto a blank tape and expenditure of less than one pound an 
original recording priced at £5 or £10. A home copier makes a copy for his own 
private use and is thus to be distinguished from a “pirate” who makes infringing 
copies the sale.’339 The feature is used to record and tape onto a blank tape at 
twice the speed of playback. 
It was secondly, noted by Templeman LJ that an asterisk at the end of the above 
warning drew the potential purchaser’s attention to a footnote, ‘the recording and 
playback of certain material may only be possible by permission. Please refer to 
the CA 1956, and the Performers Protection Act 1958-1972.’340 
Before going on to examine the parallel the above presents to the instant case, it is 
worth noting that Templeman LJ cited the whole advertisement for the Amstrad 
model tape recorder. This is relevant because it puts the “boast” about the “high 
speed dubbing” into perspective, or rather, into further perspective. The advert 
started with the assertion that the Amstrad model consisted of various other ‘flush 
look’ parts.341 Thus the “boast” was part of a longer advertisement that lessened 
the impact or the value of incitement to purchase an Amstrad machine based on 
its technical capability to copy works quickly. 
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Concerning the parallels to the instant case, the log in/welcome page and message 
on the Newzbin website similarly informed users of other features.342This can be 
likened to the advertising for the Amstrad model. A statement appeared on the 
bottom at the same page: 
 
Newzbin indexes the contents of USENET, however it neither provides or 
uploads any of the files that may be contained within it. Any 
descriptions are a result of the indexing and therefore do not relate to 
downloadable files.343 
This attempt at a disclaimer thus bears semblance to the disclaimer in the Amstrad 
case, even if it is somewhat less fact specific; what however is clear, is that as 
noted above, the user terms and conditions mirror those of the editors, which 
“attempt” to restrict the use of the site to lawful purposes not including ‘breach of 
copyright or any other intellectual property rights, or in breach of the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990 or other relevant legislation or the right s of another user’.344 
 
b) The difference between Amstrad and Newzbin 
Of course, there are certain major differences between Amstrad and Newzbin. 
First of all, blank tapes are capable of being used to record any recording whether 
protected by copyright or not and, in cases where copies are made of copyright 
protected works defences may be available. As such tapes or better to say Amstrad 
tape recorders are dual use items, despite it being noted in the case that “it is 
statistically certain that most but not all consoles are used for the purpose of 
home copying in breach of copyright”.345 Furthermore, it is up to the purchaser or 
operator of the equipment whether and what kinds of copies are made. Notably, 
the manufacturer, Amstrad, has no control over this activity following the first sale 
of the product. Lord Templeman in Amstrad noted, and Kitchin J cited almost 
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verbatim in Newzbin, that “by selling the equipment, the defendants might 
facilitate copying but did not authorise it”.346  
Newzbin’s services include not only indexing and categorisation but also the 
creation of NZB files available to download onto members’ computers which allow 
for the assembly of original binary works and the making of copies of said in doing 
so. In this connection it is significant that the judge considered it highly relevant 
that “a very large proportion of the content of the Movies category is commercial 
and so very likely to be protected by copyright” and that “in the context of the 
other features of Newzbin, the NZB facility provides the means for infringement, 
was created by the defendant and is entirely within the defendant’s control”.347 It 
would thus seem that the element of “ongoing” control in Newzbin coupled with 
the skewed ratio of copyright protected to unprotected works is the main 
differences between the two cases. The judge in Newzbin also cited the absence of 
a filtering system to deal with the very large proportion of copyrighted content, as 
well as the active encouragement of editors to make reports on films, as 
supporting the proposition of authorisation of copyright infringement.348 
Concerning advertising, there is also a significant divergence between both cases. 
It is noted in Newzbin that the advertising in Amstrad did not authorise unlawful 
copying; instead, or rather to the contrary, it warned that some copying required 
permission and made it clear that the manufacturers Amstrad did not have any 
authority to grant such permission.349 It was also noted, more or less verbatim 
from Amstrad, that “no purchaser could reasonably deduce from the equipment or 
from the advertisement that the defendants possessed or purported to possess 
the authority to grant any required permission for a record to be copied”.350 What 
is it particularly interesting in this regard is that this is a close, policy, judgment 
call.351 
 
c) Application of the Law to the Facts 
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The facts which were relevant for a finding of authorisation of copyright 
infringement were as follows. The judge first noted that the premium members 
had infringed the claimants’ copyright in their films, including those specifically 
identified these proceedings, by subscribing to Newzbin’s facilities which allowed 
them to download said works. Considering the question of authorisation on the 
part of Newzbin, Kitchin J opined that the following particularly relevant: 
1) The nature of the relationship between the defendant and its members: 
This analysis included noting the “for profit” contractual nature of the setup; the 
specialised and targeted categories and subcategories; the binary listing and 
grouping of messages and the extremely useful and important NZB facility.  
2) The large proportion of copyright protected content and the movies category; 
3) The absence of an easy to install and thus entirely feasible filtering system; 
4) The encouragement to the editors regarding posting films with URLs; and 
5) The retention and editors who have been known to post reports on infringing 
materials. 
It was therefore held that: 
 [A] reasonable member would deduce from the defendant’s activities 
that it purports to possess the authority to grant any required 
permission to copy any film and that a member may choose the Movies 
category on Newzbin and that the defendant has sanctioned, approved 
and countenanced the copying of claimants’ films.352  
Kitchin J chose to specifically incorporate the definition “sanctioned, approved and 
countenanced”. The wording of the above when read closely, despite faintly 
resembling the definition as espoused by Atkin LJ as mentioned, could be said to 
be impotent, since it only refers to purporting to possess the requisite authority 
and not actually purporting to do any granting of the right to do the act 
complained of. This formulation has more in common with the statement of 
Whitford J in Ames. In fact, it mirrors the ordinary/reasonable person standard353 
as well as “having or purporting to have authority”. What must be stated however 
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in this regard is that Whitford J’s observation whilst being an accurate observation 
cannot be said to reflect the standard required for a finding of authorisation of 
copyright infringement per se. Instead it is perhaps better to view Whitford J’s 
above quoted statement as an elaboration on Atkin LJ’s standard, again as noted 
above. It could perhaps be observed in this regard that Kitchin J was aware of this 
fact and therefore included the word “and” in his finding, as emphasised. What is 
however troubling in this regard is that the definition “sanctioned, approved and 
countenanced” has more in common, as noted above, with the wider 
“inevitability” standard, since the definition in Ames also specifically states that 
someone who “merely enables or possibly assists or even encourages another to 
do that act, but does not purport to have any authority which he can grant to 
justify the doing of the act”, would not be liable for authorisation of copyright 
infringement and that what is required per Atkin LJ; also specifically, a “purported 
grant”. It must therefore, with great respect, be submitted that Kitchin J must have 
suspected that a combination of Atkins J’s and Whitford J’s definition of 
authorisation, as adopted in Amstrad, would not have yielded a finding of liability 
on the part of Newzbin. Only by reformulating these standards could liability be 
produced. 
The incorporation of the various factors listed above, following a consideration of 
the Australian practice of taking such factors into account, whereas arguably 
legitimate, relies quite heavily not only on the statute but on the formulation of 
authorisation in Moorhouse, that control of the means, making available of such 
with knowledge or suspicion of infringement without reasonable preventative 
measures, results in liability.354 The judicial finding in the instant case, without 
saying as much, arguably thus distinguishes Amstrad from Newzbin due to the 
alleged control element, since it would otherwise overlook the absence of a duty 
“to prevent or discourage or warn against infringement” as in Amstrad.355 
Although it could be argued that the control element is only relevant to a finding of 
negligence. Concerning the actual level of control, bearing in mind that the 
definition in Moorehouse cites photocopying machines as providing the requisite 
standard, it must be said that providing search, indexing and NZB facilities to 
premium members would most likely objectively be viewed as exceeding the 
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requisite minimum level of control of the means by which infringement of 
copyright may be committed. 
 
IV. Procurement and Participation in a Common Design (Joint 
Tortfeasorship) 
 
1) The Definition of Procurement and Participation in a Common Design 
Copyright infringement, despite its seemingly elevated status among the throng of 
torts a culpable person/entity may commit, is susceptible to the common rules 
regarding joint/several liability just as much baser civil wrongs. As such, it is not 
surprising that the plaintiffs in Newzbin allege, and Kitchin J considers 
“procurement and participation in a common design”. Yet many of the applicable 
formulations from precedent stem from cases that do not deal with intellectual 
property matters.  
Concerning copyright infringement in this way, liability for procurement is separate 
from the participation in a common design. The procurement of copyright 
infringement will render the participants jointly and severally liable, whereas 
participation in a common design will only render the perpetrators jointly liable. As 
noted in the case, there is naturally a lot of overlap between the two categories. 
This classification is relevant since: 
 If one of a number of joint tortfeasors, or of several tortfeasors causing 
the same damage, is sued alone, he is liable for the whole damage, 
though he did but a small part of it. In the case of several tortfeasors 
causing different damage, on the other hand, each is liable only for the 
damage which he has caused.356 
One of the perhaps most authoritative discourses on the application of the 
allegation of the legal construct of joint liability can be found in Amstrad. The case 
thus references several patent decisions relating to the concept in question. The 
first two cases cited shore up the theory that knowledge whether general or 
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specific, that a customer or associate will use the product sold, and one would 
assume that this would be the same for services provided, in a manner such as to 
infringe an intellectual property right, is insufficient to render the person with such 
knowledge liable for joint infringement. It was held in Townsend v  Haworth 
(1875), a case that dealt with a defendant selling chemicals for use by the 
purchaser to infringe a patent, concomitantly with purported promises of 
indemnification should the purchaser be liable, that: 
Selling material for the purpose of infringing a patent to the man who 
was going to infringe it, even although the party who sells it knows that 
he is going to infringe it and indemnify him, does not by itself make the 
person who sells an infringer. He must be a party with a man who so 
infringes, and actually infringe.357  
In Amstrad the rights holders also tried to avail themselves of the decision in Innes 
v. Short and Beal (1898), a case in which the defendant sold powdered zinc and 
included instructions on how the purchaser may infringe a process patent, in 
particular: 
There is no reason whatever why Mr Short should not sell powdered 
zinc, and he will not be in the wrong, though he may know or expect the 
people who buy it from him are going to use it in such a way as will 
amount to an infringement of Mr Innes’ patent rights. But he must not 
ask the people to use it in that way, and he must not ask the people to 
use it in that way in order to induce them to buy this powdered zinc from 
him.358  
Therefore, the above two cases make clear that the law required a joint infringer 
to be “a party” or that incitement or inducement of infringement had taken place. 
Furthermore, the third case cited in this connection examined the nature of the 
products sold - questioning whether they could be, in essence, dual use. A product 
which could be dual use, naturally, would lessen the culpability of the parties 
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involved in the commission of the alleged infringement, by providing what could 
be stated to be an inherent defence.  
Thus, in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Limited v David Mosley & Sons Ltd where the 
products in question were tyre covers which formed part of a combination patent 
for tyres and rims, but which whilst being adapted for use in the manner described 
in the patent, could also be used for other purposes. Swinfen-Eady J stated that 
“the covers would probably ultimately be used in one or other of the patented 
methods but that those are not exhaustive of the purposes to which the covers 
may be put, and that they would be useful for other purposes in connection with 
other tyres...”.359 
Lastly, the third case cited, The Koursk p.140 per Scrutton LJ p156 explicitly 
adopted the formulation of the passage in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 7th edition 
(1921) p59 to the effect that ‘persons are said to be joint tortfeasors when their 
respective shares in the commission of the act are done in furtherance of a 
common design’. 
Analysing Newzbin along the lines of the preceding cases, it is highly probable that 
the operators of the website knew of the infringing content, and indeed that they 
induced subscriptions to their services by openly encouraging the use of such. It is 
furthermore submitted that the above quotes by the operator of Newzbin yield 
the facts which would sustain the proposition that Newzbin is most likely not dual 
use.  
It therefore follows that Kitchin J is entirely correct in citing Mustill LJ in Unilever 
plc v Gillette (UK) Ltd: 
 I use the words “common design” because they are readily to hand, but 
there are other expressions in the cases, such as “concerted action” or 
“agreed on common action” which will serve just as well. The words are 
not to be construed as if they formed part of the statute. They all 
convey the same idea. This idea does not as it seems to me, call to mind 
any finding that the secondary part has explicitly mapped out a plan 
with the primary offender. Their tacit agreement will be sufficient. Nor, 
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as it seems to me, is there any need for a common design to infringe. It 
is enough if the parties combined to secure the doing of acts which in 
the event proved to be infringements.”360  
The above quote is valuable in the respect that it more precisely explains the 
theory of “common design” and therefore joint liability, imparting that the degree 
of commonality of the objective need not be a high one. Naturally this worked 
against Newzbin the current instance but also does so against any other ISP in the 
future. Yet Hobhouse LJ’s dictum in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export 
Credits Guarantee Dept [1998] is also used in Newzbin to analyse the claim of joint 
tortfeasance: 
But mere assistance, even knowing assistance, does not suffice to make 
that ‘secondary’ party liable as a joint tortfeasor with the primary party. 
What he does must go further. He must have conspired with the 
primary party or procured or induced his commission of the tort ...; or 
he must have joined in the common design pursuant to which the tort 
was committed (...).361 
What is interesting about the above quote is that it explicitly brings procurement 
into play and in effect equates it with inducement. The judge in Newzbin also looks 
to Amstrad concerning procurement, citing Templeman LJ: 
I accept that a defendant who procures a breach of copyright is liable 
jointly and severally with the infringer for the damages suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of the infringement. The defendant is a joint 
infringer; he intends and procures and shares a common design that 
infringement shall take place. A defendant may procure infringement by 
inducement, incitement or persuasion.362 
Contrasting the quote from Amstrad with that taken from Credit Lyonnais above, it 
would seem that the concepts of procurement and common design overlap, 
whereas Lord Templeman’s definition of joint tortfeasorship in Amstrad is perhaps 
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a little less accurate since it implies that intention of procurement and common 
design must necessarily take place together. The concept of common design is a 
broader one compared to that of mere procurement. Nonetheless the definition of 
procurement by Lord Templeman above once again expressly includes 
inducement, incitement or persuasion. Without pre-empting later chapters, this is 
a fact worthy of note. 
 
2) Judicial Finding of Procurement and Common Design  
Applying the above concepts and the law of joint tortfeasorship, Kitchin J in 
Newzbin started his ratio of this particular part by noting that the claimants were 
not able to: 
 ‘point to specific acts of infringement by particular infringers which the 
defendant may be said to have procured. However, I do not understand 
Lord Templeman’s speech in Amstrad to preclude a finding of liability in 
such a case. Clearly it is one of the matters to be taken into account and 
absent the identification of such specific acts a finding of procurement 
would not in general be appropriate.’363  
Kitchin J was referring to Lord Templeman’s finding that ‘generally speaking, 
inducement, incitement or persuasion to infringe must be by a defendant to an 
individual infringer and must identifiably procure a particular infringement in order 
to make the defendant liable as a joint infringer’.364 In effect Kitchin J has overruled 
this concept, also due to holding in almost apologetic terms that ‘the claimants are 
not able to identify particular infringements by particular members only because 
the defendant keeps no record of the NZB files they have downloaded’. It is in this 
connection submitted that Kitchin J’s Opinion is suspect in so far as it focuses on 
the identification of the infringement by particular members alone instead of also 
focusing on the inducement, incitement or persuasion by Newzbin to the infringers 
individually and in specific circumstances. 
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It is further submitted that some commentators may wish to note that Kitchin J 
does not adequately address Templeman LJ’s citation of Buckley LJ in Belegging-en 
Expoitatiemaatschappij Lavender B.V. v. Witten Industrial Diamonds Ltd.: 
‘facilitating the doing of an act is obviously different from procuring the doing of 
an act.’365 Facilitation could be seen as a weaker form of inducement, one 
insufficient to yield a finding of procurement. Lord Templeman used this quote to 
explain why he refused to hold Amstrad liable for advertisements which persuaded 
potential customers to buy an Amstrad machine but that cannot be said to 
influence said purchasers later decisions to infringe copyright. It is possible that 
Kitchin J considered the facts in Newzbin as speaking for themselves in the sense 
that he found that: 
 [T]he defendant operates a site which is designed and intended to 
make infringing copies of films readily available to its premium 
members; the site is structured in such a way as to promote such 
infringement by guiding the premium members to infringing copies of 
their choice and then providing them with the means to download the 
infringing copies ... the defendant has further assisted its premium 
members to engage in infringement by giving advice through the 
sharing forums.366  
It may thus be stipulated, and indeed inferred from Kitchin J’s Opinion that by 
advertising its services as well as instructing and guiding customers, Newzbin in 
fact not only engaged in a common design but also procured the infringement of 
copyright with the aid its premium (subscriber) members. 
 
3) Knowledge of Infringement and Feasibility of Filtering 
 
Two issues which have been prevalent in this area of the law were considered in 
Newzbin, namely any (guilty) knowledge of infringement and the possibility of 
preventing infringement/the use of filtering technologies. At a basic level these 
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questions were asked to ascertain culpability and intent. Naturally the possibility of 
preventing infringement by filtering technologies also normally in this area of the 
law includes a focus upon the feasibility i.e. whether filtering technologies would 
either be technologically or financially feasible. This question is usually asked by 
judges for the reason that even in instances where it is known that certain 
technologies such as search engines enable the infringement of copyright it is 
possible that a judgment which requires the use of filtering technology would 
foreclose or “chill” new technologies. This means that this is de facto a policy 
consideration in the truest sense. 
The consideration of the defendant’s state of mind only has a bearing upon two of 
the three argued claims in Newzbin however, namely authorisation and joint 
tortfeasorship, since primary infringement of copyright by communication to the 
public is a strict liability offence. This means that guilty knowledge is irrelevant 
concerning the third claim, communication to the public.  
Regarding the knowledge element, the defendant asserted that it had no 
knowledge of any infringing material being made available through the Newzbin 
website. During the trial in the High Court however it became evident in cross-
examination that one of the three owners did indeed have a detailed knowledge of 
infringements367  concerning copying of BluRay technology368 which was accepted 
by Kitchin J, and assisted in obtaining TV show updates automatically.369  
It was also relevant in this case that the defendant was given notice by the 
claimants that Newzbin had been used by members to infringe the claimants 
copyright in their films. The defendant however took no action. As a result of the 
above Kitchin J noted that he had no doubt that the defendant was aware for 
many years that most of the films in the Movies category of Newzbin were 
commercial and were likely to be protected by copyright and furthermore that the 
members of Newzbin who use the NZB facility to download such material were 
infringing copyright.370 
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a. Feasibility of Filtering 
 
In what is a remarkably short space, Kitchin J accepts the trial’s expert computer 
witness’ unchallenged evidence that it would be straightforward for the defendant 
to control access to copyrighted cinematographic works in the Movie and TV 
categories of binary content. Furthermore it was also taken for granted that it is 
relatively easy to combine the information provided on the Newzbin database with 
that of a film database provided by the claimants. As such it might appear in the 
current instance to be entirely feasible to prevent copyright infringement. 
 
V. Remedies against OSPs 
 
Before examining the remedies available against OSPs it is important to stress that 
the emphasis of this thesis is on a comparative examination of 3PCL. The aim of 
this section is, therefore, to provide an overview of pertinent remedies only 
against OSPs.  
Since the most relevant remedies are permanent ones, which take the shape of 
injunctions these will be discussed, injunctive relief being beyond the scope of this 
thesis. This discussion aids in appreciating the functionality of outcome of claims 
against OSPs, for example on the basis of 3PCL. 
1) Final Relief 
Final relief can be split into declaratory judgment and permanent injunctions.  
a) Declaratory Judgement 
A declaration by the court as to whether a particular act/subject matter is 
infringing may be sought by either content producers/rights holders or conversely 
potential defendants/OSPs.371 It will however be necessary that the declaration will 
regard current verifiable and existing issues, namely actual or intended 
infringement of copyright, and that the declaration, limited to the factual 
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circumstances in question, will be of use in this regard.372 Generally, declarations 
of non-infringement are not coupled with summary judgements, but may be 
granted where a final determination of the issues is obtained without a trial such 
as a default judgement, where this is essential for the administration of justice. 
The concern here is that the court does not generally wish to grant declaratory 
relief against persons that have not asserted rights. 
 
b) Injunctions 
Both Art.44 (1) TRIPS and Art.11 Enforcement Directive require the availability of 
permanent injunctions. Where claims regarding copyright infringement succeed, 
entitlement to a permanent injunction normally arises, to halt and/or restrain the 
infringement at issue, 373  subject to the usual equitable caveats such as ‘clean 
hands’. 374 
It is relevant to both content producers and content users that the court is allowed 
to grant requests for the award of pecuniary relief in lieu of an injunction. This is 
enshrined in Art.12 Enforcement Directive, and will be applicable in circumstances 
where the defendant infringed without intention and negligence, where the 
injunction would cause disproportionate harm and pecuniary compensation to the 
claimant would be reasonably satisfactory.375 
 
Particular Problems concerning Injunctions against OSPs 
 
Two related streams of European legislation impact on the availability and 
applicability of injunctions in a copyright context for OSPs. Art.8(3) EUCD requires 
the availability of injunctions against ‘intermediaries whose services are used by a 
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third party to infringe the copyright or related right’. From a policy point of view it 
is thus worth noting that the reasoning behind this is that intermediaries or OSPs 
are best placed to monitor the activities that they in fact sponsor, as noted in 
Recital 59 to the EUCD. Moreover it was also stated that such should be available 
even in instances where intermediaries would be exempted under Art.5 EUCD, in 
other words in instances where actions could be construed as ‘permitted acts’ 
(limitations to copyright).  
Moreover, Art. 11 Enforcement Directive, which applies to all intellectual property 
rights, mirrors Art.8(3) and is stated to be without prejudice to said EUCD article. It 
however does not contain provisions for applicability in circumstances where Art. 5 
may apply, such as acts of temporary reproduction. Art.11 has not been specifically 
formally implemented. 
Concerning the above, the judge in L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG376 decided 
that Art.11, and in particular the scope of any such injunction, was unclear, and 
therefore decided to make a reference to the Court of Justice. Conversely, in 
Newzbin the judge did not identify any such difficulties, albeit concerning an 
infringing undertaking, and applied s.97A CDPA 1988, which can be said to 
implement Art.8(3).  
As has been noted above, the government was previously of the opinion that there 
was initially no need for specific legislative implementation concerning Art.8(3) or 
Art.11. To a certain extent, regarding Art.11 this view holds some truth, as the 
judge in L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG noted, noted before making a CJ 
reference.377 
As some commentators have noted, the consultation process concerning the 
implementation of the EUCD exposed the concerns of copyright holders on the 
implementation of Art.8(3) EUCD, especially since this made specific provision for 
intermediaries which were themselves not infringing, as mentioned above.378 As a 
result, the Government ultimately decided to implement said article in sections 
97A and 191JA CDPA 1988, permitting injunctions against service providers where 
such had actual knowledge of a third party using its services to infringe copyright. 
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The definition of actual knowledge is thus a crucial one. Actual knowledge will be 
construed by the court were taking into account all relevant matters including 
whether notice in accordance with Reg.6(1)(c) of the EC Regulations was served.  
Practitioner commentators have observed that s.97A and s.191JA have seldom 
been used, due to the fact that applicants may end up having to pay defendant 
service providers’ costs, despite the possible granting of an injunction. Moreover, 
Newzbin and its progeny is the only reported case in which s.97A CDPA 1988 has 
been applied. Granting relief under s.97A CDPA 1988 was in itself not necessary, 
since the defendant service provider was itself infringing.379 
Concerning s.97A CDPA 1988, it was argued in Newzbin by the claimants that the 
defendant was a relevant service provider with actual knowledge and that the 
premium members had infringed claimants’ copyrights. This is representative of 
what would be argued in similar instances in the UK. In this regard it may be noted 
that the definition of “service provider” as referenced above, referring to Reg.2 of 
the E-Commerce Regulations, simply means “any person providing an information 
society service”. It will not escape the reader that this is a circular definition, and is 
not significantly improved by examining the meaning of “established service 
provider” or “information society services”. 
As is usual in such cases, the claimants prayed for a wide injunction, one that 
would restrain the defendant from disseminating any material which would 
infringe copyright. The defendants, as was to be expected, accepted the definition 
of “service provider” but questioned whether the requirement of actual 
knowledge had been fulfilled, due to a lack of being served with a notice referred 
to in this section. Upon a plain reading of the section in question, it is obvious that 
arguing that service of a notice of the kind referred to is required for actual 
knowledge, is a very tenuous argument. The judge in Newzbin followed this 
reasoning. Concerning the request for an injunction Kitchin J made three points: 
firstly, he stated that the terms of the EUCD directive contemplate the grant of an 
injunction upon the application of rights holders and thus not an injunction to 
restrain any and all potentially infringing activities; secondly he did not accept the 
allegation that the defendants had actual knowledge of other persons using 
Newzbin to infringe such other rights, meaning that, at the same time he lacked 
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the jurisdiction to grant such an injunction; thirdly given that the rights of all 
potential other rights holders were completely undefined, granting such an 
injunction would mean creating an injunction of uncertain scope. For these three 
reasons an injunction to only “restrain the defendant from infringing the 
claimants’ copyrights in relation to their repertoire of films” was granted. 
More recently in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation & Ors v British 
Telecommunications Plc380 (Newzbin2) Arnold J also granted an injunction under 
s.97A CDPA 1988 against the ISP, British Telecommunications Plc, prohibiting the 
making accessible of the subject website and service. The court stated that "the 
exposure of intermediaries to an injunction under Article 8(3) is part of the price 
which they pay for immunity from claims for damages under Articles 12(1), 13(1) 
and 14(1) ... the E-Commerce Directive".381 Moreover, Arnold LJ, referencing the 
interplay mentioned above, noted that "the Court of Justice also held in L'Oréal v 
eBay at [139] that measures under Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive (and 
hence Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive) must be fair and 
proportionate".382 
 
c) Election between Damages and Account of Profits 
 
Successful claimants for infringement of copyright are entitled to an enquiry 
regarding damages, or at their election, an account of profits. It should be noted 
that an account of profits383 is an equitable remedy that is inconsistent with 
damages, also in a chain of defendants. This will be relevant where OSPs are sued 
along with users. The content provider may however make this election following 
an inspection of the documents obtained through disclosure. 
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Flagrancy 
 
Flagrancy will be taken into account384 and includes deliberate and calculated 
infringement by the defendant to enrich themselves beyond the damages that 
would normally have to be paid in such an infringement.385  
For example, in Newzbin, due to the defendant’s credibility problem and 
evidenced objectives in operating the website, the judge identified a deliberate 
course of conduct. Therefore, it was noted concerning the claimants’ request for 
additional damages under s.97 CDPA 1988, that the court when hearing an enquiry 
as to damages should have regard to these findings. 
 
Punitive, Aggravated and Exemplary Damages 
 
Concerning punitive damages it was held in Phonographic Performance Ltd and 
Reader386 that an award of additional damages, such as the above referenced 
flagrancy add-on may contain a punitive element, as long as it is not solely for the 
purposes of punishing the defendant. 
 It was held in Rookes v Barnard387 that exemplary damages may be awarded 
where the case falls into one of the three categories listed in said case, in 
particular on a finding of flagrancy. The defendant’s pecuniary gain was calculated 
to exceed compensation payable to the claimant.  
In the UK, the definition of aggravated damages is one of damages taking into 
account injury to the claimant’s proper feelings of pride, dignity, humiliation, 
distrust, insult or pain caused by the circumstances of the defendant’s conduct as 
held in Nottinghamshire Healthcare National Health Service trust v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd.388  
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VI. The Digital Economy Act 2010 
 
1) The Importance of being Earnest: Positioning and Questions 
 
The DEA 2010 is quite possibly one of the most controversial pieces of legislation 
introduced in recent years. This part will examine how the DEA 2010 reflects the 
industry interests delineated in Part 1 and what its likely effects will be on the ISP 
community, given that the DEA 2010 by its nature targets the ISP community. In 
terms of terminology, ISPs are as referenced in Part 1(A)(I) above, a subset of the 
OSP community, principally engaged in the marketing of access of the internet. 
The DEA 2010 introduces not only just new rights and liabilities, but as a tool, 
erects a broad administrative framework for the enforcement of IPRs which 
directly comes to bear on the entire internet using population of the UK.  This fact 
is one which stands in stark contrast to targeting individual copyright infringers, so 
called “end users”.389 It may however be appreciated, somewhat crucially for this 
thesis, that this strategy also deviates, at least at first glance from that of pursuing 
ISPs for 3PCL of copyright infringement. Thus how this piece of legislation interacts 
with such liability is germane to the examination conducted by this thesis in terms 
of whether it: 
1)  in practice replaces approaches developed in relation to 3PCL; or whether 
2) being part of a broader strategy, it complements 3PCL, by adding another layer 
of intermediary liability; 
3) is open to challenge based on European law; and 
4) as part of the aforesaid, or independently, imposes extra and perhaps 
inappropriate liabilities.  
                                                          
389 Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU,C-
275/06,[2008] ECR I-271. 
133 
 
The discussion in this part is limited by the fact that the DEA 2010 is a recent piece 
of legislation and has not been fully implemented. This means that, in particular 
the discussion in the conclusion to this part will be at a macro-level, also when 
addressing the above questions.390 Such will highlight how market participants are 
affected, whether beneficially or otherwise, and the desirability of the legislation 
for the internet using population in the United Kingdom in broader policy terms.  
a) Enactment: Infrastructure and Incentives 
 
 The initial announcement in late 2009391 followed the publication and 
presentation of the Digital Britain Report to Parliament, which was prepared by 
the Department for Business Innovation and Skills as well as the Department for 
Culture Media and Sport, following a consultation process which included so called 
“Digital Britain Summits” allegedly aimed at producing “a representative ‘people’s 
response’ and gather[ing] a set of positive, realistic contributions for the report”.392 
In broad terms, the report emphasised the importance of a digital network 
architecture for Britain’s future competitiveness and that it did so in unwaveringly 
“fluffy” terms.393 
The Information Service of the House of Commons referred to the accelerated 
debate on the DEA 2010 in the House of Commons as “pre-election wash up”, 
whilst confirming that the present government [at the time of writing of the 
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official statement] held no plans to repeal any of the Act’s provisions, 394 contrary 
to the pre-election statements of the now Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg.395  
 
2) The Previous s.18 (now ss.17-18) 
 
Like the original s.17, s.18 was regarded as being controversial; “preventing access 
to specified online locations for the prevention of online copyright infringement” 
was removed in the House of Commons committee stage. The clause was split into 
ss. 17 and 18 of the Act, namely “power to make provision about injunctions 
preventing access to locations on the Internet” and “consultation and 
parliamentary scrutiny”. Section 17, is concerned with the formulation of 
provisions that would restrict or prevent access to, for example, certain websites. 
It is in this regard admitted that s.17(1) still retains some of its controversial 
character. The section again permits the Secretary of State to make regulations 
concerning so-called “blocking injunctions”396 to be followed by the courts in 
instances where the court is satisfied that a location on the Internet “has been, is 
being or is likely to be used for or in connection with an activity that infringes 
copyright.”  
The aspect of s.17(1) DEA 2010 which is most likely to cause concern for the 
content using industry is that so-called “blocking injunctions” may be issued by 
courts upon a finding of the relatively low threshold that a particular location is 
likely to be used in connection with copyright infringement. Some commentators 
are likely to note that “in connection with” is the operative element of the 
required standard of proof; it is applicable to a wide, perhaps not even causal, 
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spectrum. Moreover, the standard of mere likelihood is capable of being framed in 
terms somewhat lower than the lowest standard of proof, namely, “more likely 
than not”. It is however more likely that the courts will simply read the standard of 
proof as being the usual “on the preponderance of the evidence” standard i.e. 
“more likely than not”.  
The imposition of a standard of likelihood, goes against the example of the usual 
determination under the American Cyanamid rules, namely that in all cases the 
court should under normal conditions determine the matter of granting an 
interlocutory injunction by first asking whether there is a serious issue to be tried 
i.e. one that is not frivolous or extensions; whether damages might be an adequate 
remedy; and whom the balance of convenience favours i.e. who will suffer a 
greater harm if the injunction is or is not granted.397 It may be noted in this regard 
that there is a parallel to confidential information cases where the courts 
considered a derogation from the usual standard in favour of a likelihood standard, 
which was viewed as a stricter standard, and warranted due to the human rights 
freedom of expression element.398  
It must of course in the interest of completeness be mentioned that s.17(3) DEA 
2010 requires that the Secretary of State is satisfied with three factors, inter alia 
the proportionality. The effect this provision will have in practice is unclear. It is 
framed in general terms. This could indicate, not an examination of the adverse 
effect particular Internet activities are having in specific instances, but rather a 
consideration of specific and similar activities viewed as a whole. This of course 
makes it easier for the Secretary of State to be satisfied. 
 
a) The Nature of the Location Being Blocked 
 
Subsections 4 and 5 specify matters which the court must concern itself with in 
granting a blocking injunction. Subsection 4 deals with the gravity of the alleged 
infringements and mirrors the above categories in respect of which the Secretary 
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of State may make regulations, it has in turn three subsections, a-c. The first two 
subsections that deal with locations either from which, or at which, a substantial 
amount of material has been or is likely to either be obtained or made available in 
infringement of copyright. The phrasing of the first to parts of subsection 4 is again 
noteworthy particularly due to the element of futurity, which widens the scope of 
such injunctions considerably. The conceivable effect of these new provisions is 
that a website which looks “suspicious”, but which does not infringe copyright may 
be blocked due to the fact that it is likely to make available copyright infringing 
material. This could be viewed as being disturbing in itself, without taking into 
account freedom of speech/expression aspects. The third part of subsection 4 
builds on aforegoing parts by adding that a blocking injunction may be granted 
concerning a location which has been, is being or is likely to be used to facilitate 
access to a location referred to in the first two parts. This section is clearly aimed 
at sites which themselves do not purport to post copyright infringing material, but 
rather provide links to websites that do. Some commentators are likely to note 
that this provision could be viewed as being disproportionate in the sense that 
even if a particular site were likely to include a link to a website which would in 
turn be merely likely to make available material which infringes copyright, then 
both service providers would be blocked in their entirety. Additionally, it may be 
noted that “facilitation” is not defined in the Act.  
 
b) Evidence and Relevant Factors 
 
It is a requirement that the Regulations as formulated by the Secretary of State 
must include a provision that the court in determining whether to grant an 
injunction, must take into account evidence presented by both the service 
provider and the copyright owner as well as representations made by a Minister of 
the Crown. Moreover, in terms of a check and balance the court is to consider 
whether granting an injunction would likely have a disproportionate effect on any 
person’s legitimate interests and the importance of freedom of expression. It could 
be noted in this regard that the first two points regarding evidence by the parties 
concerned adds little to the existing framework for the application for an 
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injunction. The requirement that the court take into account representations by 
government Ministers is interesting and likely exists to ‘guide’ the court’s 
interpretation of regulations made pursuant to the provisions in the DEA 2010.  
 
c) Consultation and Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
In addition to the above s.18 DEA 2010 introduces several provisions aimed at 
providing further scrutiny and balance concerning regulations made pursuant to 
s.17 by the Secretary of State. It can, broadly speaking be split into two sections, 
the first relating to whom the Secretary of State must consult and the second 
concerning the tabling of proposals of the draft regulations for consultation by 
Parliament. Whereas neither parts of this section would prevent the Secretary of 
State from introducing regulations which were deemed to be inappropriate, they 
do allow for concerns to be taken into account and made public in this regard. 
Whether the above checks and balances would prevent websites from being 
blocked that operate on the borderline of copyright infringement as for example 
those sampling sound effects or segments of music or remixing such, blogs citing 
the large extracts of text from newspapers, or even content hosting sites such as 
YouTube, remains to be seen. It is naturally, as commentators such as Farrand 
have pointed out, conceivable that even search engines such as Google could be 
subject to an injunction by linking to infringing content.399 
 
3) The Main Online Copyright Infringement Scheme 
 
Sections 3 - 16 DEA 2010 contain the relevant provisions concerning how ISPs are 
to act on copyright infringement reported to them by rights holders. In this part, 
sections 3 - 4 detail what are referenced as “initial obligations” in s.5 of the Act.  
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These amend the Communications Act 2003 by inserting various new sections, 
starting with s. 124A, which corresponds to s.3 DEA 2010; s. 4 DEA 2010 inserts 
s.124B. It is worth examining these two sections first because they form a cohesive 
block. They are followed by four broad groups of provisions, namely those dealing 
with the imposition of a code by OFCOM (ss.5-8); important provisions concerning 
the limitation of internet access (ss.9-10); appeals by subscribers (s.13), and finally, 
costs in (s.15). 
a) Examining the “Initial Obligations” 
The “initial obligations” can be split into two categories; the first being the 
obligation to notify subscribers of reported infringements as detailed in s.3 and the 
second being the obligation to provide infringement lists to copyright owners as 
set out in s.4 DEA 2010.  
The first obligation to inform subscribers of their alleged infringement of copyright 
is executed via copyright infringement notifications.400 These relay the information 
provided by the content owners; including descriptions of the infringing content, 
the IP addresses at the time and the name of the content owner making the 
report.401 
 It is important to note that the section expressly requires ISPs to comply with such 
reports not only in circumstances where it is suspected that a subscriber has 
infringed copyright by means of the service in question, but also where a 
subscriber has allowed another person to use the service and such other person 
has thereby infringed a content owner’s copyright.402 What is undoubtedly 
envisaged here are situations where, for example, parents provide Internet access 
to their likely, more tech savvy children, and these commit online acts of 
infringement. In such circumstances stating that the subscribers themselves are 
not liable to be notified due to not having taken any infringing action in this regard 
will be disregarded. Naturally s.124A(1)(b) would also apply to other similarly 
casual situations such as Internet cafe scenarios. It can at this point be noted that 
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whilst understandable, from a content provider’s point of view, in a certain sense, 
some commentators have already identified “a constructive prohibition of 
unsecured WiFi by the back door, for consumers, corporations and the public 
sector”.403 Moreover other commentators have argued that this provision will 
ultimately have the effect of preventing maximum accessibility of Internet services 
in for example, libraries, airports or other establishments that rely on open access 
WiFi services. Coincidentally, internet access at these locations was previously 
deemed part of the Digital Britain strategy, yet such provisions run counter to this 
stated public policy. 
Despite the delineation of when copyright infringement reports may be sent to 
ISPs in s.124A, the sending of such is also subject to more specific provisions that 
will be in force under a code of practice as regulated by s.124C or s.124D known as 
the “initial obligations code”. Similarly, it is stated in s.124A(4) that the notification 
of subscribers is predicated on compliance with said code. It should perhaps also 
be mentioned that an ISP will have one month to notify subscribers from the day 
on which the ISP has received the copyright infringement report from the content 
owner. 
It is evident that the purpose behind s.4 DEA 2010 is to inform subscribers that 
their Internet use can and will be monitored and that rights infringements are not 
anonymous in certain circumstances. It is hoped by the content providing industry 
that such letters of notification by the ISPs will end in most cases particular 
copyright infringements. This will be examined in detail below, since a specific aim 
of reduction of infringement has been imposed, which if not met, will spur further 
action on behalf of the Secretary of State. The fact that notices may include items 
of information such as the ISPs possible subsequent duty to supply infringement 
lists to copyright owners as well as the subscriber’s identity to content owners 
following a court order and the possibility of subsequent imposition of “technical 
measures”  that may include disconnection should, in many cases fulfil that aim. 
Infringement lists 
The second obligation, namely the obligation to provide infringement lists to the 
copyright owners in question is also subject to specific provisions that will be 
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contained in the initial obligations code. Crucially however, the “copyright 
infringement list” is defined as a list which “sets out, in relation to each relevant 
subscriber, which of copyright infringement reports made by the owner to the 
provider relates to the subscriber, but does not enable any subscriber to be 
identified”.404 The copyright owner may apply to a court for an order of disclosure 
of the copyright infringer’s identity. The basis for such a court order thus would be 
a “Norwich Pharmacal order”.405 Such an order typically requires a respondent to 
disclose certain documents or information to the applicant.406 It is important that 
the respondent is a party that is involved or connected to a wrongdoing, whether 
innocently or not, and is unlikely to be a party in potential proceedings. Such an 
application can be described as standard fare in Intellectual Property litigation, and 
is thus not out of the ordinary, which is not to detract from it’s gravity. 
It has been noted by commentators regarding the infringement lists that the 
requirement of provision by ISPs of lists of subscribers is slightly confusing. In 
essence ISPs will be providing information in a slightly modified form that they 
have already been provided with by the copyright owners in the first place. It has 
been speculated that this is required due to the fact that some ISPs use “dynamic” 
IP addresses that are allocated and change upon connection. A content owner, 
despite being able to identify infringing IP addresses, cannot link these to 
individual subscriber accounts. The ISPs gather and link IP addresses to individual 
subscribers. This would allow the copyright owners to seek disclosure based on the 
evidence in the form of IP addresses and their linked infringement reports. 
Commentators such as Farrand have noted that there is a significant risk of so-
called “false positives” due to the fact that the most avid infringers of online 
copyright often operate on a commercial scale.407 This means that as part of 
sophisticated commercial operations they are likely to compromise computer 
systems; use Virtual Private Networks or IP spoofing in order to conceal their 
activities and escape prosecution.408 This could lead to subscribers that have not 
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perpetrated copyright infringements being targeted, which could expose ISPs to 
liability for vexatious action.  
A review of the Explanatory Notes to the DEA 2010(“the Notes”), might provide 
some guidance as to the intentions behind the various sections enacted.409 The 
Notes explaining s. 3 DEA2010, concerning the obligation to notify subscribers of 
reported infringements, focus mainly on infringers making available for download 
works that infringe copyright. The notes explain that currently copyright owners 
are able to go online and “look for material to which they hold the copyright and 
identify an authorised sources that material. They can then seek to download a 
copy of that material and in doing so capture information about the source 
including the IP address along with a date and time stamp” the Notes however go 
on to state that ISPs do not have the ability to combine the IP address as well as 
the date and time stamp, with the identity of the broadband subscriber.410 This is 
used as an explanation for why only ISPs may process notification notices and 
serve these on the relevant subscribers and also for why later the provision of a 
subscriber’s IP address is required. ISPs are under a duty to maintain records of 
copyright infringement notices supplied to them and copyright infringement 
notices sent out to individual subscribers. This allegedly allows copyright owners to 
identify the most serious “repeat” infringers. The Notes to the Act explain that “by 
allowing copyright owners to target only the most serious repeat infringers, 
copyright infringement lists provided by ISPs are intended to make legal action a 
more attractive and effective tool the copyright owners to use in respect of their 
copyright”.411 This explanation was tendered as part of the elaboration on s. 4 DEA 
2010 concerning the obligation to provide infringement lists to copyright owners.  
It will be observed that there may be a mismatch between the explanation offered 
as to the focus of IP list keeping and notification in s.3 by ISPs, i.e. concerning up-
loaders and the focus on “serious infringers”, i.e. also down-loaders. The Act is 
very heavily focused on file-sharing, and that these sort of terminological 
explanations would not apply in cases such as Newzbin, as referenced above. 
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i) Imposing an Initial Obligations Code 
The approval of the initial obligations code referred to above is regulated by the 
section following the obligations, namely s.5 DEA 2010. S.124C(3)-(5) specifies 
conditions that may be included in such a code; whereas s.124C(6)-(13) adds 
definitive factors. The following sections, 6-8 DEA2010, define the required 
content and situations where OFCOM itself is obliged to draft a code. 
In respect of the code of initial obligations the government has noted in its the 
Notes to the Act that it hopes that all parties concerned will contribute to the 
development of an industry code. Given the nature of the process, it is unlikely 
that consumers will significantly contribute.  
It will no doubt be of interest in liability terms for ISPs that according to the Notes, 
the Government anticipates that any approved code will include a time limit or for 
copyright owners to submit a copyright infringement report.412 This might balance 
the obligation of ISPs to act on copyright infringement reports by issuing 
notifications to the relevant subscribers, in negotiation terms.413 
Whereas some commentators have mooted the point that the above initial 
obligation provisions might not apply to smaller ISPs, the government makes clear 
that it intends for the obligations to fall on all ISPs, except those that “are 
demonstrated to have a very low level of online infringement”.414 The government 
however does explain that the reason for this is that in cost terms it would be 
disproportionate “to require an ISP to incur significant costs to counter a problem 
that does not exist to any significant degree on its network”.415 The Government 
therefore proposed a “qualifying threshold criteria based on the number of CRI is 
an ISP receives in a set period of time” adding that the government anticipates that 
most small and medium-sized ISPs and, possibly, the mobile networks would fall 
under the threshold.416 Such measures would certainly remedy the issues raised 
above concerning WiFi ISPs. 
b) Progress Reports 
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S.8 DEA 2010 inserts S.124F into the Communications Act that 2003, which 
requires the preparation of reports for the Secretary of State by OFCOM 
concerning the infringement of copyright by subscribers to Internet access 
services. Such reports must be provided every 12 months. They are to include a full 
assessment of; the level of copyright infringement by the use of Internet access 
services; including descriptions of steps taken by copyright owners to enable 
subscribers to obtain lawful access to copyrighted works; as well as other steps 
taken to deter subscribers from infringing copyright such as changing the attitudes 
of members of the public; assessments of the aforesaid including assessments of 
the extent to which the copyright owners have utilised the copyright infringement 
report regime and brought legal action against subscribers.417 
The explanatory notes, again reveal these reports are to help the Secretary of 
State assess the effectiveness of the obligations on ISPs.  
Importantly for this thesis and for ISPs the Notes also stipulate that the reports 
provide the basis for the Secretary of State to make a decision on whether to 
impose additional obligations on ISPs.418 As such, the reports are an important part 
of the new online infringement regime, and will most likely be closely be read by 
the content using industry. 
c) Possible Obligations to Limit Internet Access 
Sections 9-12 DEA 2010 in insert sections into the Communications Act 2003 
dealing with the possible imposition of obligations to limit Internet access via ISPs. 
It is important to remember in this regard that in the framework of the Act this is 
viewed as a second phase, following the initial obligations and possible litigation. 
As a result, it is reserved for the Secretary of State to direct OFCOM to assess 
whether ISPs should take technical measures against certain subscribers, including 
carrying out a public consultation.  
Technical measures may only be taken against “relevant subscribers”, meaning 
subscribers that have sufficient copyright infringement reports linked so there 
accounts, thus making them eligible for inclusion in a copyright infringement list. 
Any proposals for orders under this section are subject to a 60 day period of 
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scrutiny and require Parliamentary approval. Furthermore pursuant to S.12 4J CA 
2003, provisions must be made detailing subscriber appeals, which will be dealt 
with below. 
Despite having noted the above restraints, obligations to limit Internet access 
under the Act can still be termed problematic due to the fact that the definition of 
“technical measures” under S.124G(3) CA 2003 is open-ended. The section, as is to 
be expected, includes within the definition of a “technical measure” measures that 
limit speed or capacity and prevent access to particular material. However, 
s.124G(3)(c) and (d) CA 2003 state that a technical measure is also one that 
suspends or limits the service provided to a subscriber in another way. The Act 
does not define suspension in terms of length. The Act also does not define or give 
an example of what limitation in another way might be. Whilst it is clear that the 
content providing i.e. copyright owning industry will be in favour of such measures, 
it is likely that the content using and in particular the ISP industry will view these 
undefined terms and possible obligations with scepticism since they not only do 
not clearly delineate an ISP’s obligations that could conceivably also give rise to 
action by subscribers under their subscription agreement in certain circumstances.  
d) Independent Tribunals 
Section 13 DEA 2010 introduces new section 124K CA 2003, which details the 
mechanism for subscriber appeals.  
The initial obligations code and any future technical obligations code must provide 
a route for appeals, setting out the grounds. S.124K(5) logically explains that a 
subscriber appeal is to succeed lacking the requisite proof by an ISP, in relation to 
each relevant copyright infringing report, that an infringement of copyright has 
been correctly linked to a subscriber’s account. Interestingly however, s. 124K(6) 
also stipulates that a subscriber’s appeal must also succeed where a subscriber 
shows that the infringement that was proven, was in fact not carried out by the 
relevant subscriber, and that the relevant subscriber had taken reasonable steps to 
prevent such infringement. This runs contrary on one reading, to the notification 
provisions mentioned above, which provide for notification, logging and possible 
future action whether technical or legal, irrespective of whether it is the actual 
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subscriber that commits acts of infringement or a third-party using the subscriber’s 
account as a proxy. 
e) Enforcement of ISP Obligations 
The enforcement obligations in section 14 DEA 2010 which introduces section 124L 
CA 2003 apply in respect of a contravention of the initial or technical obligations by 
ISPs or in respect of contraventions by content owners in assisting OFCOM. The 
maximum penalty has been fixed at £250,000 and may be imposed by OFCOM if 
appropriate and proportionate, taking into account any representations made to 
OFCOM or steps taken for remedying the consequences of the contraventions. 
In terms of assessing the liability of ISPs this “enforcement obligation” could be 
termed a codification of secondary liability, transforming said into primary liability. 
Thus, relevant ISPs will in particular take note of section 124L(4) CA 2003 
concerning the power of the Secretary of State to amend this section substitute a 
different maximum penalty, subject to the approval by Parliament. Although the 
substitution of a new maximum penalty is relatively unlikely given the market 
dynamic. What is meant here is the fact that the current maximum penalty of 
£250,000 applies per contravention, in turn meaning that in terms of the 
mathematical likelihood, it is certain that there will be several cases inflicting the 
possibility of such a maximum penalty which could accumulate to exhibit severe 
punitive characteristics. The level of this penalty could be regarded as being 
excessive since it must face the test of a global appreciation of the likelihood of 
contravention and, indeed imposition. 
In addition to the above, the preceding rules concerning 3PCL for copyright 
infringement remain active, so that the new regime simply imposes another, albeit 
codified, layer of regulation, liability and risk in this regard. 
f) ISP Liability Concerning Costs 
As the Explanatory Notes highlight, the initial obligations and any later technical 
obligations will naturally give rise to enforcement costs. What is also quite 
apparent is that ISPs have no interest in contributing towards these costs. These 
costs include not only processing copyright infringement reports received, issuing 
subscriber notifications, or the imposition of technical measures; but of course 
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also OFCOM’s costs in approving, preparing and regulating both sets of codes 
including enforcing them, which involves the preparation of annual as well as 
extraordinary reports. 
At the time of writing, the government has responded to the consultation 
proceedings initiated and stipulated that “the notification costs of ISPs and OFCOM 
as a regulator are to be split 75:25 between copyright owners and ISPs on the basis 
of the costs of an ISP which is an “efficient operator” as verified by OFCOM. The 
regulator costs also include the costs related to the appeals system.”419 At present, 
there would be no fee for subscribers to appeal against notification letters. 
However this is subject to change. This highlights the uncertainty of the 
consequences of this regime as well as an incomplete understanding of how many 
appeals there might be. 
The Government’s Communication on the Response to the Consultation for Online 
Infringement unsurprisingly states that copyright owners also wanted an inclusion 
of their detection costs, which was ultimately rejected on the basis that this was 
“largely “business as usual” costs that copyright owners would face is part of 
protecting their own copyright material”.420 The Response also cites the decision to 
split the costs in this manner as being driven by a desire to provide incentives ISPs 
to ensure the adoption of the most effective and efficient processes in relation to 
copyright infringement reports and issuing notifications. 
Regarding the fees to access the appeal system, it is revealed that the government 
considered imposing a modest fee that would be refundable if the appellant were 
to be successful.421 The aim of this would have been to discourage frivolous 
appeals. 
 
4) Future Development 
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It is arguable that the future of the DEA 2010 is not certain, at least in its present 
form and specifically concerning the Online Infringements part. This is the case for 
several reasons. 
a) Draft Initial Obligations Code 
OFCOM published a draft Initial Obligation code in May 2010. The points contained 
in this code which are worth adding at this stage are that OFCOM has proposed 
specific ISPs which should be governed by the code and has also delineated a 
threshold for including subscribers on a copyright infringers list. OFCOM has set 
out a three stage notification process for informing subscribers of infringements 
through notifications and has proposed that subscribers following receipt of a third 
notification, could be included on a copyright infringement list. Said list may be 
requested by a copyright owner which has made at least one report against that 
subscriber. As highlighted above, OFCOM has followed the government’s guidance 
in exempting small and medium-sized ISPs from the scope of the initial obligations 
code. OFCOM has in this regard proposed a definition of “small and medium-sized 
ISPs”; being ISPs with no more than 400,000 subscribers. The Initial Obligations 
code will, at first, only cover “fixed ISPs” and not ISPs on mobile networks.422 
b) Judicial Review 
It is highly relevant that two ISPs filed an application in 2010 for judicial review 
shortly after the enactment of the DEA 2010. The Administrative Division of the 
High Court in April 2011 ruled in favour of the government, except on a technical 
point concerning sharing OFCOM’s costs.423 This illustrates the fast moving nature 
of the subject matter, which means that a detailed analysis of the application has 
been removed, the issues now being largely irrelevant. The applicants had argued 
that the contested provisions; 
a) constitute a technical regulation and/or a rule on services within the meaning of 
the Technical Standards Directive, as such they should be notified to the European 
Commission but were not, as a result the contested provisions are unenforceable; 
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b) are incompatible with the E-Commerce Directive; 
c) are incompatible with the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive and 
with the requirement that the measures in issue should be proportionate. 
The relief sought by the applicants was, logically, a quashing order in respect of 
s.3-18 DEA 2010, or in the alternative, declaratory relief to the effect that the 
contested provisions were unlawful. 
 
c) United Kingdom IP Review 
The recent IP review concluded in May 2011, aimed to reduce “the barriers to new 
Internet-based business models, including the costs of obtaining permissions on 
existing rights holders; the cost and complexity of enforcing intellectual property 
rights within the UK and internationally; the attraction between IP and 
competition framework; the cost and complexity to SMEs of accessing services to 
help them protect and exploit their IP.”424  
The review did not critically analyse the DEA 2010 in detail. It however repeatedly 
demanded monitoring of the measures scheme for potential readjustment.425 A 
lack of research in this area is identified.426 
 
5) Conclusion: Digital Economy Act 2010 
 
It was asked at the beginning of this section how the DEA 2010 interacts with 3PCL 
in the traditional sense. The above has made clear that whereas the DEA 2010 has 
not yet been implemented in a way which would permit an analysis of the actual 
effects on ISPs. The Act will most certainly introduce additional models and legal 
risks, as noted above regarding the finding of non-compliance with the initial 
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obligations or possible technical measures code. As such, the second question 
posed above can be answered in the affirmative, namely that the DEA 2010 does 
appear to form part of a broader strategy, and from a content providers/copyright 
owner’s perspective compliments 3PCL, by adding another layer of intermediary 
liability. Thirdly, the ‘negative’ judicial review outcome was discussed above and 
the matter rests for now.  
Whereas it is understandable that the content providing/copyright holding 
industry wishes to continue its strategy of simultaneously preventing user Internet 
driven primary copyright infringement and pursuing such infringement, it is 
arguable that in terms of public policy the DEA 2010 is entirely undesirable. The 
measures taken impose a costly and strict framework of regulation and liability for 
both subscribers and ISPs. This has human rights and privacy implications, the 
benefit of which are questionable. It has not been proven conclusively in economic 
terms that the prevention of the kind of copyright infringements the Act is aimed 
at in any way fosters balance sheet growth.427 What is however clear is that 
policing ISP subscribers, supporting OFCOM and lubricating an appeals system for 
ISP subscribers is, in pecuniary terms, necessary. 
 Finally, the provisions relating to “persuading” relevant subscribers not to infringe 
copyright will most likely mainly be made use of by larger undertakings which are 
able, for technical and financial reasons, to carry out policing for the purposes of 
filing copyright infringement reports with ISPs. It might thus be argued that, in 
simplified terms that the entire framework has been put in place to support a few 
major market participants, in what can be termed an oligopoly. Yet industry 
commentators assert the need for the DEA 2010, in terms of safeguarding revenue 
and culture.428 
Despite being beyond the remit of this thesis to analyse this issue in depth, parties 
acting on the DEA 2010 should be aware that subscribers may take action for 
breach of contract or indeed inducing such. It is accepted that this is tempered by 
the legitimising nature of the DEA 2010 however.429  
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VII. Conclusion 
 
1) Third-Party Liability for Copyright Infringement  
As has been explained above, 3PCL in the context of this thesis is, in dogmatic 
terms, found in the realm of primary liability for copyright infringement.430 A 
contextual criticism could be levelled at this, at first glance, seemingly illogical 
state of affairs. Yet despite such observations, as by the Whitford Committee,431 it 
must be conceded that there is at least some merit to viewing tortious theories of 
3PCL as being a common law appendage to acts of direct copyright infringement. 
This recognises the current inherent nature and procedural arrangement of this 
type of liability.  
A Case Law Lament 
In order to explain the instant lament on the at times seemingly ad hoc approach 
in this case law driven area, the different theories of torts examined above may, in 
opening the argument, be briefly referenced. The ‘general’ category of joint and 
several torts despite historically being focused on the relationship between the 
parties, such as those mentioned above, as well as the outcome of their actions, 
allows for the imposition of joint tortfeasorship where concerted action can be 
identified - but which stops short of including mere facilitation as a subset.  
Facilitation and Authorisation 
Two things may be noted in this regard. Firstly and most importantly, the 
relationship between the value based exclusion of ‘facilitation’ in theories of 
common design and ‘authorisation’ is not an easy one. In particular given the 
judgement in Newzbin, which of course built on Amstrad, there is a significant 
danger and likelihood that UK theories of authorisation of copyright infringement 
have strayed into the realm of mere facilitation, despite the explicit denial of this 
fact.432 This can be said to be the case because the expansive definition of “grant 
or purported grant to do the relevant act” lends itself to such an interpretation and 
especially because in Newzbin the judge further expanded this test of liability by 
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allowing for the inclusion of ‘relevant circumstances’, which are not mutually 
exclusive and some of which could be said to take significant steps towards 
potentially reducing the test to one of facilitation by justifying the imposition of 
authorisation-based liability simply by providing the means to infringe.433  
Ratification & Inducement in Authorisation 
Secondly, despite the fact that vicarious liability under UK law cannot be 
transposed into the realm of intellectual property due to the missing element of 
the usually requisite relationship, the current theory of authorisation does bear 
some, even if reverse, semblance to the act of ratification, which has been defined 
as “in effect, subsequent authorisation” by commentators.434 Despite the core 
construct of authorisation dictating the prior availability of a grant or purported 
grant to do the act complained of, if it may be asked whether the current 
definition does not in effect, or perhaps should not, in fact include such a concept. 
It must after all be noted that despite the judge in Newzbin initially seeming to 
distinguish earlier definitions as in Falcon v. Famous Players Film Company of 
“sanctioning, approving and countenancing” particular actions, these three words 
were in fact included in the final determination of liability.435 There thus seems to 
be a conflict between the definition of granting or purporting to possess the 
authority to grant the required permission to do such an act, which could be 
summarised as being similar to inducement, and the second strand of de facto 
ratification. As has been noted above, it is again strongly suggested that utilising 
the definition ‘grant or purported grant to do the act complained of’ or a close 
variation, is highly problematic since it is entirely doubtful whether in many cases 
the primary infringer would have perceived the intermediary’s actions as such, and 
perhaps also whether the intermediary’s actions in relation to the infringement 
can be styled as such objectively. The applicability of this observation naturally 
depends on the specific facts of the case, however in circumstances similar to 
those in Newzbin, where both the primary infringer and intermediary in effect 
colluded to commit copyright infringement, there can be no doubt that the parties 
were aware that there was no legitimate authorisation, nor could there have been. 
It therefore follows that this particular inducement-like definition of authorisation 
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and must not be preferred to the previous ratification-like definition, nor is it 
improved when acting in concert with the previous definition. 
Fluid Definitions – A Common Design? 
The above definitional criticisms of 3PCL expose what could be stated to be the 
main weakness in this area of law in the United Kingdom. The law seems to be 
relatively uncertain in defining crucial terms for intermediaries. This is not only the 
case concerning authorisation, but perhaps more so concerning common design 
and procurement. Despite this second category of 3PCL being easier to define and 
more certain than authorisation, it has been noted above that concerning common 
design, judges are equally at ease with using phrases such as ‘concerted action’, 
‘tacit agreement’ or ‘combining to secure the doing of acts which in event proved 
to be infringements’.436 Procurement can equally be labelled ‘inducement’, 
‘incitement’ or ‘persuasion’.437 Moreover, both common design and procurement, 
with the blessing of even the most senior of judges, as in for example Amstrad, are 
not shy of each other – yielding what can be termed a partnership which may 
further obfuscate industry observers. These definitions present judges with 
unacceptable leeway and parties with an unacceptable lack of legal certainty –  
impacting negatively on industry risk assessments even whether carried out by 
legal representatives in- or out-house, which is compounded by the fact specific 
nature of intermediary liability. This is the case even taking into account the fluid 
and ever changing nature of the electronic medium in question, which 
understandably must leave some scope for legal adaptation. This state of affairs 
can also be said to raise questions of a constitutional nature,438 even accounting 
for Lord Devlin’s model of judicial activism as opposed to dynamism, 439 it should 
perhaps be for the legislature to impose adequately flexible yet robust 
terminological borders for 3PCL in the UK. Without wishing to overstretch Lord 
Devlin’s model, by applying it all too firmly to the distant realm of intellectual 
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property law, some commentators may note that the United Kingdom is presently 
still in a state of division let alone acceptance or consensus on this issue. 
Therefore, judicial formulations taking the form of dynamism could endanger 
judges’ reputations for independence and impartiality.440 Yet it is admitted that the 
main concern in this regard is rather with the constitutional role of the judiciary 
and what it is not – namely the legislature. Whereas to counter this argument 
some commentators could observe that these are but commonplace concepts of 
liability, stemming from tort law and should thus not cause great concern. It would 
again be submitted that whereas this might be true in principle, given that their 
application in this area of the law is at best uncertain and at times confusing, 
combined with the ever increasing importance of intermediaries online both in 
their own right and for the content providing industry, as recognised by legislation 
both European and domestic, this makes a prima facie case for a fundamental 
revision of this area of the law. 
Quo Vadis 3PCL? 
In view of the above it is proposed that a government consultation process is 
commenced with a view to providing a legislative framework and definitions to 
replace the current common law theories. In doing so, the above concerns could 
be adequately addressed by firstly, providing more precise definitions of applicable 
tort theories and secondly, tailoring said definitions to a possible subsequent 
statutory regime which could either operate on a standalone basis, in the CDPA 
1988 or in fact be complementary to the DEA 2010. Given Commission concerns 
that current legislative and non-legislative instruments are not powerful enough to 
combat online infringement of intellectual property rights, it would also be in line 
with the European context to engender such an undertaking. 441 Amending the 
CDPA 1988 section on secondary liability, as defined above, could be a logical path. 
In order to provide the valid proposals for legislation, one of the most important 
copyright jurisdictions in terms of actions filed and damages sought, namely the 
US, will be examined in the next Part. This thesis will in this regard strive to analyse 
what can be learned from case law on 3PCL in the US.  
                                                          
440
 See see D. Kairys, The Politics of Law: A progressive Critique(New York:Basic Books,1998). 
441
 Commission report on Enforcement Directive, COM(2010)779 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2010:1589:FIN:EN:PDF(02 February 2011). 
154 
 
 
2) The Interplay between 3PCL and the DEA 2010 
Lastly, whereas the above section on the DEA 2010 contains its own intrinsic 
analysis,442 it is worth placing this into context with the aforementioned 
conclusions and preliminary proposals. This is difficult to do given that most of the 
provisions of the Act are not yet fully in force and that there is no data on the 
effects such would be having. The DEA 2010 addresses only a section of the OSP 
spectrum this thesis deals with. The consumer - ISP relationship being targeted is 
obviously a subset of the consumer - OSP/ISSP relationship and because the DEA 
2010 is primarily/initially targeting P2P file sharing, which again represents a 
subcategory in the broader online copyright infringement context. The interaction 
between the DEA 2010 and 3PCL in the UK from a non-stakeholder perspective as 
a whole is minimal due to the fact that it was unlikely from the outset that 
requisite ISPs, meaning the common mass-market non-wireless Internet Access 
Providers covered by the Act, would be subject to such theories due to the nature 
of their activities.  
This is however not to say that a) the DEA 2010 would not affect ISPs legal standing 
in situations where they would for one exotic reason or another be brought into 
the scope of 3PCL, and b) the Act does not itself create additional intermediary 
liability for those ISPs concerned. The unlikely hypothetical scenario of situations 
raising the application of 3PCL theories coupled with the actions of ISPs in pursuit 
of DEA 2010 initial obligations compliance is an area of indeterminate interaction, 
yet also one in which the following careful observations can be made. It is difficult 
to see how the actions of an ISP in compliance with DEA 2010 provisions could not 
limit the applicability of 3PCL theories namely authorisation, common design and 
procurement. Concerning authorisation, the ISP in question will likely be 
encouraged to issue cease and desist letters to the individual infringers, once it has 
done so it has conclusively proven that it does not authorise such actions – upon a 
narrow definition of authorisation (grant or purported grant...); yet arguably less 
so where the preferred definition would be to ‘sanction, approve or countenance’ 
i.e. ratify, since here the sincerity of the ISP would arguably be more directly 
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relevant. The categories of common design and procurement are less 
straightforward in this regard. It is conceivable that even where an ISP were to 
send out cease and desist letters, the ISP could still, depending on the facts, part-
take in a common design, where such letters are found to be purely cosmetic 
warnings in light of other encouragement. Naturally, this would not detract from 
any available defences. 
As has been noted above, the DEA 2010 imposes new duties on ISPs and as such, 
additional intermediary liability for the ISPs concerned. The ISP liability intrinsic to 
the Act is, as identified above, limited to a failure to comply with any initial or 
technical obligations, the maximum penalty being fixed at £250,000. It is important 
to note in this regard that it remains unclear whether the maximum penalty 
applies per ISP during a certain time frame or whether it applies per contravention 
or infringer, and thus whether several maximum penalties may aggregate. Any 
aggregation would undoubtedly be excessive, and in terms of future negotiation 
strategy and a working business environment between content providers and 
content users, does not afford a harmonious and level playing field. In business 
terms this could be said to be a mistake, since it is likely that such measures would 
not stand but would further aid the OSP industry in lobbying representatives for 
additional protection. 
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PART 3 – UNTED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
A. The System of Copyright Protection 
 
This Part examines US copyright law and in particular 3PCL, similarly to Part 2, 
taking into account commercial and political considerations as well as 
technological facets, to aid in such an examination. It also immediately concludes 
and compares corresponding Chapters. 3PCL is mainly intrinsically concluded in 
this Part, but separately compared to the UK with proposals in Part 4. Throughout, 
a constructive, logical approach is taken in the following chapters, broadly 
speaking; first exploring the state versus federal interaction then delineating 
categories of works, the rights pertaining to them as well as relevant defences and 
remedies.  
This chapter will examine state/federal interaction, the Copyright Acts, categories 
of works and conclude and compare regarding the UK. 
 
I. Statutory Regime 
 
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and discoveries. 
Section 8, Article I, US Constitution (the Constitution), above, is how the so-called 
Founding Fathers443 of the United States of America (US) framed and justified 
Congress’s power to enact laws concerning copyright and patents.444 It is both a 
source of and a limitation on Congress’s power to legislate in this regard, as will be 
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seen below. US copyright law, prior to the framing of the Constitution, originated 
from UK censorship laws of the 16th century445 and later most notably from the 
Statute of Anne.  
 
1) The Copyright Acts 
 
a) The Copyright Act 1909 
 
The earliest influential and noteworthy US Act dates back to 1909, it was 
superseded by the 1976 Act, which for the most part took effect on January 1, 
1978. Only with the CA 1976 did the US receive truly federal copyright. The CA 
1909 still governs aspects of transactions between 1909 and 1978, and may thus 
have bearing on litigation today.446  
 
b) The Copyright Act 1976 
 
i) Federal Pre-emption: The Supremacy Clause  
 
For the most part, the CA 1976 abolished common-law copyright and created a 
federal copyright.447 However, several cases prior to the 1976 Act declared state 
anti-copying laws as pre-empted due to their incompatibility with federal copyright 
law. One such reason was the argued incompatibility with the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, which as its name implies, ensures the 
supremacy of the Constitution. 
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Given the federal nature of the US, the overriding federal theme of the Supremacy 
Clause is mirrored in the Privileges or Immunities Clause in Amendment XIV, 
Section 1, Clause 2: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the US. 
As early as in 1859 the US Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth,448 citing the 
Supremacy Clause, determined that any contradiction of the decisions of federal 
courts, by state courts, would be overturned. More recently, the US Supreme 
Court has expanded its jurisprudence in this area and thereby also the remit of the 
Supremacy Clause; in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,449 “Even without an 
express pre-emption provision, state law must yield to a congressional Act if 
Congress intends to occupy the field” citing California v. ARC America Corp.,450 “or 
to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute” citing Hines v. Davidowitz.451  
 
i) Federal Pre-emption: Section 301, Copyright Act 1976 
 
Having taken note of cases concerning federal pre-emption in the area of patent 
and copyright, Congress passed s.301(a) CA 1976, which subsumed all legal and 
equitable rights equivalent to the protection afforded by s.106 to subject matter in 
s.102-103, whether arising by common, or State law. 
The section would be entirely absolute, were it not in fact tempered by s.301(b), 
which includes provisions that State rights and remedies are not to be annulled or 
limited should they relate to;  
(1) subject matter falling outside section 102 and 103, including unfixed works; or  
(2) the rights afforded by state law that are not equivalent to the rights accorded 
by section 106. 
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It is clear that the first category allows States to legislate against unauthorised 
copying  of, for example, lectures by notation or tape recording, or any other “live” 
form of content or performance thereof.452  
The second category of rights afforded by State law which are not equivalent to 
the rights accorded by s.106, has sprung what is referred to as the “extra element” 
test for non-pre-emption. This test developed due to the fact that an earlier 
version of the copyright revision bill itemised non-pre-empted state causes of 
action, which is currently not the case with s.301.453 Commentators have observed 
that “there is good reason to believe that the deletion from of the list454 from the 
bill was not intended as repudiation”.455  
 
ii) Particular Relevance to OSPs 
 
The area in which this issue becomes particularly relevant to this thesis is that 
concerning the treatment of infringement, which most often concerns primary 
infringers but is thus inherently also of interest to OSPs, given the nature of 3PCL. 
OSPs, but also the content producing industry, are arguably more certain of the 
scope and remit of federal provisions, both current and future, than they are of 
State legislation in this area. Some might thus be concerned with preventing the 
applicability of State laws.  
As will be seen from the above, this may be done via s.301 or a wider theory of 
pre-emption. Such a wider theory would include the above discussed delineation 
of federal policies implied by the CA. For example, in Foley v. Luster,456  a case 
concerning Florida’s law of indemnification and the interplay with joint-liability for 
copyright infringement, the Court of Appeals framed the question as being 
whether provisions in the CA would be nullified and whether “state law stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
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objectives of Congress”457, in this case however, Florida common-law principles of 
indemnification were upheld. Commentators have noted that “some courts are 
more willing than others to effect “accommodation” of federal and state laws, and 
thus to deny that the state law is pre-empted.458 
 
2) A Compact Taxonomy of Works in the United States 
 
In the US works “works of authorship” are substantiated in eight overlapping 
categories and are explicitly enumerated in section 102(a) CA 1976.459 For 
protection to be afforded, the section requires, arguably needlessly for some of 
the categories,460 that works be fixed, as explained below. 
It is also interesting to note that s.102(b) contains a stipulation that copyright 
protection shall not extend across the idea/expression dichotomy divide.  
 
Titles 
There are certain categories of subject matter that are excluded from protection, 
such as titles to works. This position may be contrasted with that in the aforegoing 
Part, in particular the position after Infopaq and the application of the requisite 
“intellectual creation of the author” standard in Meltwater, where it was held that 
titles of newspaper articles may attract protection either individually or as part of 
the works which they relate to. The reason why titles, or similarly, slogans461 have 
been refused copyright protection in the US is that, despite consisting of words or 
symbols, thus residing within the realm of s.102(a), potentially attracting 
considerable goodwill, they represent a de minimis manifestation of the requisite 
esprit de droit d’auteur. This is also the official policy of the Copyright Office, which 
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groups titles, with, among other things, phrases and trademarks in the category of 
unprotectable subject matter.462 It will refuse registration for such.463 
What the Categories Mean/Meant 
Despite the 8 non-exhaustive categories of the 1976 Act represented a shift away 
from the ostensibly open ended phrase “all the writings of an author”, the 1909 
Act in s.5 specified 14 categories for registration which the courts themselves, as 
observed by commentators, treated as definitive.464 This imposed rigidity, is not 
exhibited by the current regime. Moreover, one may observe that the categories 
related more to material objects than actual works, such as ‘books including 
composite and encyclopaedic works’. The current Act separates these two items, 
recognising that works falling into one category may be embodied in several 
different types of medium.  
The current categories are overlapping, in some respects unlike those in the 
preceding chapter in the UK.465 Most notably, a literary work may also be a 
dramatic works and lyrics may either be literary or musical works. This is to a 
certain extent institutionalised by the official categories used by the Register of 
Copyright, which further groups works into the following four categories; TX (non-
dramatic literary works); PA (performing arts); VA (visual arts) and SR (sound 
recordings). 
Given that a discussion of the relevant protectable categories would not be 
complete with their specific definitions, these must briefly be examined. This is 
important, as in Part 2, in the sense that the protectable subject matter and rights 
accruing must be precisely delineated before different theories of infringement 
can be examined. 
 
a) Literary Works 
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These are defined in the Act in s.101 CA 1976 in inclusive terms, i.e.  what they are 
not. It will be particularly relevant but, also obvious, that they are not audiovisual 
works. They are those written in words or symbols of any kind. Like in Part 2, 
“literary” does relate to any subjective adjudication of merit.466 It would be remiss 
to omit to mention, but out of place to analyse in depth, the fact that under the CA 
1976 the relationship between the protection of software and the category of 
literary works is not a straightforward one.467  
 
b) Musical Works 
 
Musical works are curiously listed in s.102(a) as a category, but not defined in 
s.101 CA 1976. Unlike the corresponding category under the CDPA as mentioned in 
Part 1, in the US “musical works” include the accompanying words. The relevant 
legislative report merely states in this regard that ‘”musical works” have fairly 
settled meanings.  
 
c) Sound Recordings 
 
Concerning ‘sound recordings’ in the US it is necessary to distinguish between pre- 
and post-1972 sound recordings. Prior to the Sound Recording Act 1971 (SRA), this 
particular subject matter was not protected by the CA 1909. Said Act harmonised 
protection across the US. The content producing industry at the time was dealing 
with the impact of tape technology, which the various, and at times inconsistent, 
state common law rules were inadequate for. The measures in the SRA 1971 were 
adopted in by the CA 1976, which protected sound recordings fixed after 1972. As 
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a result of the aforementioned pre-1972 sound recordings are still subject to state 
law, as expressly stipulated in s.301(c) CA 1976, until February 15, 2047.468 
 ‘Sound recordings’, are defined in s.101 CA 1976 and exclude sounds 
accompanying films or other audiovisual works. The definition is technologically 
neutral in the sense that it includes any material medium. These recordings may 
incorporate literary, musical or dramatic works but these will be distinct.469 
 
d) Dramatic Works 
 
The category of ‘dramatic works’ despite being listed in s.102(a) CA 1976 is left 
undefined, apart from the explicit inclusion of accompanying music, due to the 
general perception that most people will understand what is meant in this 
category. Despite the intended lack of legislative definition, the Copyright Office 
has, in old internal staff use documents, defined a dramatic work as ‘one that 
portrays a story by means of dialogue or acting and is intended to be performed. It 
gives directions for performance or actually represents all or a substantial portion 
of the action as actually occurring, rather than merely being narrated or 
described.’470 The classification of a work as dramatic rather than a non-dramatic 
literary or musical work has implications as to its protection which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 471   
 
e) Motion Pictures and Audiovisual Works 
 
Both categories are enumerated distinctly from each other in 17 USC s.102(a), yet 
it is, upon inspection, at once clear that audiovisual works is a broader parent 
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category, which includes motion pictures. It therefore makes sense to define 
audiovisual works first. The statutory definition exhibits a three step model. It 
starts by requiring series of related images, which are then intrinsically intended 
for consumption by the use of machines, together with any sounds. The definition 
is technologically neutral regarding the key method of displaying or the nature of 
the material object in which the works are embodied. The more narrow category 
of “motion pictures” is defined as being one of audiovisual works again, consisting 
of related images but which must be shown in succession and again must in part 
an impression of motion, together with any accompanying sounds. It is therefore 
clear that the ontological subset is a narrower category also in legal terms due to 
the requirement of succession, and the impression of motion. 
Having stated the above it is important to remember that an audiovisual work may 
consist of other individually identifiable copyrightable works that fall within the 
above definition, creating a audiovisual work. Importantly, it was held in Stern 
Electronics, Inc v. Kaufman that audiovisual displays did not have to occur 
sequentially.472  
Importantly regarding the category of motion pictures, it may be noted that, since 
it includes sound tracks, it differs substantially from that for films under the CDPA, 
which switched the position in the UK back to that under the 1911 Act, as noted in 
Part 2, separating the score from the film.473 This of course means that sound 
tracks in the US enjoy performance rights, which is generally not the case for 
sound recordings. 
It must also be noted that motion pictures require fixation in a tangible medium of 
expression, which therefore excludes live performances of for example American 
Football matches, unless a hardcopy is also simultaneously made.474  
 
3) Fixation and Relevant Problems 
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In the US, the fixation requirement for copyright is also not merely a legislative 
matter, but one that has been reinforced by the Supreme Court itself. As has been 
noted above, Congress’s legislative mandate concerning copyright stems from the 
Copyright Clause contained in the Constitution. Said copyright clause protects 
what are known as “Writings” of authors. In Goldstein v California,475 the Supreme 
Court defined “Writing” as “any physical rendering of fruits of creative intellectual 
or aesthetic labor”.476 
Works in Copies and Phonorecords 
The fixation requirement arises from s.102(a) requiring a work to be fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression. Moreover, fixation is also required concerning 
infringement, thus in s.106(1) concerning the reproduction right which references 
not just reproduction of copies but also phonorecords, such infringing copies 
themselves are defined as requiring fixation. The Act, as noted above, in its 1976 
reincarnation does not require any particular material object for fixation, it does 
however split all objects into two categories; copies and phonorecords. This 
naturally elevates phonorecords somewhat, which in turn benefits the content 
providing, in particular the music industry. Aside from such foundational 
consequential commercial observations, commentators such as Nimmer have 
argued that this distinction introduces a degree of unnecessary complexity.477  
Stability & Permanence (Non Transience) 
Fixation is also defined in terms of stability/permanency. This has a particular 
bearing on technological processes in online media. Specifically, what is required 
according to the definition of ‘fixed’ in s.101, is that when a work is embodied in a 
tangible form it is also “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”478  
One of the few remaining major non computer based commercial/industrial 
processes that has a complicated relationship with the stated requirement is that 
of live television and radio broadcasts. This is because as a rule, the sounds and 
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images making up a live broadcast should, it can be argued, be regarded as being 
ephemeral and not fixed, therefore not copyright protected. The reason why this is 
currently not case in the US is because the s.101 definition of fixation provides that 
where sounds or images, or both, are transmitted they will be regarded as fixed 
where a fixation of the work is made simultaneously with its transmission, as a 
result all broadcasters protect their works by simultaneous recording.479  
For previously unprotected works that only fixations authorised by the author or 
by someone deputised by the author may attract copyright protection.  
 
Computers, RAM/Buffers and Fixation (Non Transience) 
Computer-based commercial processes have a complicated relationship with the 
requirement of fixation. For example, Random Access Memory (RAM) is temporary 
due to the fact that data in a “buffer” is often replaced with new data as a matter 
of course, and that in any event, data in RAM generally is deleted upon switching 
off a computer. One of the most important cases in this area is MAI Systems Corp. 
v Peak Computer Inc,480 in which it was held that embodying software protected by 
copyright in RAM constituted fixation, and was, as a result an infringement of the 
plaintiff’s reproduction right.  
Many commentators have criticised this decision since if permanence and stability 
were defined in terms of a spectrum, then alleged fixations in RAM lie very much 
to one end of the spectrum, if not entirely outside it.481 Such critique receives solid 
backing from the requisite House Report, defining fixation in s.101 as such that 
excludes purely transient reproductions, including those captured momentarily in 
the ‘memory’ of a computer.482 Litman for example identified logical and to a 
certain extent quite practical problems, were the ruling to be applied in other 
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areas; browsing the Internet, given the storage of copyright protected data in 
RAM, could effectively be prohibited by content owners.483  
 
DMCA s.117(c) “Maintenance & Repair” Exception 
In 1998 Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Concerning 
this particular issue the DMCA amended s.117(c) CA 1976, creating a defence for 
service providers that conduct maintenance or repair and that temporarily and 
reproduce computer programs.484  The exception is relatively narrowly tailored 
given that it requires the authorisation of the owner or the lessee of a machine to 
authorise the making a copy of a computer program made solely due to activation 
of the machine, which is not used to any other purpose and destroyed 
immediately after maintenance and repairs completed. 
 
Cablevision - Revival of the Duration Requirement 
The above 1998 amendment and defence obviously does not abrogate the 
controversy surrounding buffer copies, whether in computers or similar 
equipment, as can for example be seen from the recent case, The Cartoon Network 
LP, LLLP v CSC Holdings Inc.485 (“Cablevision”). In Cablevision the Court of Appeals 
considered in depth the making of copies of films using a Remote Server Digital 
Video Recorder (RS-DVR) by the defendants at a central remote server at the 
direction of users of the RS-DVRs for time shifting. Naturally this technological 
process raised many issues and the instant case will be referred to throughout this 
Part. However, for present purposes, the buffer copies alone will be of immediate 
concern. In order to analyse Cablevision it is first necessary to understand the 
technological processes involved. The provision of the RS-DVR service involved, in 
simplified terms, the selection by a user of a program to be recorded, which then 
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started a technological “chain reaction” creating a buffer and, once complete, a 
permanent copy on the defendants remote server.  
The Court of Appeals in Cablevision rebuked the District Court for limiting its 
analysis to the embodiment requirement, and thus emphasised that both the 
embodiment and the duration requirement must be met. The court quite 
persuasively and elegantly stated that to hold otherwise, regarding the duration 
requirement would be to read it out of 17 USC s.101. 
The above approach not only clarifies rules pertaining to fixation, but undoubtedly 
also benefits the content using OSP industry. The importance of the train of 
thought embodied in Cablevision cannot be overstated, particularly bearing in 
mind that the US copyright system does not contain provisions similar to those in 
s.28A CDPA, pertaining to exemptions for technological processes, as highlighted 
in Part 2.486 
 
4) Originality 
 
The analysis may be commenced with a consideration of the second part of the 
phrase “writings of authors”, given that “writings” has already been defined above. 
It was held by the Supreme Court already in 1884 that the definition of “author” as 
required by the Constitution is to be “[Someone] to whom anything owes its 
origin; the originator, maker (...)”.487 This is seemingly a helpful definition, but also 
one which, with respect, is not quite as direct as commentators such as for 
example Nimmer or Leaffer make it out to be. 488 This is the case since on one view 
it does not inherently closely enough suggest that said authorship is itself 
connected to originality. One may, for example be the maker of a copy or derived 
work. But this is one view only.  
The Court’s following determination that what is protected is the “intellectual 
conception of its author, in which there is novelty, invention, originality, and 
therefore comes within the purpose of the Constitution” is more direct in this 
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regard, referring to the purpose of the Introductory Phrase and supplements the 
above, despite being a relatively early and strict definition.489 Yet, in defence of the 
above quote concerning the definition of “author”, it omits its second part, which 
forms the quote; “[H]e to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one 
who completes a work of science or literature”, which arguably strengthens the 
relevance of this definition.  
The requirement of originality stems directly in part from the Copyright Clause in 
the Constitution itself, affording protection to ‘writings of authors’ as well as 17 
USC 102(a) “copyright subsists in original works of authorship”.490 Although, it 
must be added that originality is, unlike other terms, not expressly defined in 17 
USC 101. The relevant House Report thus makes clear that the 1976 Act intended 
to incorporate the definition previously developed by the courts.491 It is therefore, 
implicitly, also clear that original authorship requires; 
(a)  independent creation; and a 
(b) modicum of creativity  
as the Supreme Court determined in the famous 1991 decision, Feist Publications, 
Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.492 (Feist). The case dealt with a 
telephone directory which Rural claimed was subject to copyright and which was 
copied by Feist Publications following a refusal to license. It was held there was no 
copyright in a telephone directory, and the double standard of originality referred 
to was propounded. Due to this explicit adoption of court determined originality, 
certain commentators have argued that Congress has forfeited its power to 
legislate using the Copyright or Commerce Clause of the Constitution, say for the 
benefit of particular works that under the requisite standard would not obtain 
protection. 493 Importantly from a UK perspective, the Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected a “sweat of the brow” approach due to allegedly ‘protecting facts’, 
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impermissibly crossing the idea/expression rubicon.494 Yet, perhaps s.103 also 
played a part; requiring expressly originality for ‘factual compilations’. 
Summary: Independent Creation (Originality) 
The concept of “independent creation” which has been held in cases such as Alfred 
Bell & Co v. Cantela Fine Arts, Inc.,495 (Alfred Bell) not to require novelty simply 
means that the work is not copied from another work.496 It is thus possible, like 
under UK law, for two individuals to independently come up with the same work, 
and both will be protected by copyright.  
 
Modicum of Creativity 
It is important to distinguish between the criterion/requirement of ‘independent 
creation’ and that of a ‘modicum of creativity’, since these are linked but separate 
concepts. 
The well known ‘Trademark Cases’ of 1879 were the first determination by the 
Supreme Court concerning the copyright clause. 497 The Court held that “writings” 
must constitute “the fruits of intellectual labour” and that as such, trademarks did 
not qualify for protection since they did not constitute a writing in this sense. This 
pronunciation was followed by cases considering this issue up to the present 
day.498  
Whereas a work may be independently created, it may fail to meet the standard of 
creativity. What exactly may be protected depends on the facts of the case and the 
specific subject matter at hand, as can be seen from Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc v. 
Nifty Foods Corp.499 in which the label on a box of cake was protected due to 
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having sufficient commercial artistry to entice protection against obvious 
copying.500  
 
Appreciation of Work as a Whole 
Very much like under UK law in Part 2, the courts in the US have held that 
determining the requisite modicum of originality must be done with reference to 
the entire work. The courts in Atari Games Corp v Oman501 held that the Copyright 
Office erred in denying registration for copyright for a videogame screen, due to 
improperly focusing on individual independent components.502 
Artistic Merit Irrelevant 
Furthermore, is important to stress at this juncture that the courts since Bleistein v 
Donaldson Lithographing Company, 503 do not assess in subjective terms what 
comprises artistic merit. This is almost identical to the position in the UK.504  
 
5) Formalities 
 
Formalities were emphasised from the dawn of U.S.  copyright law to the CA of 
1976, which at its passage provided that failure to observe certain formalities 
could result in either a loss of copyright, or in a loss of certain remedies under the 
copyright.505  
 It is first of all useful to distinguish between the requirements of formalities under;  
a) 1909 CA;  
b) 1976 CA; and  
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c) the situation under the 1976 Act after the 1989 accession of the US to Berne.506  
A trend towards abolition of formalities from 1909 to 1989 can be observed. Under 
the 1909 Act copyright protection;  
a) could fail where notice and manufacture provisions had not been complied 
with;507 and 
b) could not be enforced and in certain instances remedies denied the before the 
courts without prior registration with the Copyright Office.508 
It will for present purposes not be necessary to delineate the difference between 
the 1909 Act and 1979 Act as originally passed, given the amendments pursuant to 
an accession to Berne. Presently in the US, for works created after the period 01 
January 1978 - 01 March 1989, copyright notice, manufacture,509 registration, 
renewal provisions are not in force.  
Registration 
Registration or an attempt to register is required for suits in the US by US 
nationals.510 Such also, for all litigants, allows for the recovery of fees for 
professional representation and the election of statutory damages, both of which, 
given the cost of litigation in the US and the nature of statutory damages 
themselves, are an immeasurable benefit.511 Moreover in cases which start off with 
an enquiry as to the establishment of prima facie copyright infringement, the 
court’s enquiry will first of all revolve around the ownership of valid copyright. It is 
therefore usual for plaintiffs to file as an exhibit to a complaint a certificate of 
registration with the Copyright Office which serves as prima facie evidence of valid 
ownership of copyright pursuant to 17 USC 410(c). Registration is usually effective 
in this manner if it was made within five years after first publication. Section 410(c) 
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specifies that where registration is made thereafter, the evidentiary weight to be 
accorded to the certificate is within the discretion of the court. Additionally, as may 
be the case for works in the period between the effective date of the 1976 Act and 
1 March 1989, the effective date of the BCIA, where the plaintiff is a party other 
than the author, such must first record with the Copyright Office the assignment, 
for example, using the actual deed.512 An important exception to the requirement 
of registration prior to bringing suit is that of works of foreign origin, these are not 
subject to such a requirement, but may not receive the above mentioned adjunct 
benefits. 
It is worth briefly delineating publication, notice and the manufacturing provisions. 
Publication 
The publication of a work can be said to be the fixation work in a tangible medium 
of expression, as already defined above, and required by s.102(a). From that point 
on, federal copyright protection exists in the work, for the life of the author +70 
years as per s.302(a).  
For works falling within the time period 1 January 1978 and 1 March 1989, notice 
showing the date of publication was required for all publicly distributed copies of 
the work per s.401(a) and 402(a) for both types of works respectively. Failure to 
include notice on published copies of the work during the specified period could 
lead to forfeiture of copyright per s.405. 
 The BCIA abolishes the requirement for notice of works published on or after 1 
March 1989. The BCIA does not touch upon the deposit requirement within three 
months after publication pursuant to s.407(a), with the library of Congress; non-
compliance with which does not yield forfeiture, but instead fines pursuant to 
s.407(d). Following the depositing of the work with the Library of Congress it is 
usually the case that the author will register the work to gain the above identified 
advantages set out in s.408-412. The advantages include prima facie evidence of 
validity of copyright were said work is registered within five years the publication, 
statutory damages and attorneys’ fees where registration proceeds infringement or 
a work has registered with the copyright office three months post-publication. 
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Concerning phonorecords, under the 1976 Act, publication of a sound recording 
publishes both the sound recording as well as the linked musical work.513  
Notice Provisions 
Notice for the purpose of the 1976 CA per s.401(b)514 constitutes affixing the 
symbol (c) or the word “copyright” or the abbreviation “Copr.” together with the 
year of first publication of the work515 and the name of the owner of the copyright 
in the work or an abbreviation/alternative designation of the owner. Said must be 
fixed in such a place and manner so as to give “reasonable notice of the claim of 
copyright”.516 Where the notice is compliant and the defendant in a copyright 
infringement action had access to such, then per the statute “no weight shall be 
given to a defendant’s interposition of a defence based on innocent infringement in 
mitigation actual or statutory damages”.517  
Prior to the BCIA in 1988 such notice was required for all publicly distributed copies 
of the work of authorship. When comparing this requirement to that in other 
similarly situated jurisdictions, it is clear that such a requirement was unique in 
particular in relation to forfeiture of copyright as a result of non-compliance.518 
Commentators have noted that it was precisely this requirement which prevented 
accession to Berne for over 100 years, to the detriment of US authors.  
There are four main purposes of the notice regime namely; conversion into public 
domain of non-exploited works; placing the public on notice of a claim to copyright; 
identification of the copyright owner and date of publication.519 Burdens and 
unfairness to copyright owners which must be balanced against the main purposes 
of the notice regime. The reason for a revision of the 1909 statute in this regard 
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was to avoid unjust forfeitures resulting from “unintentional relatively unimportant 
omissions or errors in the copyright notice. It has been contended that the 
disadvantages of the notice requirement outweighs its values and that it should 
therefore be eliminated or substantially liberalised”.520  
Manufacturing Clause 
The manufacturing clause expired in its own right on 1 July 1986, and was 
contained in both the 1909 and 1976 CA. It prohibited the import of books by 
American authors521 unless the works were manufactured, printed and bound in 
the US or, later Canada.522 Copies in contravention were eligible for seizure, 
forfeiture and destruction by the Department of Treasury and the U.S. Postal 
Service.523 Moreover in actions for infringement of a copyright owner’s 
reproduction or distribution rights , the owner’s violation of the manufacturing 
provisions could, given certain facts were proven, constitute a complete defence.524 
Non-compliance can still be used as a defence for works publicly distributed 
between 1 January 1978 and 1 July 1986, where the copyright owner has not 
registered a US edition. 
 
6) Term of Copyright 
 
Concerning the duration of copyright, the Copyright Clause (Art I, para.8, cl.8 of the 
Constitution, as mentioned above, empowers Congress to grant exclusive rights to 
authors for “limited times”. The length of protection in successive Copyright Acts in 
the US has increased, as in the UK. The 1790 CA modelled on the Statute of Anne 
initially granted copyright protection to the published works to authors for 14 
years as well as the right to renew for an additional 14 years, if the author was 
alive at the end of the first term. The 1909 CA increased the period of protection 
from 14 years to 28 years respectively. It also permitted the invocation of 
indefinite, state copyright prior to publication, whereupon common-law copyright 
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was pre-empted by federal copyright, given compliance with the requisite 
formalities, as noted above.  
From 1 January 1978, the 1976 CA provided for protection upon fixation in a 
tangible medium of expression, as noted. It thereby extended its protection to pre-
existing published or unpublished works. The 1976 Act changed the period of 
protection for works created or published after 1 January 1978 to the life of the 
author +50 years, thereby concurrently abandoning the renewal format.  
The period of protection under the 1976 Act was extended in 1998 by the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) as relevant for purposes of comparison 
with Part 1, for works; 
a) in their initial 28 year copyright term under 1909 Act on 1 January 1978, for 67 
instead of 28 years, thereby effectively providing a 95 year term of copyright; 
 b) in their renewal term under the 1909 Act on 1 January 1978, for a total period 
of 95 years from the date copyright protection started;525 
c) created on or after 1 January 1978, for life +70 years; 
d) created prior to 1 January 1978, yet unpublished, the period of life +70 years. 
The term of protection for works made for hire526 is 95 years from the date of 
publication or 120 years from the date of creation, whichever expires first.527 
Sound Recordings (and inadequate protection) 
Lastly, given the fact that sound recordings were not protected until 15 February 
1972, the protection of such is a complicated matter.528 For recordings prior to 
1972, 17 USC 301(c) maintains rights and remedies under common law or statutes 
in the individual States until 15 February 2047. It will be observed that that this 
protection is problematic and when compared to be protection for sound 
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recordings in the UK, providing comparatively less certainty to the rights holders or 
the content producing or even using industry. However, sound recordings created 
between 15 February 1972 and 31 December 1977 have the usual 28 year first 
term followed by a 67 year renewal term. Moreover recordings created on or after 
15 February 1972 benefit from the standard, life +70 years period of protection. 
 
7) Conclusion & Comparison 
 
The above discussion has examined the development of copyright law in the US, 
highlighting relevant legislative milestones and their interaction with the federal 
nature of the jurisdiction. Within this landscape, a taxonomy of the works 
protected been undertaken, including particular existential attributes, namely; 
fixation, originality, formalities, and their term. The framework for a logical follow-
on discussion of rights, exceptions and remedies pertaining to the subject matter 
has therefore been laid. 
The federal categories of works, as in Part 2,529 have broadened e.g.  the 1972 
creation of ‘sound recordings’, in tandem with technological developments. They 
are however ‘organically grown’ (targeted; e.g. difference between motion 
pictures and audiovisual works) and partially overlapping. Notably absent from 
protection, contrary to in the UK, are titles and similar subject matter; musical 
works include accompanying works; motion pictures include sound tracks. 
Yet, as compared with the UK, US copyright law features an added dimension due 
to the federal/state interplay. Without wishing to overstate the importance of this 
fact, this has added a limited element of legal uncertainty, in particular with 
respect to the dynamic nature of the base of operations of OSPs. It is not 
inconceivable that individual states may in the future adopt ‘copyright plus’ laws. 
Importantly, concerning fixation, the duration requirement has recently been 
affirmed as operative in Cablevision.  US copyright law does not have the 
equivalent to UK s.28A CDPA,530 which made this important. 
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Concerning originality, the US approach diverges, at least terminologically, from 
the UK one in that “sweat of the brow” is refused and an independent creation 
exhibiting a modicum of creativity is required. The first part of the test 
(independent creation) is almost identical to the first part of the UK test. The 
second part, the modicum of creativity or ‘intellectual labour’ requirement 
arguably at least generally differs in scope, being narrower, than the UK 
requirement of “relevant skill and labour”, yet bearing in mind recent 
developments, i.e. as of yet unresolved CJEU references on the interplay between 
the UK test and “independent intellectual creation of the author” in particular in 
Football Dataco.531  
Most formalities were abolished following the BCIA 1988 in the US. However some 
requirements, unlike in the UK since the Berlin Revision (1908) of Berne, mean that 
under US law OSPs might enjoy some slight benefits, the extent depending on 
exact  time period a work falls into. It is currently still the case that where the 
works in suit have not been registered, this will mean that ownership must be 
established and statutory damages as well as representational costs cannot be 
claimed. 
The term of copyright in the US has been set at, mainly, life +70 years, explicitly so 
under the 1976 Act, and with ‘add on’ terms for works protected under prior Acts, 
or 95 years for corporations. The term of copyright for sound recordings in the US 
is a particularly problematic issue, given the late introduction of the category; 
protection straddling both state, until 2047, and federal law. In sum, the 
protection for some works is longer in the US than the UK where the maximum is 
life +70 years; the Gowers Review rejected term extensions citing the absence of a 
competitive disadvantage. The length of protection naturally favours the content 
providing industry. 
Given the above, it must be stated that as relevant to validating the central third-
party copyright liability comparison and proposals for reform, both regimes are 
largely similar and operate in a similar fashion. 
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B. Primary Copyright Infringement 
 
Having examined the nature of copyright protection under federal law including 
relevant categories, it is now logical to examine the nature of the exclusive rights 
granted in the US. This section, as in Part 2 is necessary to provide proper 
definition and demarcation of 3PCL theories, so that these may then later be 
analysed as well as compared and contrasted accurately. As with the section 
above, the following analysis will include instant comparisons to UK law were 
relevant and appropriate.  
This Chapter examines the rights attaching to the protected categories delineated 
in Chapter A, which may be directly infringed; as such it examines the 
reproduction, distribution, public performance, and public display rights. This 
examination is followed by a conclusion and comparison to the law in the UK. 
 
I. Delineation and Meaning of Exclusive Rights 
 
The exclusive rights of copyright owners set out in s.106 concern reproduction, 
adaptation, distribution, performance and display & recording of digital audio 
transmissions of works. The doing of any such act without authorisation amounts 
to infringement, where such is not subject to an applicable limitation as set out in 
ss.107-122; the current Act in the US as compared to the CDPA 1988 contains 
more detailed limitations.532 
The various exclusive rights listed in s.106 pertain to different forms of 
copyrightable works. For clarity, it is important that it will be remembered that the 
reproduction, adaptation and distribution rights apply to all works listed in 
s.102(a), whereas the rights of public performance and public display inherently 
only apply to the categories delineated in s. 106(4) and (5). The right of public 
performance attaches only to musical works but not to sound recordings. Despite 
at first glance not seeming directly relevant to both the aforegoing and present 
classification and delineation of works and exclusive rights, this is not so – in 
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particular given the complex nature of the subject matter at hand. Whether a 
music connoisseur that publicly exhibits his taste in songs at an event at Madison 
Square Garden, New York City,533 simultaneously dons the hat of a pirate depends 
inter alia, upon the method of purveyance for aural pleasure. In other words, in an 
unauthorised scenario, while the exhibitionist playing recordings might get served 
by the author and not the record label/owner, one utilising a website for a “digital 
audio transmission” could expect an action from the copyright owner, pursuant to 
s.106(6). This example admirably demonstrates the interplay between media, 
owners and s.106. Yet, irrespective of the right or subject matter, the limitations 
referenced above apply equally. 
An alternative perspective on the above may be tendered in the sense that some 
commentators have focused in their discussion of this topic on the requirement of 
reproduction in some form for all infringements.534 As such this requirement has 
been termed an external limitation, meaning that exercising rights pertaining to a 
work must concern infringements emanating directly or indirectly from the owner 
of the requisite right. This can be contrasted with so-called internal limitations 
meaning that not every unauthorised act, even to the extent where it emanates 
directly from a copyright protected work automatically infringes copyright.535 This 
is of course not to say that certain unauthorised acts might not infringe despite the 
fixation of the work not being involved, for example by public sale, performance or 
display. This is particularly relevant for music, sound recordings, audiovisual works 
and movies, which are the focus of this thesis. 
Whereas some would undoubtedly consider a discussion of copyright in such 
doctrinal terms as superfluous, such is in fact essential to the development, nature 
and outcome of this thesis. As, noted above, and as in the UK, the copyright owner 
may do certain restricted acts or authorise others to do them per s.106. This 
language of including “authorisation” is important, and commentators have noted, 
relying on Sony Corporation of America and Universal City Studios, Inc.,536 that 
“furnishes the basis for incorporating into copyright law the principle of 
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contributory infringement”.537 This fact is important, because it highlights a major 
difference between the UK copyright system and the US copyright system in the 
sense that the latter does not include at the outset a category of secondary 
copyright infringement, even where such a category in the UK is not comparable 
with the evolved category of contributory infringement i.e. secondary liability in 
the US.  Discussion of Sony will resurface throughout this part, since it is relevant 
to not only in the development of 3PCL but also to exceptions. 
It now behoves to briefly provide more details regarding relevant exclusive rights, 
for an adequately in-depth discussion of the rights ultimately being infringed in 
primary or 3PCL. 
  
II. Reproduction Right 
 
Since the first CA 1790, evolution has also occurred concerning what can be 
termed the most fundamental copyright, namely that of reproduction; the most 
immediate and striking feature being the inclusion of “phonorecords” in the right 
to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”.538  
As noted, infringing reproduction must include the unauthorised fixation in a 
tangible and relatively permanent medium of expression. It will be important to 
distinguish between the reproduction right and the distribution right. The 
reproduction of only one copy in unauthorised manner will infringe automatically. 
In the classical sense one might wonder why a commercial party would reproduce 
a work without distributing it for pecuniary gain. This can be answered however 
with reference to cases such as Sega Enterprises Ltd v Accolade Inc.,539 where the 
infringer had as its stated purpose the reverse engineering of the plaintiffs 
software; or Walt Disney Productions v Filmation Association540 where the infringer 
reproduced the plaintiffs works during the production of a film despite non-
distribution of the copies in question. In short, the reproduction right can be 
justified without distribution. It is also submitted that it would be instructive to 
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distinguish between reproduction and copying in the sense that reproduction 
occurs only with the above referenced fixation, whereas copying as a broader 
category can include instances where fixation has not occurred such as by 
performance or display.541  
The definition of reproduction in s.106(1) refers to “copies” and “phonorecords” in 
technologically neutral terms, implicitly by incorporating the requisite definitions 
in s.101, which principally centre around the phrase “by any method now known 
or later developed”. Commentators have thus noted that unauthorised copies 
generated by technology through the years have therefore not caused concern.542 
Conversely, transient storage whether in RAM or ROM causes problems due to the 
impermanent nature of fixation. 
 
1) Proof of Unauthorised Copying 
 
Given the relatively practical nature of this thesis it is important to discuss the 
proof of copyright infringement in the US, without which even the most solid 
theory of infringement by a plaintiff will fail. There are three different approaches. 
The first may be termed the “ordinary observer/audience test” and as a name 
suggests is relatively simple. It involves recording the subjective, spontaneous and 
immediate reactions of non-legally trained observers in court.543 Commentators 
have noted that the way in which the test has been used varies, but this need not 
be a concern presently, given that it is also be noted that the present approach in 
the US is a two-step approach.544 This two-step approach, splits into depending on 
the sphere of judicial allegiance, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit approach. 
Given that the Ninth Circuit modified the earlier approach by the Second Circuit, 
this will be analysed first. Thus, in Arnstein v. Porter545 (“Arnstein”) the Second 
Circuit emphasised the importance of differentiating between, on the one hand, 
unauthorised copying from the plaintiffs work, and once this has proven, on the 
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other, that it could be deemed improper appropriation. Admission by the plaintiff 
is the most direct route, yet this is rarely the case, and therefore joint evidence of 
access and similarity must suffice for an inference by the court in this regard. It 
also follows that proof of access and similarity are entirely sequential. Access will 
often prove less challenging than establishing the requisite degree of similarity. 
 
a) Two-Tier Copying Test 
 
Arnstein proposed a two tier test of copying in this regard. The first level examines 
merely whether when comparing the two works, at a very low level, the 
similarities are “probative”546 of copying – meaning that they indicate the likely 
absence of independent creation. The second more rigorous stage, in case of a 
positive finding at the first stage, examines “substantial taking” measured either 
qualitatively or quantitatively. Again, there are, substantial similarities between 
the US and UK jurisprudence on the topic of the ontological enquiry for a judicial 
determination of copying, such that might even loosely and conceptually satisfy 
the first level test in Arnstein. Most interestingly commentators such as Gorman 
have noted the inverse relationship between the weight of proof of access and of 
similarity, in the second part of the test.547 This means that is has been argued that 
the greater the obstacles a defendant faced in gaining access to the copyright 
protected work the stronger the case must be on similarities between the two 
works in question; conversely where there are relatively few similarities between 
the works in question the more the success of the case for the plaintiff will hinge 
on proof of access.   
Gorman's observations may however be qualified.548 It was held in Warner Bros., 
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies,549 that "because direct evidence of 
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copying is ordinarily unavailable, a plaintiff is permitted to demonstrate copying 
through indirect proof. [Thus,] it is well settled that copying may be inferred where 
a plaintiff establishes that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and 
that the two works are substantially similar."550  
Somewhat problematically in dogmatic terms given the possibility of two identical 
but independent creations which are both worthy of copyright protection, it has 
been held in US jurisprudence that inferences of copying may be drawn even 
where evidence of access to the work in question is absent given “striking” 
similarities.551 The Court of Appeals in Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc.,552 held that 
the concept of a degree of similarity that is close to identity can be evidence of 
access in itself, thereby ruling out the “accident of independent creation”. 
However the Court ameliorated this approach by taking into account 
works/subject matter in the public domain which the defendant in question may 
have drawn on first, as well as specifically allowing for a rebuttal, by disproving 
access or establishing independent creation by other means.553 
 
b) Question of Degree once Probatively Affirmed 
 
It must be remembered however that proven copying does not suffice for a finding 
of infringement. What is required instead is the addition of substantiality in terms 
of the degree of copying, so as to make the appropriation unlawful, as indicated 
above. The question was raised in Arnstein whether the court will find expert or lay 
testimony useful. It was thus held that experts may prove useful in assisting the 
court with a determination of whether copying at the first tier had occurred, 
whereas lay persons’ responses to the second tier are likely to be more 
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determinative.554 This means that experts are limited in their usefulness to 
determine the likelihood of copying but not the actual substantiality. It has been 
held in US jurisprudence that in considering whether a work is substantially similar 
to the copyrighted work it is the ordinary observer’s perspective that must be 
adopted.555 The relevant public will be taken into account where a particular work 
was marketed at a particular audience, in these cases such audiences’ observations 
will be of particular value regarding substantiality.556 The court in Lyons P’ship, L.P. 
v. Morris Costumers, Inc.557 further imposed a two-part analysis concerning 
substantiality; differentiating between extrinsic and intrinsic similarity. The former 
concerned similarity on the grounds of substantially similar ideas which are 
copyright protected, and the latter involved similarity because the alleged copies 
express ideas in a “substantially similar manner, from the perspective of the 
intended audience of the work". It was important that the court noted, concerning 
intrinsic similarity that this concept may lead to a “slippery slope” due to requiring 
an enquiry into “the ‘total concept and feel’ of the works’, but only as seen 
through the eyes of the ordinary observer”.558  
 
c) Ninth Circuit Variation: Krofft 
 
The Ninth Circuit has varied the approach in Arnstein in Sid & Marty Croft 
Television v. McDonald’s Corporation.559 The creation was called an “extrinsic-
intrinsic test for infringement based on the idea-expression dichotomy” and was 
intrinsically described as substantially similar.560 The first stage enquiry seeks out 
substantial similarity of ideas by analysis, including experts. Such must be proven 
by the plaintiff. Once found, the jury is to determine sufficiency of quantity based 
on the view of such, without experts, much like the audience test referenced 
above. It may be observed that similarity of ideas does not disprove independent 
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creation and commentators have stated that Krofft favours defendants, especially 
given the complexity of the first hurdle before a jury considers the facts.561 
 
d) De Minimis Doctrine 
 
Where, despite a copyright protected work being copied it lacks substantial 
similarity, copyright infringement cannot be found. This has been termed the de 
minimis/de minimis non curat lex doctrine in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment 
Television, Inc.562 Whereas in principle it would seem that short excerpts would fall 
within this denomination, it has been held that sampling can be held to be 
inapplicable to music recordings.563  
 
e) Strict Liability 
 
Given that copyright infringement is, as noted in Part 2 also, a strict liability tort, 
unknowing or unconscious infringement does not present a defence.564  
 
2) Compulsory “Mechanical Licenses” 
 
Despite having noted that the exclusive right of reproduction in 17 USC 106(1) also 
applies to works embodied in phonorecords, this is tempered by the important 
compulsory license provisions (“mechanical license”) in s.115(a)(1) which provides 
that following the authorised distribution of nondramatic musical works in the US, 
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any person, may following the acquisition565 of a compulsory license, make and 
distribute phonorecords of said works.566  
These provisions hark back to the 1909 CA and Congress’s concern at the time that 
a monopolist would emerge with title to almost all recording rights. The objective 
was thus to facilitate the emergence of smaller record companies to kindle 
competition in the industry. Certain commentators have noted that despite, or 
others have propounded perhaps because, emblematically, the Aeolian 
Company,567 one of the most powerful undertaking at the time, does not existing 
anymore, this has in fact worked.568 Other such commentators, e.g., Pallas Loren, 
adamantly call for the abolition of both the compulsory license regime for musical 
copyright owners.569 She also rails against the unequal treatment of musical and 
sound recording copyright owners, citing the result of prospective parity as being 
“a more efficient market for downstream use”.570 
 
a) Tribunals to Panels 
 
Royalty rates despite initially being fixed statutorily under the 1909 Act, were 
under the 1976 Act initially regulated by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.571 The 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal members appointed by the President, formed what can 
be defined as an independent agency, with delegated authority to legislate 
concerning compulsory licenses within a relatively narrow remit. The tribunal also 
adjudicated disputes concerning the allocation of funds collected for cable 
television and jukebox performances. 
The Copyright Tribunal’s activities were controversial from the outset, since the CA 
1976 provided detailed guidance as to rate-setting for compulsory licenses yet, 
perhaps understandably, did not specify the manner of allocation of royalties. It 
may also be noted that the Tribunal had the mandate to develop its own rules of 
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procedure provided these complied with the Administrative Procedure Act 1966.572 
Decisions of the Tribunal were appealed to the DC Circuit relatively frequently573 
and House Committees examined the Tribunal’s actions several times.574 Oman 
suggested in 1986 that the jukebox license despite its amendment by the BCIA 
stood in the way of US adherence to the Berne Union.575 Divestiture from the 
Tribunal began in 1993576 and cumulated in 2004/6577 with copyright royalties 
under the scheme being administered by Copyright Royalty Judges appointed by 
the Librarian of Congress. 
 
b) Digital Phonorecords Delivery 
 
The license provisions, apply equally to any media and distribution. In fact, 
downloads are specifically catered for by 17 USC 115(c)(3) in what is classed as 
“digital phonorecords delivery” regardless of whether the digital transmission is 
simultaneously “also a public performance of the sound recording under s.106(6) 
of this title or of any nondramatic musical work embodied therein under s.106(4) 
of this title”. This provision was added at quite an early stage in the development 
of the internet by the DPRSA 1995. Some commentators have noted in this regard 
that the metamorphosis of the “mechanical license” being a mechanism to 
facilitate the distribution of musical works by extending the original consensual 
license into what can be termed “interactive digital audio transmission 
technology” is a cause for concern for the content producing industry.578 This 
awareness is exacerbated by s.114 as amended by the DPRSRA, regarding the 
reception by consumers of sound recordings transmitted in ‘real-time’ thereby, as 
with traditional broadcasts, allowing for simultaneous and allegedly unlawful 
home recording and further compounded from a content providing industry 
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perspective by s.118, which provides compulsory licenses for non-commercial 
broadcasting entities.579  
The DPRSRA in distinguishes “digital phonorecords delivery” which usually results 
in reproduction from performances in real-time which are non-interactive 
subscription transmissions without reproduction is in s.115(d). The DPRSRA 
amendment specifically stipulates that any digital phonorecords delivery shall be 
classified as infringing unless the requisite delivery was authorised by the copyright 
owner of the sound recording and that such or the entity causing the digital 
phonorecords delivery has obtained a prior compulsory license under the section 
or has otherwise been authorised by the copyright owner of the musical work to 
distribute or authorise such by means of the requisite technology in s.115(c)(3)(h). 
The DPRSRA specifically exempts the sound recording copyright owner from 
secondary liability for unauthorised distribution in cases where the sound 
recording copyright owner has not licensed distribution of the phonorecords 
containing the nondramatic musical work in question.  
It is moreover highly relevant that the royalties set by the Copyright Royalty Judges 
in respect of the digital phonorecords remain the same as for delivery via more 
traditional means. Commentators have noted that this is due to a “functional 
equivalence”.580 This significantly shifts the balance of the compulsory licensing 
provisions a way from those receiving the copyright royalties, since under normal 
market conditions these most likely would negotiate new rates given the 
significantly lower production and distribution costs. Leaffer however notes that 
payment of royalties for digital phonorecords delivery under the compulsory 
license scheme will most likely be negotiated voluntarily or simply issued through 
or following an administrative assessment.581 
The concept of compulsory licenses is interesting in the sense that the content 
providing and using industries have attempted to find compromises in this regard. 
In support this contention commentators such as Leaffer for example cite s.111 
concerning secondary transmissions which in particular reflects intense 
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negotiations between different lobbies resulting in a complex system of 
regulation.582  
 
III. Distribution Right 
 
S.106(3) sets out the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords to the 
public. This may be done by several methods, namely by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, rental, lease or lending, per the statute. 
The definition of “to the public” is to be taken literally, comporting with a right to 
control the work’s publication.583 “Distribution” was used by the drafters 
purposively instead of “publication” to add clarity. Nimmer has thus observed that 
some might argue that distribution to a confined group, for limited purposes, not 
to “the public at large”, should not infringe the distribution right. The contrary 
position stems from the fact that the right to “vend” and the right to “publish” 
under s.1(a) CA 1909 were arguably subsumed under the present definition. The 
right to “vend” constituted a broader set of activities, in the sense that in could 
include more closely defined groups of consumers, whilst however implying 
pecuniary recompense.584 Commentators have therefore argued that a 
construction that broadens the term “to the public” by including smaller subsets, 
strips the instant right of its intended meaning.  
Moreover infringement of the distribution right requires actual dissemination and 
not, for example, public performance or transmissions. This is quite natural since 
performance does not in the classical sense involve publication nor does it involve 
a physical transfer. Nonetheless, in the event where an OSP makes available an 
unauthorised copy on its website or via services, to be downloaded by members of 
the public, it infringes the copyright owner’s distribution right, as for example held 
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in Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Hardenburgh, Inc..585 It will be is observed that this is 
a logical development from liability of a public library “when it places an 
unauthorized copy of the work in its collection, includes the copy in its catalogue 
or index system, and makes the copy available to the public”, as in Hotaling v. 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.586  
It will also be borne in mind that under this right, unauthorised distributors are 
liable for infringement and not the recipients, unless the distributor is himself an 
infringer, wherefore the buyer may in fact be liable as a contributory infringer as 
stipulated in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs.587 
 
1) First Sale Doctrine 
 
The above referenced distribution right applies to the first public distribution of 
the work leading to what has been known as the “first sale doctrine”. S.109(a) 
governs the first sale doctrine, by providing that the lawful owner of a 
copy/phonorecords, or any other person such authorises, is entitled to sell or 
otherwise dispose of said copy/phonorecords, without the authority of the 
copyright owner.588  
The above implies that the copy in question was lawfully made with the 
authorisation of copyright owner, transferred under the copyright owner’s 
authority and that the defendant was the lawful owner of the copy in question as 
well as the concomitant implications that the distribution right is availed of and 
not the reproduction right. 
This means that the copyright owner that has to divest themselves for the first 
time of the title to their intellectual creation589 by philanthropic590 or pecuniary 
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means and loses the right to control or to benefit from subsequent dispositions. 
“Pecuniary means” does not include transactions that bear the hallmarks of leases 
or licenses which witty drafters of transactions may seek use to circumvent the 
first sale doctrine, as for example in click wrap or shrink-wrap licenses. However, it 
was held in Adobe Systems Inc. v One-Stop Micro Inc.,591 that an agreement 
relating to computer software to be distributed to educational institutions was in 
fact a licensing agreement and not distribution of the software, despite the use 
throughout the “license agreement” of terms indicating a certain finality of 
divestiture, or sale.592  
Looping back however to the rights of the person in possession as to the original 
copyright owner, such a person is naturally not permitted to reproduce or perform 
the work publicly without the consent of the copyright owner. Given the above, it 
also logically follows that the doctrine is not triggered when a work has been 
rented, leased or loaned without transfer of title by the copyright owner. It will 
however be important for practitioners that it was held in United States v. Wise,593 
that the doctrine may be modified contractually by the parties to the agreement. 
Such amendments or modifications will then be subject to enforcement via 
contract law.594  
 
2) Digital Transmissions 
 
The Copyright Office has stated that the first sale doctrine is bound up through and 
through with the tangible nature of copies embodied in its regime.595 Some will no 
doubt question how well this fits in a world where significant numbers of works 
are “disposed” of in digital/online environments. Problems arise when a legal 
owner transmits a work to another person due to the fact that the sender usually 
keeps of what is known as a “source copy” and unless expressly deleted, at the 
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same time the recipient receives a further copy. Therefore, the technologically 
advanced legal owner that previously would have divested itself of a physical copy 
arguably infringes both the reproduction and distribution right pertaining to the 
work in question. Lemley has thus called for a change to the first sale doctrine to 
include the transfer of electronic works to single parties provided the source 
copies deleted within a reasonable time.596  
Other commentators have questioned this innovative approach from a policy 
standpoint.597 Such commentators are aligned with the Copyright Office’s view 
that classic physical copies are in their nature not the same as digital copies. This is 
the case due to economic and practical reasons. It may be validly observed that 
the market for digital versions of works differs from the traditional one, and that 
digital works in general do not degrade and can be perfectly reproduced cheaply, 
globally, and in greater numbers. 
Commentators such as Nimmer pose the question whether “users acquired 
interests during an era when they acquired tangible goods—books, discs, 
paintings, etc.—which simply do not arise in today’s Internet environment.”598 
Naturally, the Internet raises many new issues for copyright law, one of the 
responses to which has been the DMCA 1998.599 In the hearings on the DMCA, it 
was stated that extending the first sale doctrine to online environments runs 
counter to the policies the doctrine was intended to protect.600 Statements such as 
these are again in tune with Copyright Office’s view. It is therefore not surprising 
that the Office’s mandated s.104 Impact Report does not recommend amending 
the CA to deal with the digital first sales.601 
It was noted in the preceding paragraphs concerning digital transmissions that the 
sender arguably infringes the distribution and reproduction right of the copyright 
owner in copying and sending a copy of the work to another. The reason why some 
commentators argue that where a sender simultaneously or shortly thereafter 
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deletes his copy should fall within the safe harbour of the first sale doctrine, is that 
it is arguable that this achieves the same result as handing, for example, a copy of 
a DVD to another. Yet the reason why commentators disagree with this point of 
view, thereby arguably supporting the content providing industry’s view, is that for 
the divestiture via the copy-send-delete mechanism the reproduction right is 
infringed at the outset. It is therefore submitted that extending the first sale 
doctrine to digital transmissions implicates by limitation the distribution right to a 
lesser degree than the reproduction right. Both views are seemingly valid, to the 
extent that; 
a) purchasers of OSPs services are penalised for their actions versus their non-
computerised counterparts. A consumer acquiring a film via a licensed OSP 
distributor in digital format is at a disadvantage to the extent that he may not sell 
on the film via digital transmission after tiring of it, contrary to a purchaser of a 
hard copy DVD; versus 
b) The fact that the first sale doctrine in s.109(a) states that "notwithstanding the 
provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord." Whilst the consumer acquiring a film via 
a licensed OSP distributor in a digital format may not copy-send-delete due to his 
first sale safe harbour right pertaining to that particular copy, he may utilise means 
equivalent to those of purchasers of hard copies to divest himself of that particular 
digital copy. This in turn signifies that he may either distribute the medium on 
which the film has been embodied (for example a USB drive), or he may use means 
such as “cut and paste”. 
In closing commentators such as Calaba note that the doctrine must evolve 
digitally since not to do so would cause damage, given the increasing digital 
market, not only to such but ultimately also to works themselves.602 
Calaba thereby addresses the conclusively underlying issue of scale. Whereas he 
uses it to bolster his proposition, this may also be used to argue against the 
imposition of a digital first sale doctrine, since it is arguable that in theory where 
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works are perfectly, instantaneously, stealthily and at low-cost reproduced globally 
this cannot fail to have a more significant impact on demand than transfers of 
physical copies, as originally anticipated. It is thus submitted that a digital first sale 
doctrine provides a significant imbalance in the equation previously used to justify 
the first sale doctrine. Moreover, referring back to the first paragraphs in this 
section, the question of whether the aims and justifications of the first sale 
doctrine still hold, also remains to be answered, which could lend further support 
for the instant proposition.603 
Whilst bearing the aforesaid arguments in mind, it may however also be observed 
that they are theoretical, given the scale of the problem and the lack of resources 
to police the nonexistence of digital first sale doctrine. It is logical that this is where 
ideas or ideals clash with real life and market economics. There are many 
situations that run in parallel enforcement terms; meaning not only the scale 
problem with peer-to-peer piracy but also through example format shifting from 
CDs to MP3 players in the UK. 
The relevance to OSPs of the above discussion should not be underestimated, 
since in an environment where the digital first sale doctrine is modified to allow for 
the "passing on" of, for example, MP3 music files, OSPs that are involved in such 
may flourish. The scale of such activity would be apparent. Where liability lies in 
terms of individual users that fall foul of the absence of a digital first sale doctrine, 
any OSPs facilitating such may stand for consideration under US 3PCL. 
 
3) Application to OSPs and the ‘Making Available’ Controversy 
 
The application of the distribution right and its first sale doctrine as it relates to 
OSPs may be specifically examined.  
It will first of all be important that the Supreme Court held in New York Times v. 
Tasini that LexisNexis had infringed copyright owners’ distribution rights regarding 
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copies by electronic transmission of their articles.604 This means that it has been 
affirmed that the distribution right functions in the context of electronic 
transmission of copyright works.605 
More specifically, directly in an OSP related context, it was held in UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Hummer Winblad Venture Ptnrs. (In re Napster, Inc.)606 that due 
to the fact that the filesharing OSP, Napster, did not have works in a “collection of 
recordings” and that it did not transfer specifically identifiable copies, it or the 
investors following bankruptcy proceedings, were not liable for direct infringement 
of the distribution right. The court distinguished the situation of hosting an index 
of song titles without hosting the actual songs on a server from the situation in 
Hotaling where the works were physically within the library’s collection.607 It 
stated that contrary to the view in Hotaling the mere offer to distribute copyright 
works does not give rise to liability under s.106(3), in part due to the definition of 
“publication” in 17 USC 101.608   
Thus, the court refused to hold the investors liable for secondary liability on 
Napster’s part caused by the direct liability of the customers infringing the 
distribution right by uploading filenames into the search index operated by 
Napster. However, concerning a theory of contributory and vicarious secondary 
liability predicated on users’ uploading and downloading the court held that “there 
is no doubt that these (...) theories are legally sufficient to establish defendants' 
liability.609  
Hotaling is a seminal decision which examines the precise scope of the distribution 
right. It stands for the view that even without direct evidence of actual distribution 
a party may be held liable that has made unauthorised copies and placed these in 
library collections across the country, accessible to the public. 610 The plaintiffs 
argued that the libraries had made available the unauthorised copies and that this 
constituted distribution within the meaning of s.106(3). As noted above, the court 
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in Hotaling agreed with the plaintiffs. This could be termed to be reducing the 
distribution right to a right of “making available” without the need to any actual 
follow-through receipt. This has been a point of much contention in many courts 
across the US. 
The court in Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc. distinguished Hotaling, on the 
grounds that proof of dissemination or proof of actual use by the public is required 
to establish distribution.611 
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon. com, Inc.,612 the court held that “deemed 
distribution” as in Hotaling did not apply to the search engine provider Google. 
Google, much like Napster did not have a collection of the plaintiff’s full-size works 
(exotic photographs) and did not communicate these to the computers of the 
users of the Google search engine. As in Napster, Google merely indexed which 
was insufficient to establish a theory of direct distribution. 
It remains to be added, as regards direct infringement, that that even with more 
‘advanced’ OSP filesharing technology the basic tenets remain the same. A user of 
the KaZaA filesharing service in Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP v. Bigwood,613 
was held to be a direct infringer due to having stored copyright films in shared 
directory which were made available to download to other users. This general 
contention was also supported in Arista Records LLC v. Greubel614 as well as a line 
of similar cases.615 It follows that Motions to Dismiss by counsels in these cases on 
the grounds that copyright owner Plaintiffs’ pleadings lacked specificity or 
particularity thereby inter alia referencing an insufficient pleaded standard of 
deemed or constructive distribution, were dismissed.  
 
4) Compliance with WIPO Copyright Treaty: The Presence of Inconsistency 
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Expanding the distribution right to include either “deemed distribution” or 
“making available” would, some argue, bring US jurisprudence on the matter into a 
compliant zone regarding WCT 1996, Art. 6(1),“Right of Distribution” and Art. 8, 
“Right of Communication to the Public” (10 and 14 WPPT).”616 Yet commentators 
do note that the precise compliance of s.106(3) and related jurisprudence as 
examined above lacks clarity due to inconsistent holdings.617 
It was first held in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Brennan,618 on a Motion for Default 
Judgement that the motion must be denied due to a valid defence that for the 
distribution right to be infringed there must be actual distribution of a copy, which 
the plaintiff had omitted in its pleadings.619 Concerning the sufficiency of the 
pleadings the court quoted Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly “a complaint "does not 
need detailed factual allegations, [but] a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 
`grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and 
conclusions”.620 The court also cited a similar case dealing with a motion for 
default judgement, namely Interscope Records v. Rodriguez,621 in which the court 
found that entry of a default judgement was not warranted on an insufficiently 
stated claim which did not include facts to show the plausibility of certain 
allegations of copyright infringement beyond the “bare conclusory statement that 
‘on information and belief’ defendant has downloaded, distributed and/or made 
available for distribution to the public copyrighted works”.622 The court thus railed 
against “speculative pleadings” as abhorred by the Supreme Court in Twombly. 
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 Thereafter it was held in Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Barker,623 on a 
Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 8624, which runs in 
parallel with the motions in Gruebel and many other cases, as cited above, that  
a) Whereas Defendant’s counsel argued that plaintiffs could not claim 
infringement of the distribution right without alleging an actual transfer of 
plaintiff’s works by the defendant; the court noted that the great majority of 
courts that had considered the making available question stopped short of fully 
endorsing such a right625; 
b) Distribution within the meaning of the section 106(3) equals “publication” 
within the meaning of section 101 and that the same, arguably somewhat 
problematically, applies vice versa; and 
 
c) Publication, or offer to distribute, equals distribution, yet that in this instance 
this had not occurred due to plaintiffs’ insufficient claim for further distribution. 
Also noting that CA 1976 does not reference ‘making available’; Plaintiffs citing 
such thus fail to state a claim.626 
 
d) despite not following a claim for a de facto authorisation right as a subset of the 
distribution right/making available right, the court entertained an amicus brief 
proposing an alternative route to establishing the making available right of 
contravention of the s.106 “exclusive right to do and to authorise” for example 
distribution. The court relied on Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co.,627 in 
rejecting the arguments by agreeing with the holding that section 106 ‘does not 
create a right of authorisation independent of infringement of one of the specific 
enumerated rights set forth in that section’.628 The court further noted that the 
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language of “authorisation” was included by Congress to “avoid any confusion with 
regard to contributory infringers”.629 Yet holding that s.106 does not create an 
independent right of authorisation, and ‘thus cannot form part of a “make 
available” right’, the court was not being entirely clear due to the logical 
inconsistency inherent in this statement. 
A case decided almost contemporaneously with the aforementioned was London-
Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1,630 in which Gertner J expressly rejected equating 
distribution with publication,631 requiring actual material632 distribution such as an 
electronic file transfer, whilst rejecting an authorisation based making available 
theory. 633  
 
IV. The Public Performance Right 
 
The public performance right resides in s.106(4), stating that the holders of 
copyright in literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works may exclusively perform such 
publicly. Despite the inclusion of musical works, sound recordings are not included 
in s.106(4). Moreover, the definition of “to perform” as per s.101 means to “recite, 
render, play, dance or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process.” 
This of course means that any edition of a work by transmission to the public is 
included. In particular, the right of public performance relates to playing a film via 
a DVD player or Digital Video Recorder,634 just as it is implicated by playing a MP3 
file on related media.635 The definition also encompasses a broadcaster’s actions in 
transmitting either live or recorded performances. It may thus be stated that the 
right as defined is broad. 
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The most important limitation arising from the definition of the performance right 
is that it must be to the public. Some commentators have observed that the 
purpose of the CA 1976 was not to keep people from singing in their bathtubs.636  
The first place to start when defining the meaning of “publicly” is naturally s.101 
which states that a performance is public if it takes place; a) at a place open to 
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of the 
normal circle of a family and social acquaintances is gathered; or b) where it is 
transmitted or otherwise communicated to such a place (or the public) by 
whatever means and whether the public have received it in the same or separate 
place(s) and at the same or at different time(s) or were indeed not capable of 
receiving the performance at all. 
As the House Report makes clear, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. 
Wyatt,637 was specifically legislated against in that performances in “semipublic 
places” including clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps and schools are public 
and subject copyright control. Importantly, the same report states that “a family” 
also includes “an individual living alone” and exempts as private that person 
gathering with social acquaintances.638  
Transmissions which are defined as a “process whereby images or sounds are 
received beyond the place from which they are sent” may infringe the public 
performance right when these are to limited segments of the public - even 
occupants of hotel rooms or subscribers of cable television services.639 It was held 
in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc v. Redd Horne, Inc640 that the definition of 
public must be read in one of two ways. The first concerning public places, where 
the size and composition of the audience was irrelevant; the second being a non-
public place where the size composition of the audience is determinative.641 This 
case concerning videocassette stores with television sets and private screening 
runs which could hold up to four customers, but were held to be public places, was 
distinguished from a case concerning hotel rooms. This was due to the fact that 
they are living quarters and not occupied the sole purpose of watching films, 
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analogous to renting a film and watching said in one’s home. The court in 
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc642 held 
that a hotel was not publicly performing films following the installation of 
videodisc players in each of its rooms.  
 
1) Addition of Digital Audio Transmissions 
 
Due to the conspicuous omission from s.106(4) Congress passed the above 
mentioned DPRSRA 1995, which now in s.106(6) recognises performances and 
sound recordings involving “digital audio transmissions”, as defined in 114(j)(6). It 
must be noted that such transmissions represent the only circumstances where 
performances and sound recordings are thus protected for performance.  
As noted above, a radio station’s (non-digital audio transmission) broadcast of a 
song will only benefit the owner of copyright in the musical work since this person 
may claim royalties for the performance of the musical composition, and yet the 
owner of a sound recording, which may be a record company or performer, does 
not have a claim to royalties in this respect. It should be noted in this regard that 
the content using industry, in this case broadcasting groups, stand to gain since 
they would undoubtedly view additional royalty rights as a form of tax on the 
performance of popular songs, which could threaten margins. Commentators have 
argued that broadcasters would not only have to purchase licenses from 
performing rights societies but also from new sound recording rights societies.643 
 
a) DPRSRA Policy Analysis 
 
It has been observed that this amendment, despite initially benefiting the holders 
of copyright in recordings for the playing of such on a digital home subscriptions, 
similar to cable television, now also stands to benefit rights holders concerning the 
                                                          
642
 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc,866F.2d278 
(9
th
Cir.1989). 
643
 R.L. Bard & L.S. Kurlantzick, A public Performance Right in Recordings: How to Alter the 
Copyright System Wihout Improving It,43Geo.Wash.L.Rev.152(1974). 
203 
 
widespread use of the Internet to listen to music. Concerning such services 
without subscriptions, “nonsubscription transmissions”, Congress in 1998 with the 
DMCA legislated for such, subject to compulsory licensing provisions in section 
114, provided such ‘non-subscription transmissions’ were not part of an interactive 
service.644 This brought certain types of ‘streaming’ via the Internet within the 
remit of s.114. 
Some commentators view the Act as a logical and inevitable development from the 
arguably quite late recognition of sound recordings which were prior to 1972 
excluded from federal protection. Protection that was introduced was initially 
against piracy and not public performance. Commentators therefore suggested 
that the DPRSRA was a ‘delayed legislative response’ to the concerns by the 
recording industry by the following bringing sound recordings into federal 
copyright.645 It is however also submitted that the Act was in particular a reaction 
to, as noted above, the advent of the Internet and digital transmissions whether 
via cable or wireless means.  
It was also a particular concern that such media permitted subscribers or others to 
tailor the delivery of music that was desired in an interactive way. The user of such 
a service is no longer bound by traditional compilations. As mentioned, the 
cumulative fear was that a) consumers would simply make use of digital 
subscription services to listen to particular songs and that b) such consumers, with 
the necessary equipment, would be able to download high quality transmissions 
for home recording. Both factors, whether combined or independently, it was 
perceived, threatened certain unit based business models and the viability of the 
content producing industry in this regard. 
 
b) Digital Audio Transmission Right Limitations & Compulsory Licensing 
 
The digital audio transmission right contained in s.106(6) is subject to numerous 
special limitations contained in section 114(d), which apply exclusively to said 
right, unlike for example the fair use doctrine.  S.114(d)(1) was introduced to 
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enhance the relatively new digital transmission technology market, the exemption 
relates to “non-interactive non-subscription services” meaning a) free broadcasts 
in digital formats; b) selected secondary transmissions of exempted primary 
transmissions; and c) intra and direct to business transmissions (commercial use of 
recordings for example as background music). Importantly none of the exempted 
services are interactive. This has a significant bearing on OSP business models. 
Compulsory Licensing 
The performance right in sound recordings limited to digital transmissions; 
 a) Exempts FCC646 licensed terrestrial broadcast stations; 
b) Subjects subscription transmissions to compulsory licensing; and 
c) Prohibits non-authorised on-demand interactive transmissions. 
The licensing regime has been preliminarily examined above, and it has been 
noted that the DMCA also brought within the realm of compulsory licensing 
“eligible non-subscription transmissions” which included Internet streaming 
audio.647  
The initial stage concerning compulsory licensing is one of voluntary negotiation, 
per section 114(f). Concerning the content providing versus using industry stand-
off, a particular section of the content using industry, namely small and non-
commercial web-casters have argued that royalty rates should be assessed 
differently for them given the nature of their market. It is not surprising that the 
recording industry suggested a per listener, per song royalty computation which 
the opposing content using industry of small and non-commercial webcasters 
viewed as being unviable. Given the disagreement, the matter was brought before 
the Copyright Royalty Judges (at the time, CARP) and later Congress passed the 
Small Webcaster Settlement Act 2002648 (SWSA 2002) imposing an alternative non-
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permanent computation.649 Problems are likely to surface again given the 
indispensability of future negotiations. 
 
V. The Right of Public Display 
 
The right of public display is detailed in s.106(5), and applies to all categories of 
subject matter except sound recordings and architectural works. The right details 
that the right holder is exclusively licensed to display the work publicly, being 
within the meaning of display recorded in s.101 specifically; showing a copy of the 
work either directly or by means of a device or process and in the case of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images non-sequentially. As 
with the aforementioned public performance right, the right of public display 
includes the same limitation of the exercise of the right having to be “in public”. 
The meaning of this is the same for both rights. 
A display shall be deemed public as and when it is transmitted to the public 
irrespective of whether individual members receive it in the same place or 
separate places as well as at the same time or at different times. In Playboy 
Enterprises v. Frena,650 the court was dealing with a display right which was directly 
infringed by subscribers to a bulletin board by uploading photographs, the 
copyright to which was owned by Playboy, which were displayed by the 
defendants, which in turn directly violated the public display right. It follows that 
public display within the meaning of the Act may occur not only by traditional 
means such as television but also by the Internet. In this case the defendant was 
held to publicly display the copyright protected photographs due to displaying 
these to subscribers since such were “a substantial number of persons outside the 
normal circle of family and its social acquaintances”.651 
Three practices have been of particular concern, namely “linking”, “framing” and 
“pop-up advertising”.652 The limitation of this thesis is to music and film, however 
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these practices may be incidental to those infringing rights of works specifically 
focused on. These practices are however for the most part limited to direct liability 
on the part of the OSP. 
Concerning “linking” and “framing” it was held in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,653 that 
the defendant software company had infringed a photographer’s display right by 
issuing links to websites hosting photographs and in turn framing these on the 
defendant’s website. Despite having to vacate this part of the opinion due to this 
issue not having been raised in the lower court, the same court a year later held 
that the mentioned thumbnails on the defendant’s website constituted fair use.654 
The issue of fair use will be looked at in detail below.655  
Concerning “pop-up advertising” the contention that sellers of software for 
example, which when installed by users inter alia provided pop-up advertising to 
rival particular offers, were infringing the copyright owner’s rights to exclusive 
display, was refused by the courts.656 In 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com,657 
plaintiffs alleged that users had been given a licence to “use and display its website 
but not to change its appearance in any way and therefore that delivering pop-up 
advertising while the user views the plaintiffs website, arguably creating a new 
screen display that incorporates the plaintiffs the copyright work, infringes the 
plaintiffs exclusive right to display said work. Naturally, the court rejected this 
contention, holding that a right to unobstructed websites/programs would 
impermissibly make many users and software developers liable for 3PCL.658  
 
1) Limitation on Display Right: Lawful Copies 
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The first sale doctrine, s.109(c) positively allows owners of lawful copies to display 
such publicly whether directly or by projection of no more than one image at a 
time to viewers present at the place where the copy is located. The purpose being 
a limitation to ‘live’ displays. This exemption does not apply to transmissions to 
members of the public from one computer to another. 
 
2) Other Limitations on Display Right 
 
S.110’s exemptions for performances also apply to displays, such as face-to-face 
teaching (110(1)), instructional broadcasts (110(2)) and religious services (110(3))  
as well as public receptions of transmissions (110(5)). Moreover exemptions in 
s.111 concerning secondary transmissions by cable television systems and 118 
concerning performance displays copyrighted works made in connection with 
particular activities by public broadcasting stations also apply. 
 
 
VI. The Audio Home Recording Act 1992 
 
The AHRA 1992 further extended the protection afforded since the landmark Sony 
ruling that private home taping of copyright works for timeshifting purposes 
constitutes fair use. The content producing industry was particularly concerned 
with the impact that tapes had unexpectedly had and were thus even more 
concerned by digital audio recording technologies which allowed the user to make 
almost perfect copies faster and with less effort. Whereas the digital audio tape 
(DAT) did not prove its worth on the market with consumers, the subsequent 
format known as “MiniDisc” introduced in 1990 was, the content producing 
industry feared, capable of becoming a serious threat due to the fact that, unlike 
normal compact discs (CDs), mini discs were able to record copies of works in 
digital formats quickly, efficiently and at low-cost. 
Arguably because of the expensive litigation surrounding home taping as exhibited 
by Sony the music and electronics industry negotiated an “entente cordiale” which 
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was finalised in 1991 and subsequently the basis for the AHRA 1992. Some 
commentators have noted that this Act was the first of its kind; a negotiated, sui 
generis, legislative undertaking. It is also noteworthy for not only providing an 
additional compulsory license but also for creating, ‘para-copyright’, as well as 
restraining technology at source, and not the end use of it. This careful approach 
of, in particular from a content providing industry perspective, tackling the causes 
of diminishing sales at the root, is a school of thought that can be observed also 
from Part 2 and the DEA 2010.659  
Main provisions 
AHRA provisions are a now part of the CA 1976; s.1008 prohibits infringement 
actions based on the manufacture, importation or distribution of digital audio 
recording devices, media or analogue recording devices or media based on the 
non-commercial use by consumers of such for making musical recordings. This was 
the main concession by the content producing industry which in turn required, in 
s.1002, the incorporation of certain copying controls concerning second 
generation digital copies, and specified in ss.1003-1007 the payment of 
compensatory royalties to music creators and copyright owners.  
The compromise therefore is clear; the electronics industry is permitted to import 
digital audio recording technologies without fear of subsequent litigation, where it 
complies with the copying control requirement and contributes to the royalty 
scheme, along with any commercial importers. This negotiated resolution reflects 
both the industry desire for legal as well as commercial certainty for both parties 
involved. A parallel is therefore also drawn with the situation in the UK concerning 
3PCL, here both industries would benefit from similar certainty. Taking this 
approach to another level, it is ultimately the stock markets and thus actual or 
prospective shareholders of companies at the heart of such friction that impose 
directly or indirectly on the management and subsequently legal counsel the 
desire to avoid unplanned losses in revenue and/or profits. 
Currently, in the event of a dispute, the Copyright Royalty Judges, as governed by 
s.1007, shall adjudicate. However pursuant to s.1009, interested parties may bring 
a civil action in the appropriate US District Court, and persons injured by a violation 
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may also bring such for actual damages. The courts may at their discretion add up 
to 50% of actual damages additionally.660 
 
VII. P.R.O.T.E.C.T. I.P. Act 2011 (Bill) 
 
 “Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act of 2011” (PROTECT IP Act), is a renewed federal legislative effort 
following the recently failed “Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits 
Act” (COICA). The intention here is to briefly state that there is intent amongst 
certain parties in the US legislative body to pass legislation enhancing enforcement 
against “rogue” websites, inter alia requiring domain name system providers, 
indexing services, financial transaction providers to as relevant block or otherwise 
disable access or service to such, upon court orders.661 The precise contents of the 
instant Bill will not be analysed due to the fact that it has not yet been passed and 
it is unlikely to pass in its current form; but it is important to note that the content 
providing industry is likely to benefit from such or similar proposals, sooner or 
later. The affected content using industry, as represented by Google, has indicated 
that it will “take action” against such measures, yet what this entails is at present 
not clear.662 
 
VIII. Conclusion including Comparison 
 
Before concluding primary copyright liability intrinsically, and in comparison to 
Part 2, it is worth noting what commentators have generally observed; namely 
that the Internet has affected the use and development of US copyright in a way 
that breaks down some of copyright law’s careful constructs. Whereas it has been 
observed in this thesis that copyright law has evolved as a response to technology, 
some of the legislative responses have deliberately borne in mind the dual need to 
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both protect innovation via copyrighted works and technology. An oft cited 
example is the DPRSA,663 which despite attempting to delineate “digital 
phonorecords delivery” in a self-contained manner, arguably leaves scope in 
particular in this regard for parties to characterise online services as either user 
requested delivery (no performance fees due to interactivity), or performances 
(mechanical royalties exemption).664 
In concluding the above section both intrinsically and comparatively, certain 
significant aspects pertaining to the various rights attached to the categories 
examined in the preceding part may be investigated. Before doing so it is worth 
remembering that as in Part 2, primary infringement relates to the unauthorised 
actions of users of OSP services as well as, in some instances, the OSP itself. 
However, unlike in the UK there is no terminological inconsistency arising requiring 
clarification; “secondary copyright infringement” being 3PCL in the US. 
The statutory framework of exclusive rights and exceptions to such, mirrors that in 
the UK, despite providing for more detailed, and arguably in particular regarding 
fair use, more wide ranging limitations.  
 
1) Reproduction 
 
Whereas concepts such as proof of unauthorised copying and the de minimis 
doctrine are substantially similar, mechanical licenses and copyright royalty 
tribunal/panels contribute to the US system’s difference in regard to the 
attempted balancing of the competing industry/social interests. Anti-competitive 
impacts of the UK copyright system on the social and commercial landscape were 
certainly never as directly considered, nor remedies as forcefully implemented, as 
in the US. It is, from a UK perspective quite remarkable that mechanical licenses 
encompass “digital phonorecords delivery”.665  At the same time however the 
negotiation of the compulsory licenses noted above between the competing 
industries set an equally noteworthy example of cost-effective compromise. 
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211 
 
 
2) Distribution 
 
Concerning the US distribution right, it as has been noted above that the first sale 
doctrine causes significant commentary concerning its non-application to digital 
transmissions. This is likely to remain an important discussion point given the 
increasing quantity of digital content. However, in the interest of maintaining 
balance between the competing industries it would be prudent not to extend the 
doctrine to the digital arena. The nature of the digital distribution is likely to, at the 
very least, continue to have a more profoundly negative effect on the content 
providing industry than consumers, or the content using industry. 
The distribution right in the US is also problematic in terms of its sais scope, in 
particular regarding “making available”. Whereas Hotaling in particular stands for 
the contention that making available insufficient liability to be incurred, “deemed 
distribution” or, the mere “offer to distribute” has been held to be insufficient in 
OSP related contexts. It may thus be concluded that the distribution right is 
arguably dissimilar, being narrower by not including “making available” or similar 
terminology and rights, to that required by relevant WIPO treaty provisions.666 This 
is in contrast with the position in the UK, where a distribution right exists 
separately from the communication to the public/making available right as 
suggested by the WIPO Treaties, directed by the EUCD and nationally 
implemented.667  
 
3) Public Performance & Display 
 
The right of public performance in the US differs markedly in from that in the UK. 
In the UK, s.19 CDPA 1988 covers literary, dramatic and musical works as well as 
sound recordings, films and broadcasts for performances, showing and playing 
such in public. Excepted from infringement however is ‘the person sending the 
                                                          
666
 Art.8 WCT; Arts.10,14 WPPT. 
667
 Supra; EUCD,art.3;CDPA 1988,s.20. 
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visual images or sounds’.668 This means that broadcasters, but also OSPs, are 
exempted from liability in this regard.669 This is why the right was not analysed in 
Part 2; yet partly also because this thesis in examining 3PCL for music and film 
related infringements by OSPs, even were liability not be excepted, is not 
concerned with public infringements, 3PCL arising from such facts and 
circumstances being less relevant. 
The US public performance right in s.106(4), despite including musical, motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works, initially did not cover sound recordings. 
Despite being able to note that transmissions received in homes are capable of 
being public performances, where the composition of the audience warrants such 
a finding,670 this is likely to be rare both intrinsically and in an OSP context. The 
introduction of liability for performances of sound recordings occurred as a result 
of the DPRSRA introduced category of ‘digital audio transmissions’.671 Importantly 
for both industries concerned, on-demand interactive transmissions are not 
subject to compulsory licensing, as compared to non-interactive, subscription and 
non-subscription, transmissions, including ‘streaming’ audio. 
The US right of public display can be said to be logically analogous to the US right 
of public performance, yet instead concerning the public display of most subject 
matter, except sound recordings. In an OSP context this right can be touched upon 
where the OSP ‘links’ or ‘frames’ a work. There are however several limitations on 
the right, as discussed.672 
Therefore, in OSP contexts the US public performance right, as well as digital audio 
transmissions, are arguably more akin to the UK communication to the 
public/making available right, which caters specifically to on-demand internet 
scenarios and includes music, film and sound recordings. The right of public display 
however corresponds more directly to the UK public performance right which 
includes showing works in public, as well as the communication to the public 
right.673 
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4) The Audio Home Recording Act 1992 
 
The AHRA 1992 was discussed in the US primary infringement section due to its 
unique limiting trade-off. The Act prohibits infringement actions based on the 
manufacture, importation and distribution of recording devices or media for non-
commercial use by consumers in respect of music recordings in return for copying 
controls and compensatory royalties. Despite this Act being targeted at primarily 
primary infringement, it may validly be compared to the DEA 2010. Whereas the 
AHRA 1992 was an openly negotiated sui generis legislative undertaking, the DEA 
2010 is more the legislative outcome of content producing industry lobbying, 
which is not to discount the value of the Digital Britain Report or consultation 
process. This is partly because the primary aim of the DEA 2010 concern is not 
primarily the content using industry but its customers. Therefore, to the extent 
that the ISP industry took part in the consultation process this was for its own 
ends, which are undoubtedly not synonymous with that of its users. The 
equivalent to the AHRA 1992 would have been an “alternative” DEA that would 
have permitted non-commercial use of film, music, and sound recordings in 
exchange for compensatory royalties, paid for and administered in the first 
instance by ISPs and OFCOM respectively. Although it may tentatively be observed 
that the purpose of the AHRA 1992 was to combat secondary recordings, whereas 
such an “alternative” DEA would perhaps more directly complete with legitimate 
sales, not least because of the scope involved. On the other hand, given that the 
DEA 2010 primarily combats peer-to-peer filesharing and does little to interfere 
with other means of infringement such as pirate directories, such a consensual 
settlement could potentially benefit the content producing industry immediately. 
It is however likely that such negotiations would fail simply because the content 
providing industry possesses insufficient legal weight in terms of threatened 
actions against ISPs. Under the circumstances such compensatory royalties would 
have to be contributed to by OSPs engaging in unauthorised activities, which 
would in turn have to be policed by the ISP and perhaps administered by OFCOM. 
Yet further complications arise due to the global nature of the medium; why or 
how would OSPs not based in the UK, but whose services are available in the UK 
contribute to such a fund? Given the above discourse, it perhaps regrettably 
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becomes obvious that the AHRA 1992 is likely to remain a pinpoint solution, since 
it is indeed easier to nationally target domestic end users. Although in principle, 
there is no reason why ISPs could not collect compensatory royalties from non-
commercial customers, leaving aside questions of computation and the perhaps 
not so hypothetical non-infringing ISP customer.  
Given the above, it must be stated that as relevant to validating the central 3PCL 
comparison and proposals for reform, both regimes are largely similar and operate 
in a similar fashion. 
 
C. Third-Party Liability for Copyright Infringement 
 
Having examined relevant categories of works and particular rights attaching to 
such in Chapters A-B, the central element of this thesis, namely third-party 
copyright liability will be turned to. As in Part 2, 3PCL (“secondary liability”) will 
first be delineated and placed into context with other general, but related torts. 
Thereafter, the main secondary liability theories will be analysed in detail, namely; 
vicarious, contributory and inducement liability. Each of these sections includes an 
intrinsic conclusion, as noted above, the comparison being reserved for Part 4, to 
allow for provision of immediate and adequately positioned of proposals. This 
Chapter also includes an essential discussion of the DMCA, including a conclusion 
and comparison to the UK. 
 
I. Secondary Liability Delineated 
 
The above discussion of primary copyright infringement has provided the basis 
upon which US 3PCL may hold certain secondary infringers/third parties liable for 
copyright infringement, additionally such liability has been compared to that in the 
UK, and certain differences highlighted. It is logical and permissible to therefore 
now examine what lies at the heart of this thesis, namely 3PCL with a view to a 
successive comparison, as conducted in Part 4. In conducting this examination 
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3PCL in the US will first be delineated, its origins and justification explored. This 
provides that the relevant basis and understanding for the separation of several 
different strands of classic third-party copyright and related liability, which are 
analysed in the following three successive subsections. This discussion is 
consciously immediately followed by a discussion of the DMCA including reasons 
for enactment and, crucially, certain tailored limitations thus arising. This section 
also includes two intermediate and intrinsic conclusions to the main categories of 
3PCL, providing an essential contribution to Part 4 which contains a final 
comparative conclusion and proposals concerning 3PCL. 
 
1) General Statutory Legitimisation & Origin 
 
Unlike the CDPA 1988 discussed in Part 2, which includes provisions for what is 
termed “secondary liability”674 and which must be distinguished from 3PCL in the 
broadly applicable tort-based sense, which is of particular interest to this thesis – 
the CA 1976 at its passage did not include any references to either “classical” UK 
“secondary liability” or actual tort-based 3PCL. Whereas 3PCL was added in 1984, 
this was and is only applicable in the limited, sui generis, context of semiconductor 
chip protection.675 This approach differs from that taken in the field of patent 
protection in the in the US, where those deemed to be “contributory infringers” 
can be held liable.676 This will be relevant as discussed below,677 given the 
importation of this concept into copyright law.678 
Despite the lack of specific provisions regarding 3PCL, the 1976 House Report 
discusses the inclusion of amendments to exempt proprietors of certain 
establishments such as nightclubs from liability for copyright infringement 
committed by independent contractors, for example disc jockeys,  but as the 
Report also makes clear, this was rejected. The principle is well established that 
one who violates any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner, whether on a 
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primary or secondary “related or vicarious infringer” basis, will be liable; no 
justification existed in the eyes of Congress for the changing of the law to include 
in such instances “significant erosion of the public performance right”.679 
However, as numerous commentators note, the position of liability for the acts of 
infringement by others has been recognised for quite some time in the US. 
Commentators however are loth to put a specific date on the first copyright case 
incorporating such. Most state that this particular extension of liability goes back 
several decades or by “a long series of cases under both the 1909 Act and the 
Current Act”.680 
As formulated by the US Supreme Court in Sony absence of specific statutory 
references do not hinder an imposition of 3PCL, general third-party tort liability 
being well established.681 
Yet some argue that the legitimisation for the imposition of such can also be 
derived from s.106 which grants the author the right to authorise others to 
capitalise on certain exclusive rights.682  
In terms of providing delineation, recourse may also be had to the helpful dictum 
in Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC.683 Judge Kimba helpfully for present 
purposes observed that, in general terms, 3PCL may imposed on parties not taking 
direct part in direct infringements of copyright by others, but playing a significant 
role in such. He clarified that the role of secondary liability684 "is that a party who 
distributes infringement-enabling products or services may facilitate direct 
infringement on a massive scale, making it "impossible to enforce [copyright 
protection] effectively against all direct infringers." In such circumstances, "the 
only practical alternative is to go against the distributor of the copying device for 
secondary liability." Going on to explain that to recover on a claim of secondary 
liability, it must be shown that a third party committed direct infringement, which 
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involved proving, as noted above, that Plaintiffs owned the copyright(s) at issue 
and such were infringed inter alia by unauthorised copying or distribution. 
Having delineated the legal justification for the imposition of theories related to 
3PCL, a delineation of 3PCL from a linked general and corporate tort law point of 
view is indicated. 
 
II. Tort Agency and Corporate Classification Theories 
 
The doctrine of respondeat superior are at this juncture serves to provide further 
delineation for the discussion below. As noted in Part 2, the concept that a master 
can be held liable for his servant is a well tested principle685 that is similar in the 
US. 
 A case best illustrating this principle is Bradbury v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,686 
where an employee’s infringement of the reproduction right lead to be liability of 
the employer. Some commentators have quite aptly compared the thinking behind 
agency principles to that of a work for hire, where the “author” may have 
physically caused the creation of a work, but is not the sole cause of it.687 
Importantly for this thesis and for OSPs in particular, it is the corporation family,688 
and certain officers689 that can be held liable as third-party defendants in the event 
of a ‘substantial and continuing connection’690 between them and the requisite 
infringing acts. Officers of the infringing corporation can be personally liable where 
such, for example, one of the founders of Google,691 were to do any of the 
following: 
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a) Take part in infringing acts beyond mere corporate capacity, requiring sufficient 
involvement in operation and right and ability to control actions of corporation;692 
b) Utilise the corporation as a shell for infringements;693 
c) Be a dominant influence thereby ultimately dictating infringing 
strategies/plans;694 
d) Be a major shareholder/stakeholder obtains financial benefit from the 
infringement in question; or695 
e) Act in a way that combines any or all of the attributes in (a)-(d).696 
This means however that where individuals, whether board members or company 
secretaries, perform administrative duties without any significant control, also 
defined as the right and ability to supervise,697 over operations or particular 
decisions regarding infringing acts such officers will not be held liable.698 This can 
also be rephrased into the statement that individuals in corporate functions will 
not be liable where they assisted in the infringement of copyright purely by being 
in their corporate function.699 
                                                          
692
 Burdick v. Koerner,988F.Supp.1206,1210(E.D.Wis.1998). Very misleadingly used by 
Nimmer,(n477),[12.04[A][1]]. 
693
 Adventures,(n682),813;citing Dangler,(n682)947. 
694
 Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding 
Ass’n,423F.Supp.341(D.Mass.1976), aff’d,554F.2d1213,1214-1215(1
st
Cir.1977) citing various 
rejections of independent contractor theories. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, 
Inc.,379F.Supp.723,(S.D.N.Y. 1974)(No evidence D “alter ego” and "completely dominates 
and controls [the corporation's] operations and is the sole beneficiary of its acts”.)rev’d on 
other grounds, 551F.2d484(2dCir.1977), cert. denied, 495U.S.207(1977). 
695
 Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp.,491F.Supp.908(D.Ct1980)(corporate vice president and 
full-time manager of a radio station was jointly liable with the corporation because he had a 
direct stake in the financial success of the station and he oversaw the station's daily 
operation). 
696
 Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. v. Associated Tel. Directory 
Publishers,756F.2d801,811(11
th
Cir.1985)citing Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, 
Inc.,517F.Supp.900,904(S.D.N.Y.1981):referring to United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunrise 
Mold, Inc.,569F.Supp.1475(S.D.Fla.1983); Stewart v. Southern Music Distributing 
Co.,503F.Supp.258(M.D.Fla.1980). 
697
 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Starware Pub. Corp.,900F.Supp.438,441(S.D.Fla.1995)(Pres’s 
supervisory abilities concerning sale, advertise and production of infringing computer desk; 
concomitant right to stop such). 
698
 Van Halen Music v. Palmer,626F.Supp.1163,1167(W.D.Ark.1986)(company secretary, 
administrative duties, without significant control, no evidence of particular related decisions). 
699
 Buck v. Newsreel, Inc.,25F.Supp.787,789-790(D.Mass.1938). 
219 
 
It will be important to distinguish between officers of corporations and mere 
employees. Employees generally do not conduct management or executive 
functions. As such, they will not be liable were infringements occurred that were 
required, without discretion, by a contract of employment.700 The reverse is also 
true and can lead to joint and several liability.701 
Lastly, one may wish to distinguish company law theories from copyright law 
theories of 3PCL. As one commentator explains “utter dominance of one 
corporation by another could lead to direct liability under an alter ego theory. By 
contrast, related defendants become liable indirectly”.702 
Having but briefly delineated the origins of copyright 3PCL and distinguished them 
from corporate theories of liability, it is now logical to examine the former in 
depth, for a comparison with the 3PCL section in Part 2. 
 
III. Vicarious Liability 
 
Accordingly, vicarious liability will be examined first and should be distinguished 
from the other kinds of liability examined below, namely, contributory and 
inducement liability. If one wished to offer a potted explanation of vicarious 
liability, one could adopt Lichtman & Landes’s definition and rationale that: 
Vicarious liability applies in situations where one party — often an 
employer — has control over another and also enjoys a direct financial 
benefit from that other’s infringing activities. A typical case arises where 
an employer hires an employee for a lawful purpose, but the 
employee’s actions on behalf of the employer lead to copyright 
infringement. One rationale for imposing liability in this instance is that 
the employer should be encouraged to exercise care in hiring, 
supervising, controlling, and monitoring its employees so as to make 
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copyright infringement less likely. Another is that it is usually cheaper 
for copyright holders to sue one employer rather than suing multiple 
infringing employees. A final rationale is that liability helps to minimize 
the implications of bankrupt infringers. An employee cannot 
compensate an injured copyright holder if that employee does not have 
adequate financial resources. Indirect liability solves this problem by 
putting the employer’s resources on the line, thereby increasing the 
odds that the harm from infringement will be internalized.703 
Vicarious liability developed as an “outgrowth of agency principles involving the 
concept of respondeat superior”.704 Upon reviewing the component parts this can 
be verified; as in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co. (Green), there are two 
independently705 demonstrable elements; a)”the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing conduct” and b) “an obvious and direct financial interest in exploitation 
of copyrighted materials”. 706 Importantly, knowledge or direct participation in the 
infringing acts is not required.707 
One of the most litigious areas prior to the era of digital copyright infringement 
was that of landlords and liability in dancehall or similar contexts where 
infringements occurred. This also explains the above quote from the 1976 House 
Report considering an inclusion of vicarious liability exemptions and the 
concomitant rejection of such. Most of the landlord cases revolve around owners 
of entertainment venues actively operating or supervising such and various agents, 
such as orchestras or jukeboxes, infringing copyright.708 Contentiously however, 
some cases strayed into the area of liability where infringement occurred on a 
more removed basis; a) without a particular landlord’s authority and against 
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orders;709 and perhaps a little less contentiously, b) where a landlord received rent 
on the basis of a percentage of the revenue arising from a tenants sale of infringing 
works and where said had the right and ability to supervise.710 
The transformation of the use of the vicarious liability rules in the dancehall cases 
can now be analysed and commented upon, step-by-step, in a more modern 
context. 
 
1) Financial Benefit 
 
Concerning the state of vicarious liability, which builds upon the concepts 
discussed above, as it is relevant to OSPs in particular, several cases may be looked 
at. In making this transition, a case with a more relevant factual situation is 
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc..711 Cherry Auction operated a swap meet in 
Fresno, California, where infringing recordings, including Fonovisa’s Latin/Hispanic 
music recordings, were sold by vendors. Cherry Auction received various fees from 
vendors selling infringing goods, as well as customers wishing to attend. They 
supplied parking, conducted advertising and maintained the right to exclude any 
vendors. The court held Cherry Auction vicariously liable, stating that the 
defendant reaped substantial financial benefits from the various fees/sales, 
despite being low,712 all of which flowed directly from customers wishing to 
purchase cheap recordings that infringe copyright.713 The court did not wish to 
distinguish Green.714 It used terminology in connection with the availability of 
infringing works as being a “draw” to customers, as in the dance hall cases.715 
It is worth looking at two further cases to clarify that inconsistent approaches have 
been part of the relevant case history, elements of which could be argued again. 
The first case is Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc.,716 in which the court examined 
a computer software producer’s, Adobe’s, claims that the proprietors of weekly 
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computer fairs in Southern California, collectively “National”, were liable under 
theories of 3PCL for selling unauthorised Adobe products. Despite the fact that 
38,000 counterfeit recordings were seized and 100 unauthorised computer 
programs existed at one show alone, the court determined that in terms of direct 
financial benefit the facts were not analogous to Fonovisa, above, where the 
market had been “saturated with counterfeit recordings, and, indeed, the swap 
meet draw was to provide a venue for the purchase of counterfeit recordings”.717 
Remarkably also, the court held that due to the size of the fairs, with the larger 
scope of infringement, and inability to identify infringing product, National was not 
liable under a theory of vicarious infringement.718  
Adobe should be compared to Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc.,719 which 
was heard in the same court, also refers to Adobe, but was decided, some argue, 
rather differently. The case concerned a well-known, in terms of litigiousness, 
adult entertainment company copyright holder that alleged that an OSPs running a 
web service called “adult check” had allowed users unauthorised access to 10,000 
images, out of an approximate total of 20 million images on affiliated websites. 
Here, the court held that “the fortunes of the site and Cybernet are sufficiently 
tied to create the requisite direct financial benefit” in doing so it applied the 
statement in Adobe that a “small number of infringing articles was insufficient to 
support a conclusion that these items provided “a significant role” in bringing 
consumers to the fairs”. 720 Some commentators have noted that the figure of 
10,000 out of 20,000,000 images should be viewed in context, and did not warrant 
a decision that these could be “a significant draw” as argued by Perfect 10.721 The 
reverse point of view is also possible, that 10,000 images are just that. This is 
arguably supported, bearing in mind the percentage quantification element of 
those that disagree with the Cybernet court, by the case examined in the next 
paragraph. Concerning the right or ability to control, it was held on the facts that 
the defendant, like the swap meet in Fonovisa, “not only has the right to terminate 
Webmasters at will, it controls consumer access, and promoted services.”722 This 
appears unproblematic, yet some might argue that a very large scale operation 
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with many Webmasters might lead to practical supervision issues, yet bearing in 
mind the policy objectives of this area of the law, this could potentially be justified. 
However, not all factual circumstances provide such difficulty in deciding direct 
financial benefit. For example, in Ellison v. Robertson,723 the court was asked to 
consider the direct financial benefit to an ISP of uploading a literary work as an e-
book onto a USENET group.724 Despite noting that it is evident that the ISP (“AOL”) 
provides access to USENET to encourage overall subscription levels, maintenance 
or expansion of which is paramount to AOL’s future, the court elaborated that 
there was no evidence of a particular ‘draw’ by customers to AOL due to the 
availability of the infringing material or vice versa cancellation of subscriptions due 
to a longer being available. The Court couched this in terms of the infringing book 
being an “added benefit” instead of a “draw”. Some commentators have seized on 
the fact that the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s assessment725 of 
the importance/relevance of the quantification that the uploaded book amounted 
to very little of AOL’s total usage.726 The court stated flatly that it disagreed with a 
quantification requirement, preferring the “draw” identified in Fonovisa, which 
need not be substantial.727 
It was decided more recently in August 2011 in Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, 
LLC,728 that despite arguments that the defendant's file-sharing website acted as a 
draw and increases user traffic along the lines of for example Fonovisa,729 this was 
insufficient alone – since the financial benefit must be attributable to the infringing 
activity.730  
 
a) Direct, Indirect or Future Financial Benefit? 
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The question whether financial benefit has to be direct or indirect arises from the 
observation that on the one hand, the 1976 House Report refers to both direct and 
indirect financial benefit from infringing performances, yet, as can be seen from 
the above cases, the courts routinely referred to “obvious direct financial benefit”. 
Are the courts ignoring Congress’s intentions? Is this an instance of selective 
judicial interpretation? Whereas earlier cases did indeed selectively interpret the 
need for financial benefit as being exclusively direct, more recently, the courts 
have adopted the stance exhibited above.731 The courts have now generalised the 
obtaining of benefit.  
This provides an elegant transition to the in-depth discussion of the second 
requirement; the right and ability to supervise. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
may be cited for both purposes: 732  The court in Napster determined, taking the 
above generalised derivation of benefit to a new level, that even where receipt of 
revenues is absent, future anticipation of monetisation sufficed for the 
requirement of financial benefit to be fulfilled.733 This is a very important holding 
since “monetisation” as referenced in Part 1 is the new “buzzword”, given the 
failure of a unit based sales model.734  
An OSP operating under the impression that it may escape the first part of the test 
for vicarious liability, due to the absence of revenue which is intended to be 
derived, for instance at some point in the future from increases in a user base, as 
explained in the Deposition of Sean Parker, an early employee of Napster, might 
be disappointed.735 At an abstract legal level it seems that the courts have gone 
from one end of the spectrum requiring direct financial benefit, to, arguably 
beyond the requirement mentioned in the 1976 House Report of indirect benefit, 
by including future benefit in this category, thereby providing for an inherently 
almost complete circumvention of the stated requirement. 
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, the Court of Appeal dealt 
with distributors of software allowing users to share files including digitised music 
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and motion pictures, of which it was alleged 90% involved copyrighted material, 
70% of which was owned by the copyright owner’s in suit. Concerning financial 
benefit, the court held that “a direct financial benefit, by advertising revenue are 
undisputed in this case”. The court thereby agreed with the judgement of the 
district court which expressly stated that financial benefit can be shown were a 
“draw factor” is present for potential customers, relying on both Fonovisa and 
Napster.736 Concerning the factual basis the users of the defendants’ software did 
not pay for the product, but the defendants nonetheless derive “substantial 
revenue from advertising”, which increases in tandem with the user base to which 
such could be displayed. Thus the defendants thus derive a financial benefit from 
the infringement.737 The draw factor thus evinces increasing determinative 
importance and the prefix “direct” is openly abandoned. When the case reached 
the Supreme Court, it declined to reach this issue due to resolving the case on the 
inducement theory.738 
 
2) Right or Ability to Supervise 
 
Concerning the second part of the test for vicarious liability, the right or ability to 
supervise, the court in Napster held that what was originally designed by Napster’s 
counsel as an argument in support of a defence, could be turned against the 
defendant, in that the defendant’s statement that it had improved methods of 
blocking users about which it had received complaints by rights holders, was 
“tantamount to an admission that [the] defendant can, and sometimes does, 
police its service”.739 The Court of Appeals held that ultimately “Napster’s failure to 
police the system’s ‘premises’, combined with a showing that Napster financially 
benefits from the continuing availability of infringing files that system, leads to the 
imposition of vicarious liability”.740 
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Despite Nimmer noting that Ellison v. Robertson provides a “different 
conclusion”741 this is arguably not the case in a supervision context, since the court 
did not address supervision, defendants’ arguments of direct financial benefit 
having failed.742 
The Court of Appeal in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 
agreeing with the district court, held that Grokster and StreamCast did not operate 
an “integrated service” which was not monitored and controlled in the same way 
as in Napster.743 It was crucial that Grokster merely offered software that 
communicates across a truly decentralised ‘FastTrack’ network, not controlled by 
Grokster. Similarly for StreamCast, the network was termed ‘Gnutella’, which due 
to being open source was apparently outside the control of any single entity.744 
Importantly, the court noted “the doctrine of vicarious infringement does not 
contemplate liability based upon the fact that a product could be made such that it 
is less susceptible to and lawful use, when no control over the use of the product 
exists.”745 Interestingly, the Court of Appeals also noted concerning Napster that 
the right and ability to police was based on Napster’s system’s current architecture 
not software.746  
Given the impressive scope of operations and the omnipresence of the OSP, 
Google, it is also worth illustrating how its use of content providing services 
interacts with the provision of copyright works by a ubiquitous adult 
entertainment company. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the Court of 
Appeal determined the limit to the second part of the vicarious liability test, 
supervision, by holding that whilst it is undisputed that Google’s worldwide 
operations substantially assisted infringing websites to distribute infringing copies 
by allowing users to access such, this is to be distinguished747 from both Fonovisa 
and Napster, in that Google, as to third-party websites, did not have the requisite 
right and ability to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct which involved 
reproducing, displaying, and distributing unauthorised copies have Perfect 10’s 
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images”.748 This decision was echoed regarding Perfect 10’s claims of copyright 
infringement against financial institutions, including Visa, which facilitated the 
purchase of infringing copies by processing credit card payments to infringing 
websites.749 The court distinguished potentially cancelling services from control 
over infringements leading to vicarious liability.750 It should be note that the Visa 
case is one of the more interesting cases in this area. As a result it is repeatedly 
referenced and discussed, for example below, regarding contributory liability but 
also very importantly in the section conclusions.751 
 
3) Conclusion 
 
The above has demonstrated the evolution from dance hall/landlord cases to the 
subject matter at hand. It is now worth making two global observations. The first 
relates to classifying vicarious liability for the purposes of this thesis to aid a more 
accurate comparison and ultimately promulgation of proposals. The second 
observation could be termed a caveat concerning the factual boundaries of the 
above theories. 
Concerning the classification of vicarious liability it has already been stated above 
that the standard theory of master-servant liability for wrongful acts during and 
within the scope of employment, without express authority may be termed 
respondeat superior. It may now validly be asked how vicarious liability sits with 
this theory when it is overlaid. As noted in Part 2752 the traditional definition of 
respondeat superior has at its heart the employer-employee relationship, and that 
the liability of dance hall operators and independent contractors or related 
defendants, as highlighted above, clearly exceeds this original format.753 The very 
first definition of vicarious liability above, has also explained the policy reasons as 
to why such would be imposed.754 The trajectory is internally, uniformly, towards 
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an expansion of this theory, as for example also evidenced by the test of financial 
benefit.755  
The caveat to this section is that ownership of physical premises or directly 
analogous digital operations is not necessarily required for a finding of vicarious 
liability for OSPs. Any instances of a relationship between a company and 
infringing conduct which evidences control, supervision, and financial benefit 
could, naturally depending on the facts, yield such a result. This may be illustrated 
by the court’s holding in Davis v. DuPont de Nemours & Company, which 
concerned a sponsor of an infringing telecast, DuPont, and it’s advertising agent, 
BBDO, which transmitted such via CBS. The plaintiff, Davies, was the owner of 
copyright in a dramatisation of a classic novel, which he claimed had been 
infringed by the telecast in question. The court, relying on Green, held that 
DuPont, directly or through its agents, had to approve steps in the production, and 
had thus exercised control.756 Given the substantial sums the sponsor had paid, the 
court inferred future benefit.757 It also inferred such for the agents which had an 
interest in client’s increased sales.758 Both the sponsor and its agent were liable for 
copyright infringement.759  
Transitioning to the next theory of liability, where a party goes above and beyond 
‘mere control’ by arranging for the infringement itself, it is likely that the court and 
indeed the plaintiff will prefer a theory of contributory infringement. 
 
IV. Contributory Liability 
 
1) Delineation and Doctrinal Basis 
 
Contributory liability stems from the simple tort law principle that one who 
directly contributes to another’s tort should be held liable.760 The court in 
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Demetriades v. Kaufmann (“copycat house”761) admirably explains, after noting 
that federal copyright law does not expressly create any form of derivative 3PCL, 
that contributory infringement is also founded on the tort concept of enterprise 
liability, albeit noting that lines between strands of 3PCL and even direct liability 
are not clearly drawn.762 The court adopted the standard in Gershwin that: 
 [O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, 
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be 
held liable as a contributor infringer.763  
Concerning the doctrinal basis for contributory liability, justifying the simple 
formulation above, it found applicable: 
 [T]he basic common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates 
in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the prime 
tortfeasor.764  
The court in Demetriades therefore noted that knowledge and participation are 
the touchstones of contributory infringement.765 
In delineating “enterprise liability”, the Demetriades court relied on Restatement 
(Second) of Torts s.876(b)(1977) that “establishing third-party, enterprise liability 
when one knows of another's tortious conduct and substantially aids or 
encourages that endeavour” yet also s.876(d) “The assistance of or participation by 
the defendant may be so slight that he is not liable for the act of another”.766 The 
essence of enterprise liability is joint liability due to being part of a shared 
enterprise.767 This concept of such is also known in UK law.768 
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Contributory infringement splits, broadly speaking, into two categories; a) knowing 
material contribution/participation; and b) supplying the means to infringe. Both 
categories will be looked at sequentially. 
 
2) Material Contribution (Participation) 
 
Gershwin makes clear, what is needed apart from knowledge that infringing act 
may occur is a material contribution/participation. This means that whilst even a 
licensor may be held liable under this theory for the acts of a licensee, where such 
under the conditions of the license infringes copyright,769 there is a general 
overriding principle that any authorisation or assistance in pursuit of any infringing 
acts must be of the direct sort and in concert with the primary infringer.770 
Linking back to DuPont, thus proceeding in the same chronological order through 
the relevant case law as above, in circumstances where a secondary defendant 
acts with knowledge and assists the primary infringer such may still infringe 
despite the absence of supervision or direct financial interest under a theory of 
contributory liability. The court in Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi 
Records, Inc made clear that what can be termed secondary defendants, such as an 
advertising agency which advertises infringing records, can be held liable provided 
such had the requisite knowledge.771 
The Court of Appeals in Fonovisa, contrary to the District Court,772 chose to hold 
the operator of the swap meet introduced above773 liable under a theory of 
contributory liability. It rejected a limitation to express encouragement, noting the 
defendant’s refusal to cooperate with law enforcement and agreeing with Third 
Circuit analysis in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., that provision of 
a site and facilities suffices for contributory liability.774 What is meant by refusal 
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too cooperate are the "allegations that the local sheriff lawfully requested that 
Cherry Auction gather and share basic, identifying information about its vendors". 
This provided a basis for liability. The 9th Circuit court's ruling raises the interesting 
question of whether an OSP could be held liable along similar lines. Naturally what 
would speak against such a proposition would be 17 USC s.512(m) which explicitly 
removes the obligation to monitor or affirmatively seeking facts indicating 
infringing activity in connection with the safe harbours in s.512, as discussed 
below. The limit to this would however be both the standard technical measures in 
s.512(m)(1) and the fact that s.512 per se addresses obtaining information not 
passing it on. As such arguments concerned with passing such on would be 
derivative in nature. 
In establishing contributory liability, both the District Court775 and the Court of 
Appeals776 in Napster stated “Napster is essentially an Internet swap meet — more 
technologically sophisticated but in many ways indistinguishable from the 
[defendant] in Fonovisa.", albeit noting its free nature.777 Both courts also 
supported a finding that Napster had actual knowledge that specific infringing 
material was available and that it could have blocked access to the system by the 
suppliers of the infringing material, but failed to do so.778 
In Cybernet, as discussed above, the district court relied on both the decisions in 
Fonovisa and Napster as analogous cases in relation to “Adult Check” and 
payments to infringing websites; proliferating infringement, this was alleged to 
comport also with Netcom.779  
The next two decisions that will be looked at are arguably the most important 
recent decisions in the sense that they have provided an almost untenable conflict. 
Reference is made to Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc./Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass'n. 
Concerning the suit against Google, at first instance the District Court did not grant 
Perfect 10s request for a preliminary injunction, holding that Google was not, as 
mentioned above, vicariously liable, nor was Google contributorily liable. The 
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action concerned the plaintiff’s claims that Google is inter alia by its image search 
facility, providing users with a grid of thumbnail pictures, in the process known as 
“framing”, which “combines multiple pages in a single window so that can’t 
different content can be viewed simultaneously, typically so that one frame can be 
used to annotate the other content or to maintain the link with an earlier 
webpage”780 and thus copying, reproducing, distributing, publicly displaying, 
adapting or otherwise infringing or contributing to the infringement of copyrighted 
images and by Perfect 10. The District Court’s differentiated between Google’s 
activities and Napster’s. It distinguished the Supreme Court’s inducement theory 
from that of “material contribution” in relation to Google’s “AdSense”/image 
search  service which did not materially contribute to direct infringement occurring 
on third-party websites. 781 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed concerning 
contributory infringement, holding that it was not disputed that Google 
substantially assisted websites in distributing infringing copies or allowing users 
access to such.  
Importantly, it can thus be extrapolated that the Court of Appeals formulated 
liability for OSPs of the contributory kind where such has actual knowledge that 
particular infringing copies can be found on its systems, that steps can be taken to 
prevent further damage to copyright owners, and that that this was not done. 
Most dramatically however as a matter of timing, before the instant case was 
heard in the district court on remand, the court of appeals handed down the 
judgment in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass'n which did not concern a 
request for preliminary injunction, but was finally determined by the district court 
which dismissed the complaint due to a failure to state a claim on which relief can 
be granted. It will be remembered that the action arose out of Perfect 10’s notices 
to financial institutions that were facilitating payments to infringing the websites 
and that, as the defendants admitted, they did not act upon this notification. The 
court of appeals, despite also drawing on Fonovisa and Napster in its decision 
decided to distinguish its formulation in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc by 
stating that the facts of a case where not analogous in that defendants did not 
provide a site or facility for infringement.782 The court also stated that payment 
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systems did not assist distribution of content, but merely facilitate profitability 
possibly increasing infringement, but that such was possible without such systems; 
thereby not being a ‘material contribution’.783 
In a beleaguered if not belligerent tone, the court stated it was compliant with its 
decision in Amazon because the plaintiff had not alleged that infringing materials 
‘passed over the defendants payment networks, processing systems, or that these 
were designed as a means to infringe’.784 
US courts will stop short of holding liable what they regard as “mere facilitators” 
for copyright infringement. Commentators have termed this “a perceived need to 
draw a line in the sand”.785 Yet the conflict between the decisions in Amazon and 
Visa place OSPs and related companies in legal limbo as to whether contributory 
liability could be avoided using the formulation in; a) Amazon of actual knowledge 
of specific infringing material residing on an OSP’s system where simple measures 
could of been taken to prevent further damage to copyright owners such was not 
taken; b) Visa of not merely facilitating, increasing the incidence of or otherwise 
materially contributing to infringement but of being the “site” of infringement, for 
example, in terms of the collection, sorting, sale or exchange of infringing works. 
What played out in the cases above is the deeper central underlying theme of this 
thesis; the tug-of-war between the content providing and content using industry. 
The Ninth Circuit in Google/Amazon stated that in policy terms it was 
uncomfortable with the results of Google’s actions on copyright holders. Similarly, 
the court appeared to be uncomfortable in chaining what it saw as the “primary 
engine of electronic commerce”, namely the credit card companies, which could 
be viewed as agents of the content using industry, to copyright law via a theory of 
contributory liability, especially also given Congress’ aims of ‘promoting the 
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer 
services/media as well as to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market on 
the Internet’.786 This was particularly the case given that in Amazon the court, 
despite the holding of secondary liability, had at its disposal the DMCA 
exemptions, whereas the defendants in Visa were not subject to such, which the 
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court termed an “anomalous result” whereas it also observed that it “recognise[d] 
that the DMCA was not intended to displace the development of secondary 
liability in the courts”.787 It is however submitted that its policy-based decision in 
Visa clearly harking back to dance hall/landlord cases concerning the “site” of the 
infringement, despite being entirely logically justifiable, could be said to have 
taken a step at least in this direction. Yet is this necessarily to be abhorred? It 
would perhaps have been preferable for Congress to limit the application of 
secondary liability, should it have deemed necessary to do so following a different 
ruling in Visa. Yet one might doubt whether a statute would be the appropriate 
tool given the inherently complicated, fast paced, subject matter and usually broad 
nature of statutes. On this view, the judgement in Visa provided exactly what was 
needed; a pinpoint solution. 
It will be relevant that when the District Court heard Amazon on remand, Matts J, 
concerning the required factual assessment, agreed with Google that Perfect 10’s 
specificity concerning most alleged infringements was lacking.788 Concerning the 
DMCA takedown regime discussed in said opinion, this will be addressed below.789 
Given this ruling, it is not surprising that Perfect 10 appealed concerning Google, to 
the Ninth Circuit.790 The case is currently ongoing. 
 
3) Purveyance of Means to Infringe & Knowledge 
 
Concerning the basis for liability bound up with the supply of the means to 
infringe, such may be arrived at were one-party provides a copyright work to 
another who without proper authorisation reproduces or otherwise infringes the 
copyright attached to said work. This however is limited to those scenarios where 
the party furnishing the work was not aware or did not have knowledge of the 
other party’s unauthorised actions, or, where such provision was on condition of 
the acquisition of authorisation from the rightful owner.791 This factual scenario is 
naturally complicated by the provision of not only a copyright work but also the 
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means by which to infringe upon the rights attaching to such a work. In this 
instance, the absence of knowledge may not lead to a negation of liability as a 
contributor infringer. A party managing the operation of a facility which provides 
for the reproduction of tapes, including by the sale of blank tapes for such, may 
not avail itself of the defence of lack of knowledge on the basis that the users of 
the service were making infringing duplications themselves, rather than staff at the 
facility.792 The same rule was applied in circumstances where the party managing 
such an operation did not provide the blank media, but where employees assisted 
with or carried out the actual reproduction.793  
In examining contributory liability for the supply of the means to infringe it is also 
important to examine the holdings by the various courts in Sony, the background 
having been introduced above. The defendants in this case which would be liable 
under the theory of contributory liability would be the manufacturer, distributor, 
sellers and advertisers of Betamax.  
Concerning the function of the Betamax recorder to record copyrighted works off 
the air and that such recording would be copyright infringement the court held 
that "the defendants could not know that this was infringing activity … the 
defendants here could not know what copyright law required. Before the suit, the 
issue had not been determined."794 For the same reason the court doubted that 
the defendants had induced or materially contributed to infringing activity. By 
referencing the “staple article of commerce doctrine” the district court 
incorporated the patent law doctrine that manufacturers, distributors, or the like, 
of staple articles of commerce which are suitable for substantial non-infringing 
uses may not be held liable as contributory infringers. The inclusion of this doctrine 
to shield manufacturers such as Sony was and still is controversial.795 
The Court of Appeals rejected the district court's analysis that the staple article of 
commerce doctrine would apply; holding that because the Betamax recorders 
were not suitable for any substantial non-infringing uses they fell outside this 
doctrine.796 The Court of Appeals also held that a lack of specific knowledge was 
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irrelevant since infringing use was the predominant use of the Betamax recorder, 
given that “virtually all television programming is copyrighted material. Therefore, 
videotape recorders are not suitable for substantial non-infringing use”.797 
Judge Stephens of the Supreme Court concurred with the district court in finding 
that a considerable number of commercially significant uses of Betamax recorders 
are non-infringing negating claims for contributory infringement.798 The court 
clarified that given that the primary infringers’ alleged unauthorised recordings 
were in fact non-infringing due to the extension of the doctrine of fair use to 
timeshifting.799 
It remains to be added that the decisions in the above mentioned tape duplication 
services cases may be reconciled with the decision in Sony given that the Supreme 
Court drew a distinction between the manufacturer of VHS recording equipment 
and the commercial operator of the duplicating machine in that the former had no 
control over the subsequent use, whereas the latter had constant control. It is 
admitted that this “drawing a line in the sand” to a certain extent mirrors that in 
Visa as compared to Amazon/Google. 
Applying the above to the even more directly relevant developments concerning 
OSPs/peer-to-peer software providers, and adopting once more a logical, 
chronological approach, it will be observed that Napster attempted to use the Sony 
staple article commerce doctrine in its defence. This was rejected by both the 
district court and court of appeals, albeit their reasons differed. The district court 
reminded the readers of its judgement that Sony had no contact post sale with the 
users/alleged infringers whereas Napster not only maintained but also supervised 
an integrated system which created a relationship between it and the users 
uploading and downloading files.800 Based on this observation as well as the 
observation that the “primary role” in Napster’s operation was to assist in the 
unauthorised reproduction and distribution of plaintiffs works, the doctrine of 
commercially significant non-infringing uses was inapplicable.801 The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed, noting that the system was capable of substantial non-infringing uses, 
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but that what was to be distinguished was said architecture and Napster’s 
management of the operation.802 Whereas the architecture of the system could be 
analogous to the Betamax recorder in Napster’s operation at the architecture and 
system meant that it fell afoul of the staple article of commerce doctrine. It will be 
important to note that a general rule may be postulated in this regard; namely that 
whereas the staple article of commerce doctrine exempts effortlessly 
manufacturers/OSPs selling products without involved “after-care”, services with 
the feature of a continued relationship with the allegedly infringing customer fall 
outside the scope of the doctrine.  
In the context of later cases in and projected/ future developments in this area of 
the law, the Seventh Circuit in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation decided on claims 
of infringement concerning a swapping service that featured as an add-on to AOL 
instant messaging, which allowed users of such to exchange files, and was used 
over the internet.803 The court explicitly rejected the contention that a system 
which is capable of non-infringing uses, is used solely to facilitate copyright 
infringement, could be exempt under the staple article of commerce doctrine.804 
The issue was presented in this way due to Aimster’s inability to prove any non-
infringing use.805 The most relevant and noteworthy part of the judgement 
concerns the equation that a system with non-infringing uses plus substantial 
infringing uses requires an equation of non-liability, where a contributory infringer 
evidences that to eliminate or reduce substantially the infringing uses would have 
been disproportionately costly.806 The reason for this pronouncement was the fact 
that the swapping service was encrypted. Aimster’s hope in this regard was that 
inter alia its lack of knowledge of the use of the system would bring it within the 
rule of the Sony decision. The court harshly criticised what it termed “wilful 
blindness” which it equated to guilty knowledge.807 The court thereby also rejected 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Napster “that actual knowledge of specific infringing 
uses is a sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer”.808 
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It is highly relevant therefore, if not also understandable, that in Grokster the 
Ninth Circuit upheld its previous jurisprudence by opining that the two filesharing 
services being examined, as introduced above, were capable of substantial non-
infringing uses.809 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Seventh 
Circuit’s rejection of its authority in Napster, thereby logically also disapproving of 
the “blind eye” theory proposed in Aimster.810 
 
4) Inducement Liability 
 
Due to the contrast between the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Aimster and the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling in Grokster, the Supreme Court gave way to a petition to hear 
Grokster: In its holding it rejected the Ninth Circuit’s findings, espousing instead a 
“new” theory of intending to induce infringement, thereafter known as 
‘inducement liability’: 
The question is under what circumstances the distributor of a product 
capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright 
infringement by third parties using the product. We hold that one who 
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken 
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by 
third parties. 811 
The intention of the parties in Grokster was virtually not at issue given their 
imaginative inducement and ‘follow up-Napster’ stance sans evidence of any self 
initiated effort to filter copyrighted material.812  
Concerning the interplay with the Sony doctrine, the Supreme Court stated that 
whilst a) where there was only one purpose, namely infringement, for an article 
there would be “no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and 
there is no justice in presuming or imputing intent to infringe”; but affirmed b) that 
                                                          
809
 Grokster,380F.3d1154,1161(9
th
Cir.2004). 
810
 Ibid,1162fn9. 
811
 Grokster,(n19),[Emphasis added] 
812
 Ibid,924-925. 
239 
 
where the item has substantial lawful as well as other unlawful uses the Sony 
doctrine “limits liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere 
understanding that some of one's products will be misused.”813 The Supreme Court 
did not expressly rule on the Seventh Circuit theory of liability based on wilful 
blindness. 
In summary, Sony was affirmed in Grokster by the Supreme Court and a new basis 
of liability was promulgated.814 The reasons behind this are perhaps best explained 
by Souter J’s characterisation of the central theme of this thesis; the conflict 
between the content producing and content using industry.815 
It is a beautiful parallel that Grokster imported the inducement theory from patent 
law in the same manner as the court imported the staple article of commerce 
doctrine in Sony.816 
Given the Supreme Court’s support of the rights holders, nudging the district court 
and potentially the court of appeals to hold Grokster defendants liable for active 
inducement, Grokster settled shortly after the Supreme Court decision, and 
Sharman ‘purportedly reached a tentative settlement’. Stream Cast remained. 
Plaintiffs initially filed motions for summary judgement as to the liability of 
defendants StreamCast and Sharman in the district court on remand. The district 
court was looking in particular for the requisite “purposeful, culpable expression 
and conduct” beyond ordinary acts incident to product distribution all may 
knowledge of infringing potential or actual infringing uses.817 The district court 
applied the inducement test holding that the evidence before the court for lawful 
intent was overwhelming.818 Moreover the court also held that the software was 
used mainly for infringement; targeted Napster users; defendants assisted 
infringing users and ensured the infringing capabilities; the business model was 
dependent on massive infringing use; no meaningful affirmative steps were taken 
                                                          
813
 Ibid,932-933. 
814
 Leaffer,(n464)430. 
815
 Grokster,(n19),928-929. 
816
 35USC271(c). 
817
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,454F.Supp.2d966,984(C.D.Cal.2006). 
818
 Ibid,985. 
240 
 
to prevent infringement; and defendants could not reasonably claim ignorance of 
infringement.819 
Somewhat unsurprisingly the district court held that the defendants distributed 
their peer-to-peer software with the intent to induce infringement.820 Whilst the 
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement on the question of 
liability against StreamCast on remand, the court heard further action for a motion 
for a permanent injunction soon after. Given the nature of the permanent 
injunction StreamCast prayed for an evidentiary hearing, additional discovery or 
the state of the permanent injunction pending appeal. After considering the 
technological issues including filtering and moving the end users from non-filtered 
versions to filtered versions of the software, the court analysed the legal issues 
relating to the history of the permanent injunctive relief sought, thereafter the 
court granted in part plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction, amongst other 
things requiring the use of the most effective means available to reduce the 
infringing capabilities of the peer-to-peer software purveyed by StreamCast, while 
preserving its infringing uses as feasible. StreamCast’s request to stay the 
permanent injunction pending appeal was denied without prejudice.821 Stream 
Cast did not appeal.822 
 
5) Contributory and Inducement Liability Contrasted & Concluded 
 
Some observers and especially OSPs, might wish to distinguish and separate 
contributory and inducement liability. It is also logical from a content providing 
industry perspective that the most fitting and powerful basis liability be argued 
thoroughly first.  
From a purely sand boxed point of view the contention that inducement liability is 
a subset of contributory liability may immediately be offered. This is due to the 
above-mentioned definition of contributory liability as holding those liable those 
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which as identified in Gershwin “with knowledge of the infringing activity, induce, 
cause, or materially contribute to the infringing conduct of another”.823  
Confusion arguably still reigns due to the Ninth Circuit’s post Grokster Supreme 
Court judgement in Visa. Despite the fact that the court defines contributory 
infringement as a form of 3PCL with roots in both the concepts of enterprise 
liability and imputed intent, and further states that a different panel in Amazon did 
not “bifurcate its analysis of contributory liability into "material contribution" 
liability and "inducement" liability, it did recognize that contributory liability “may 
be predicated on actively encouraging (or inducing) infringement through specific 
acts.”824 Nimmer has implied that the fact that the court first discussed 
contributory copyright infringement and then turned to inducement does not sit 
well with its reference to an anti-bifurcated approach.825 Just as some courts would 
consider both vicarious and contributory liability, considering one or both of the 
legs upon which contributory infringement stands, namely devolved enterprise 
liability or imputed intent is logically sound. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit panel in 
Visa at the outset clarified that that there are various formulations of the same 
basic test for contributory infringement, promulgated in Gershwin, as stated 
above. It also cited: 
 a) Napster as an elaboration in the Internet context that contributory liability may 
be found where a party “engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists 
the infringement”; and the Supreme Court in 
b) Grokster as simply proffering another version by adopting from patent law the 
concept of inducement finding that “one infringes contributorily by intentionally 
inducing or encouraging direct infringement”; just as in 
c) Amazon where contributory liability was incurred, under Grokster, for 
“intentionally encouraging direct infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps 
that are substantially certain to result in such direct infringement”826 
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as non-contradictory variations of the same basic test that “one contributorily 
infringes when one (1) has knowledge of another's infringement and (2) either (a) 
materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement”. 
It has been observed that in Viacom v Youtube, Stanton J confused the standard of 
contributory liability and inducement liability.827 
In summary however the rule in Sony concerning substantial non-infringing uses in 
a copyright context limits material contribution in the sense that it exempts certain 
designs by OSPs, whereas Grokster inducement looks at the intent of the party 
concerned, which serves to in turn limit Sony’s effect. 
Some commentators firmly believe that there is a difference between inducement 
as part of the test for contributory infringement and liability for “intent to induce”. 
Such a theory is built upon the premise that for a finding of contributory 
infringement based on inducement, a plaintiff must show that a defendant actually 
induced infringement, whereas a plaintiffs using the novel theory of “intent to 
induce” under Grokster arguably merely needs to show the defendants subjective 
intent to induce irrespective of whether the always necessary primary 
infringement actually occurred as a result.828  
In Viacom reference was made to Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC., 
(LimeWire). In Viacom plaintiffs relied in their arguments on the finding in 
LimeWire that there was “overwhelming evidence that LW engaged in purposeful 
conduct that fostered infringement: LW created and distributes LimeWire, which 
users employed to commit a substantial amount of infringement” and that “direct 
evidence of solicitation or a separate inducing message need not be shown to 
prove the requisite intent”.829 As commentators have however noted concerning 
LimeWire, the decision referenced both an extensive discussion of why the 
defendants met the Grokster inducement standard, and that such was noted to be 
“a form of the long established cause of action for contributory copyright 
infringement”.830 The court further substantiated by also referencing knowledge of 
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substantial infringement, affirmative acts to attract users and enabling such to 
commit infringement. The failure to “mitigate infringing activities” was also cited. 
However taking a sandboxed approach, the inducement definition does lend itself 
to the interpretation as a self-contained alternative to standard contributory 
liability. The Ninth Circuit’s separate consideration above does lend considerable 
credence to this contention. It is further submitted as mentioned above, that this 
test substantially facilitates findings of infringement and therefore benefits the 
content producing industry substantially. Commentators such as Leaffer agree.831 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
A plaintiff may bring suit in respect of a theory of vicarious, contributory and 
inducement liability as well as theoretically, additionally or alternatively, more 
generalised respondeat superior or corporate liability. It will be important to 
remember that the above discussion has made it abundantly clear that an OSP’s 
risk assessment is complicated not only by the intrinsic interpretation of currently 
established strands of liability, but also by the apparent ease with which these 
theories evolve to fit judicial policy considerations, for example as admitted in the 
above quote from Souter J’s opinion in Grokster. So where does this leave an OSP 
or content provider seeking to quantify legal risk or to gauge the best response to 
either infringement or the allegation of such? 
It may be submitted in this regard that the following, based on analysis of the 
above, could be deemed to aid an understanding of avoidance of being classified 
as a party capable of incurring third-party infringement. 
Visa, as discussed above, has implied that what has been referred throughout this 
thesis as primary and 3PCL could be separated into what some commentators have 
termed primary, secondary, and tertiary liability. 832 The dividing line between 
secondary and tertiary liability would be a relatively novel one and the category of 
tertiary liability one which would include for example, financial facilitators such as 
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Visa, which, it has been argued are two steps removed from any primary 
infringement. As has also been mentioned above, the suit against Hummer, the 
financial backers of Napster, could support such a classification due to the fact that 
the court granted plaintiffs motions for sanctions to the extent of a preclusion 
order and adverse inference instruction concerning the destruction of e-mails prior 
to suit.833 This means that not only do OSPs in the secondary category need to 
avoid liability, also those in the tertiary category must consider their actions 
carefully. Conversely, the content providing industry may learn from this that if it 
carefully crafts claims, it may also ‘catch’ tertiary defendants. Such may for 
example have deeper pockets then even secondary parties, and thus be worth 
pursuing. 
In going through the different theories of liability, it will, given the ‘twin barrels’ of 
vicarious liability be possible to avoid such by negating proof of control, bearing in 
mind that the criterion of financial benefit is too elusive, being loosely and broadly 
constructed, as noted above, to warrant a serious consideration of constructing 
corporate infrastructure to negate such. 
Avoiding liability for contributory infringement, the prudent OSP might adopt an 
approach predicated on bifurication of the elements of liability. Producing a 
product or service that has substantial non-infringing uses should bring the OSP 
within the rule in Sony. Concerning the intent to induce infringement, it can be 
noted that the plaintiffs would have to prove objectively that the defendant 
subjectively wished to induce such (naturally predicated upon the presence of 
infringement, though not necessarily by inducement). This means that intent to 
induce despite, as having been mentioned above as being in theory a boon to the 
content producing industry, may in fact be circumvented by the lack of evidence 
supporting such a proposition which may consist of e-mails, advertisements, 
marketing material and the like. In practice this may be difficult to achieve, 
especially where a product’s profitability is to a lesser or greater extent dependent 
on infringing uses drawing in and expanding a user-base, for example to 
increase/maximise advertising revenue or subscriptions. This may be the real cost 
of avoiding liability. As Viacom evidences, even OSPs such as YouTube, which 
apparently “furnishes a platform on which its users post and access all sorts of 
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materials as they wish, while the provider is unaware of its content, but identifies 
an agent to receive complaints of infringement and removes identified material 
when he landed infringes,”834 finds this hurdle hard to take given the e-mails 
containing worrying statements by its founders.835  
 
VI. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 
 
Having examined 3PCL theories in US copyright law, including how they pertain to 
or affect OSPs, it is now worth examining liability provisions specifically tailored to 
OSPs. Reference is of course made to the DMCA.836 Before launching into an 
analysis, it is first of all worth noting that the Act splits into five titles. The most 
relevant title for present purposes is Title II which was codified in 17 USC 512, 
although s.504 will also be relevant as will be seen below. 
 
1) Limitations on Liability for Material Online: General Matters 
 
The limitations in the following analysis of s.512 add to any defence that a party 
would regularly have under any other aspect of copyright law. The Act creates 
certain specifically enumerated and carefully, if not always precisely delineated, 
“safe harbours” which if applicable exempt an OSP from liability. Should an OSP fall 
outside such a safe harbour, liability in will be determined according to the usual 
copyright rules. 
Definition of Service Provider 
S.512(k) states that an “entity” transmitting, routing, or providing digital online 
communications connections “between or among points specified by user, or 
material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the 
material and sent or received” is deemed a “service provider” the purposes of the 
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Act and therefore in principle eligible for protected status. This definition is 
relatively broad and therefore encompasses certain staple OSPs such as Amazon or 
Google, just as it also encompasses “Napster type” services.837 
Conditions for Eligibility 
S.512(I)(1)(A) concomitantly requires the OSPs to reasonably implement, and 
inform its subscribers/account holders of its policy providing for termination in 
appropriate circumstances; where such are found to be repeat infringers. 
S.512(I)(1)(A) requires the adoption and non-interference with standard technical 
measures, which are used by copyright holders to identify and protect copyright 
works.838 
However the act also contains a very important limitation on the conditions for 
eligibility as well as the safe harbour as examined below, namely that in the 
interest of protection of privacy, a service provider is positively prohibited, 
according to s.512(m), from monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts 
indicating infringing activity, except where such would be consistent with standard 
technical measures complying with S.512(I), as mentioned above.  
 
2) Transitory Digital Network Communications (Transmissions) 
 
The first of four categories of safe harbours is Transitory Digital Network 
Communications (TDNCs). As with the other safe harbours, bringing an OSP’s 
activities within such means that, as explained above, monetary relief will not be 
available for alleged infringements. Injunctive relief will be limited as specified in 
17 USC 512(j), where the court must enter into an equation several factors such as 
the burden on the OSP, technical feasibility and the interference with non-
infringing material, were an injunction to be granted. 
Overview 
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Section 512(a) concerning TDNCs comes into play in circumstances where a rights 
holder accuses and OSP of copyright infringement due to the transmission of 
material through its system. The OSP must show that a party other than the OSP 
initiated the requisite transmission(s), chose its recipient(s), and that the OSP did 
not interfere with/select839 the content of such. The section stresses both the 
requirement of the automated nature of the involvement of the OSP, including 
routing, provision of connections or storage,840 as well as the requirement that the 
OSP makes no copy of the material beyond a transiently stored copy which is not 
ordinarily accessible to parties, except the anticipated recipients, and where such 
is not maintained on the system in a manner ordinarily accessible to the 
anticipated recipients for longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, 
routing, or provision of connections.841 the 1998 Senate Report explains that 
“transmitting” in s.512 is not the same as elsewhere in the CA, as defined in 
section 101: Transmitting for the purposes of s.512 is not limited to transmissions 
of a performance or display of images all sounds.842 
Actual Controversies 
A review of pertinent case law is instructive in illuminating the size of this 
particular safe harbour.  
There is ample case law concerning the definition of “transient storage” in relation 
to the fixation of works where such is “embodied in a sufficiently permanent or 
stable form for a period of more than transitory duration”. Thus anyone coming 
into contact with this terminology in the instant context will already have this in 
mind. In Ellison v. Robertson a science fiction writer pursued unauthorised 
exchanges of relevant works on USENET.843 Part of the plaintiff’s argument 
concerned the maintenance of messages allegedly infringing the plaintiffs works 
on servers of up to 14 days. The district court found that s.512(a) was designed to 
codify the rule as elaborated in Netcom where USENET messages were retained for 
11 days.844 As a result, it found s.512(a) satisfied, the three day difference being 
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insufficient to distinguish the two cases.845 The Ninth Circuit despite reversing 
Ellison on other grounds, approved846 of the district court’s opinion on this point.847 
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC the defendants contended that the handling of 
payments for access to websites containing infringing images was eligible as a 
TDNC, despite plaintiffs contentions that credit card data itself was not subject to 
copyright and therefore not protected and outside the remit of the section. The 
Ninth Circuit policy based judgment included such in s.512(a).848  
 
3) System Caching 
 
The second safe harbour concerns “system caching” and is embodied in s.512(b), 
which holds that OSPs are not liable for intermediate and temporary storage of 
material, provided that such was made available by another person, the storage 
being part of an automatic non-interfering849 technical process, the OSP complies 
with industry standards concerning refreshing, reloading and updating the material 
and in no way interferes with password protections and other security measures. 
As the 1998 Senate Report explains, the section is aimed at material that has been 
made available on an originating website and transmitted at the direction of a 
person through the system or network, operated by the OSP, to a different person, 
usually stored by automatic technical processes, so that the users of the system or 
network that subsequently request access to material on the originating site, may 
obtain such from the system or network.850 
 OSPs must be fully compliant with “notice and takedown” provisions where such 
original material has been removed or disabled on the primary website. A parallel 
can be drawn between this section, the above section, and the EC Regulations,851 
in that at the very least the difference between the above section aimed at 
transmissions and the instant caching section is very similar to that in the UK part; 
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whilst the former simply applies to passing and briefly stored directed 
transmissions, the latter mainly applies to temporary local storage to facilitate user 
access.852 
As in the preceding section, it is instructive to consider the application of the 
limitation in cases. Two Google related cases will be looked at dealing with 
Google’s acts of caching. In both cases, Google used an automatic program to 
scour the Internet automatically caching all content, unless the source contained 
instructions not to be cached.  
In Field v. Google Inc, a Nevada attorney took action against this practice given that 
the short stories which he posted on his personal website, without a “no archive” 
‘meta tag’,853 showed up in Google search results which were automatically 
displayed with cached links.854 Promptly after being served Google removed the 
cached links. There were several bases for finding for Google, the first was the 
defendant’s invitation to Googlebot to index the site, which was equated to a 
license;855 such affirmative conduct further estopped plaintiff,856 further , Google’s 
use was covered under the fair use exception.857  
The discussion in said case highlights the above Senate Report explanation that 
what is needed is an initial poster of information, an initial requester at whose 
direction the work is copied, a network which carries this out automatically and a 
subsequent user. As it happens, the facts of the case and Google’s caching policy, 
by using its Googlebots to index the entire Internet, unless prevented from doing 
so, does not meet the specification. The district court however disagreed. It 
implied that s.512(b)(1)(B) did not require such a chain by incorporating Google as 
the initial requester and, partly, inherently, the subsequent user, despite noting the 
possibility/aim of another future subsequent user.858 
The above means that in circumstances where such caching activities fail the test 
of fair use or consent, for example where material is posted in an unauthorised 
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manner, Google or any other OSP, hit by surprisingly forceful infringement claims 
might, being without protection, unexpectedly face liability.  
This has been claimed to be an error of interpretation of the statute.859 It is 
however submitted that the error is not as grave as Nimmer points out, in terms of 
future impact, since a court wishing to distinguish may perhaps do so given the 
non-determinative nature of this portion of the judgement and the simple fact that 
in linguistic terms the ratio has not been brought to a close. This does however 
require a more discerning court than that in Parker v. Google, Inc.860 
 
4) Information Residing on Systems or Networks at Direction of Users 
 
The third safe harbour, “Information Residing on Systems or Networks at Direction 
of Users” resides in s.512(c). It may be termed a “hosting” exception, parallel to 
that seen in Part 2,861 which excepts OSPs that “host” services on servers which are 
used by persons making information on the servers available to others, usually by 
use of the Internet. OSPs are also obliged to comply with procedural requirements 
with respect to notifications of claimed infringement.862 OSPs may more easily 
incur liability for direct infringement of exclusive rights as well as 3PCL by aiding 
such.863 Due to the section’s particularly complex nature it is worth delineating it 
precisely; it exempts a provider from liability where said: 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material; 
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(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control 
such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph(3), 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed 
to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
The Senate Report lists as examples of such storage “service space for a user’s 
website, chat room or other forum in which material may be posted at the 
direction of users”.864 
Given the importance of this section, a different approach will be taken to the 
preceding sections, meaning that it is worth dealing with the hosting exception in 
detail in the context of an in-depth analysis of Viacom. The case, as already 
mentioned above, concerns plaintiffs’ claims that YouTube and users were not in 
possession of valid licenses, authorisation, permission or consent to use registered 
copyrighted works which were owned by the plaintiffs and which appeared on 
YouTube.865 As a result, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were directly 
liable for infringing rights of public performance, public display and reproduction866 
and that defendants were also indirectly liable for inducement as well as 
contributory and vicarious infringement of copyright.867 Plaintiffs thus, among 
other things, sought a declaration that the defendants’ conduct wilfully infringed 
plaintiffs’ copyrights; a permanent injunction requiring defendants to employ 
reasonable methodologies to prevent or limit infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrights, 
and statutory damages for defendants’ past and present wilful infringement, or 
actual damages, plus profits of at least one billion dollars.868 Viacom plaintiffs in 
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment particularly emphasised the 
inducement theory espoused in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
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Ltd869 whilst also maintaining claims for vicarious and direct liability and the 
inapplicability of DMCA “safe harbor” provisions to YouTube’s activities.870 
The summary judgment in Viacom is interesting in several respects. Right at the 
outset it focuses on s.512 (c), (m), and (n). It thus approaches this case in the 
manner suggested by the defendants. The decision then looks rather briefly at 
some relevant case law, Grokster and other points deemed salient. 
Concerning certain of the plaintiffs’ submissions and exhibits871 the judge states 
that “a jury could find that the defendants not only were generally aware of, but 
welcomed, copyright infringing material being placed on their website. Such 
material was attractive to users, whose increased usage enhanced defendants’ 
income from advertisements displayed on certain pages of the website, with no 
discrimination between infringing and non-infringing content”.872 
It was however also noted that defendants had designated a DMCA agent, as 
required by 17 U.S.C. s.512(c)(2), that it was uncontroverted that of all the clips in 
suit were taken off YouTube’s website and that most were removed in response to 
their DMCA notice.  
Stanton J identified the central question in his summary judgment as being 
whether 17 U.S.C. s.512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) requires “a general awareness that there 
were infringements or whether the section requires actual or constructive 
knowledge that specific and identifiable infringements of individual items”.873 A 
reading of the section as requiring mere general awareness of infringements would 
undoubtedly favour the plaintiffs, whereas actual item specific knowledge would 
be much harder to prove and conversely, easier to defend. To interpret these 
provisions the judge examined the legislative reports on this topic, which were also 
relied on by the parties to enhance their various claims. 
 
The Legislative History (Senate & House Reports) 
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The reports as cited, regarding the purpose or spirit behind the DMCA, inform the 
reader that “by limiting the liability of service providers, the DMCA ensures that 
the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and 
quality of services on the Internet will continue to expand”.874 This policy 
perspective has been demonstrated in practice by YouTube, for example in 
relation to re-encoding works to make them accessible on different platforms. It 
has also been expounded by the various Amicus Curiae briefs in support of the 
defendants, for example by the “Sideshow Coalition” which states “YouTube is 
really UsTube. It empowers us to express ourselves, to realise our dreams, to 
communicate with others, to earn a living from our talents, and to change the 
world”.875 
The test of knowledge concerning “facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent” referred to in 17 U.S.C. s.512(c)(1)(ii) is described as a “red 
flag” test. It was however noted that there is no duty on the service provider to 
monitor or to seek facts concerning infringing activity except in so far as would be 
consistent with a standard technical measure complying with s.512(i)(1)(B). 
Nevertheless, any service provider which becomes aware of a “red flag” will lose 
“safe harbor” immunity if no action is taken in this regard. It is noted in this 
connection that the “red flag” test contains both a subjective and objective 
element. The subjective element relates to the awareness of the service provider 
of facts or circumstances in question relating to a “red flag”. The objective element 
relates to whether those facts or circumstances constitute a “red flag”, in other 
words, whether infringing activity “would have been apparent to a reasonable 
person operating under the same or similar circumstances”.876 
 
The Judge’s Analysis of the Legislative History 
a) Knowledge standard 
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Concluding his analysis of the legislative history of the DMCA, Stanton J comes to 
the conclusion that 17 U.S.C. s.512(c)(1)(i) and (ii) describes “knowledge of specific 
and identifiable infringements of particular individual items”, and that “mere 
knowledge of prevalence of such activity in general is not enough”.877  
b) Consequence of knowledge 
It was held; 
 “to let knowledge of a generalised practice of infringement in the 
industry, or of a proclivity of users to post infringing materials, impose 
responsibility on service providers to discover which of their users’ 
postings infringe a copyright would contravene the structure and 
operation of the DMCA”.878 
In terms of justification for the above, a decline to shift the burden of invigilation 
from the copyright owner to the provider of services is cited.879 This argument is, 
as always, underlined by the assertion that the copyright owner would be the 
person best placed to enforce their rights. Indeed, echoing defendants’ 
submissions, the judge notes that the ratio of infringing works to the works that 
the service provider has to deal with on their platform means that the service 
provider often cannot by inspection alone determine whether such use is being 
licensed by the owner, whether a post is “fair use” of a work, or whether a 
particular copyright owner or licensee would even object to a particular post. 
Some commentators are likely to argue in this respect that these points are 
particularly persuasive since it was alleged by the defendants that Viacom 
themselves made use of YouTube’s services by extensively uploading clips on an 
ongoing basis, deliberately leaving videos posted by others and licensing material 
to appear on YouTube.880 Two further justifications cited briefly are s.512(m)(1), 
the “privacy/freedom not to monitor” provision as well as the fact that in this 
particular instance the DMCA notification regime worked particularly efficiently 
since some 100,000 videos that were complained about in a mass takedown notice 
had, by the next day, almost all been removed. 
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The Case Law Analysed 
a) Cases cited in support of the Judgment 
In the second section of the judgment Stanton J briefly cites four cases, almost all 
of which are used to support the contention that there is no investigative duty on 
service providers and that more than general knowledge is required to impose an 
affirmative duty to remedy the problem and to disallow “safe harbor” protection. 
Two things may be noted in this regard. The first is that a statement in UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., is defined as the “very essence” of why 
general knowledge or awareness of pervasive copyright infringement is insufficient 
to impose liability on a service provider; “if investigation of ‘facts and 
circumstances’ is required to identify material as infringing, then those facts and 
circumstances are not “red flags””.881 The second is that Stanton J relies on 
drawing an analogy from the trademark case Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., that 
knowledge of specific instances of actual infringement are required in order to be 
actionable.882 The parallels drawn reflect the fact that the judge viewed YouTube 
as being in the same general category as eBay Inc, which is something that the 
plaintiffs in particular have strongly denied due to YouTube’s use of the material 
and opposing claims regarding the requisite standard of knowledge.883 
b) Grokster dismissed 
Grokster and related cases, termed its “progeny” by the judge; Usenet and Fung884 
as well as LimeWire, as cited by plaintiffs and their supporting amici, are tartly held 
to be of little application. Thus concerning the theory of liability under Grokster, as 
relied on heavily by the plaintiffs, it was held that the “general law of contributory 
liability” for copyright infringement does not apply to this particular subset of 
service providers, protected by the DMCA. This was heavily contested by the 
plaintiffs, as mentioned above, and further reinforces the, on one view, implied 
classification of YouTube by Stanton J as being a different, important and 
                                                          
881
 Viacom,(n15),17; citing UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.,665F.Supp.2d1099, 
1108(C.D.Cal.2009). 
882
 Viacom,(n15),17; citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,600F.3d93(2dCir.2010). 
883
 Viacom’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom’s motion for Summary 
Judgment, Viacom (n15),25. 
884
 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., v. Fung,No.CV06-5578,2009WL6355911(C.D.Cal.2009). 
256 
 
legitimate, breed of service provider compared to many of its brethren. Stanton J 
does however state that “on these cross motions of summary judgment I make no 
findings of fact as between the parties, but I note that the plaintiff Viacom’s 
General Counsel said in a 2006 e-mail that “the difference between YouTube’s 
behaviour and Grokster’s is staggering”. In what is perhaps the most revealing 
insight into the perception of YouTube, it is stated that: 
“The Grokster model does not comport with that of a service provider 
who furnishes a platform on which its users post and access all sorts of 
materials as they wish, while the provider is unaware of its content, but 
identifies an agent to receive complaints of infringement, and removes 
identified material when he learned it infringes. To such a provider, the 
DMCA gives a safe harbor, even if it otherwise would be held as a 
contributory infringer under the general law”. 
 
Other Points 
a) “Storage” given wide definition 
In the final part of the summary judgment three aspects of the case are dealt with. 
Firstly, it is held that “storage” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. s.512(c)(1), 
contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, in this instance includes the replication, transmittal 
and display of videos on YouTube. The judge arrives at this conclusion from the 
definition of “service provider” in 17 U.S.C. s.512(k)((1)(B), as mentioned above, 
since such would seem to flow almost naturally from a providers activities, 
provided that they flow from the material’s placement on the provider’s system or 
network. Stanton J goes so far as to say that “it is inconceivable that they [such 
allegedly infringing activities] are left exposed to be claimed as unprotected 
infringements”.885  
b) Financial Benefit and Right and Ability to Control 
Stanton J quickly covers claims that YouTube had the right and ability to control 
infringement of copyright. The judge states that for the “right and ability to 
control” an activity to be found, item specific knowledge is required. 
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c) Content Management 
The judgment dismissed claims that YouTube’s “three strikes” repeat-infringer 
policy was not reasonably implemented as required by 17 U.S.C. s.512(i)(1)(A) due 
to its calculation of the “strikes”. It was also noted that DMCA compliant notices 
themselves do not provide evidence of copyright infringement and therefore have 
no bearing on the service provider’s state of knowledge in this regard. Concerning 
the use of AudibleMagic, the video fingerprinting tool which removes offending 
videos automatically if matched with a particular reference video; it was held that 
YouTube’s initial hesitation in counting such rights-holders requests as strikes was 
indeed reasonable. In this regard Stanton J followed the same line of argument as 
that in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., where it was held that the 
automated AudibleMagic filter “does not meet the standard of reliability and 
verifiability required by the Ninth Circuit in order to justify terminating a user’s 
account”.886 Lastly, concerning the specificity of the takedown notice regime 
established by 17 U.S.C. s. 512(c)(3)(A)(ii), it was held that whereas 
generic/representative descriptions are acceptable, specific locations on the 
service provider’s site must be provided to avoid a forbidden factual search on the 
half of the service provider. 887  Such was noted to be most commonly achieved by 
providing the “Uniform Resource Locator” (URL). 888 
 
Comment 
This summary judgment, in focusing on 17 U.S.C. s.512(c)(1)(A) instead of following 
the plaintiffs’ detailed assertions regarding Grokster, abides by what some 
commentators have termed an established practice of interpreting the test for 
knowledge of infringement narrowly and favourably for service providers.889 This 
assertion in no small part stems from the fact that even the element of awareness 
of “facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” has been 
interpreted rather narrowly.890 This is likely to be regarded as  troubling by those 
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that observe that both the phraseology and vertical latitude of s.512(c)(1)(A)(ii) 
would seek to shore up the immediately preceding “actual knowledge” factor in 
s.512(c)(1)(A)(i). Correspondingly, some might thus argue that, by requiring 
knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements for both subsections, Stanton 
J has significantly reduced the scope s.512(c)(1)(A)(ii). Other commentators will in 
turn no doubt ponder whether the judge’s approach, in particular in relation to the 
knowledge requirement, does not seek to address an imbalance in the DMCA 
which, as the Senate and House Reports stipulate, should resemble at least in this 
instance, a truce.891 
Lastly, it must be noted that it is likely that some of the above will be considered 
again since Viacom has filed an appeal.892 
 
5) Information Location Tools 
 
The fourth and last safe harbour, situated in s.512(d), concerns “information 
location tools” exempts from liability service providers referring or linking to web 
locations exhibiting infringing material or providing the means to such by 
directories, indexes or search facilities.893 It requires absence of actual knowledge 
or awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing activities are 
apparent is required,894 just as the expeditious removal or disabling of access to 
such material in the event of such.895 The OSP may not draw direct financial benefit 
from any infringement where the OSP has the right and ability to control such 
activity.896 As with the aforementioned sections, the OSP must also be compliant 
with the “takedown regime”.897 Again, the OSPs is under no duty to seek out 
copyright infringement.898 
The Senate Report clarifies that the intended objective of the actual 
knowledge/”red flag” requirement includes the exclusion from the safe harbour of 
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sophisticated “pirate” directories that refer users of such to other selected sites 
containing pirated works, for example, films and music. 899 This is highlighted due 
to the fact that such directories are currently virulently prevalent means of 
illegitimate OSPs in making use of the produce of the content providing industry.  
It was held in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC that the defendant’s actions were not 
within the scope of the limitation; the defendant, following approval of payment, 
displayed hyperlinks for consumers to thereafter access client websites, also 
issuing passwords. The Ninth Circuit held that despite links arguably falling into the 
categorisation of “information location tools”, the plaintiff had not claimed 
infringement due to the links but rather its other supporting activities and 
moreover the particular safe harbour in the provided protection for infringements 
by reason of referral or linking.900 
The courts also clarified matters relating to the knowledge requirement. In Costar 
Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc, it was held that OSPs using humans to index/catalogue 
websites, thereby viewing them and arguably obtaining knowledge of their 
content, in particular their infringing character, would not fall outside the scope of 
the instant safe harbour. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC also on the topic of the 
requisite knowledge, the defendants had to defend themselves against allegations 
that dealing with URL names indicating piracy reached the requisite standard of 
awareness/knowledge. The Ninth Circuit held that references to piracy or illegality 
could be equated to mere puffery.  
The district court in one of its first decisions held that Napster did not qualify for 
protection under the transmission safe harbour, but rather offered search and 
directory services specifically designed to allow users to locate music, most of 
which was copyrighted.901  The district court found that Napster had constructive 
knowledge of its users’ illegal conduct, especially given Napster executives own 
downloading of infringing material onto their own computers and promoting such 
on the website.902 As such, the judge noted sarcastically that “defendant has failed 
to persuade this court that s.512(d) shelters contributory infringers.”903 Despite 
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ultimately holding Napster contributorily liable, and therefore outside the remit of 
s.512(d), the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s basis for its 
pronouncement.904 However, the Ninth Circuit refused to delve into the matter.905  
As noted above, concerning s.512(c), in particular in the discussion on Viacom, the 
question regarding notice and/or knowledge/awareness of infringing activity is 
pivotal, this question has not been satisfactorily determined. 
 
6) Notice and Takedown 
 
Under the notice and takedown provisions in s.512(c) the copyright holder may 
notify an OSP of allegedly infringing material on the OSP’s system. After receipt, 
such must either be removed or access to such blocked. The OSP will have 
designated a DMCA agent and notified such to the Copyright Office and to the 
public on its service, per s.512(c)(2). OSPs may ignore notices which are not in 
“substantial compliance”,906 moreover, such notices may not be used in a 
subsequent action to impute knowledge of infringing activity, e.g for contributory 
infringement. Once content has been blocked or removed, the OSP must also 
notify the user, in response to which such may send a “counter notification” 
claiming mistake or misidentification pursuant to s.512(f).907 Where such counter 
notification complies with the statutory requirements, the OSP must provide the 
copyright holder with such. Thereafter, unless the copyright holder takes action, 
the OSPs must replace or unblock the material within 10 to 14 business days of 
receiving the counter notification.908 
 
7) Subpoena to Identify Infringers 
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In order to balance Title II of the DMCA, s.512(h) includes provisions to allow 
copyright holders to request the issuance of subpoenas to service providers for the 
identification of alleged infringers.  
 It was held in Recording Industry of America v. Verizon Internet, that the ISP had 
rightly refused to identify subscribers requested by RIAA, as the subpoenas related 
to activities as conduit for allegedly infringing material.909 After hearing RIAA’s 
contention that the definition of ISP in s.512(k)(1)(B) makes s.512(h) applicable, 
irrespective of the function being performed (transmitting, caching, hosting, 
locating), the court stoutly reasoned that “this argument borders upon the silly” 
since “any notice to an ISP concerning its activity as a mere conduit does not 
satisfy the condition of § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) and is therefore ineffective”.910 
However the Court of Appeal also noted that s.512(c)(3) does apply to the OSP 
that stores material per s.512(b)-(d).911 
Verizon, to the extent cited above, was approved of in In re Charter 
Communications, Inc., where the Eight Circuit vacated various subpoenas ordered 
to be enforced by the district court. The case raised several interesting issues apart 
from the approval that s.512(h) is linked structurally to storage and not 
transmission functions. Unfortunately the court, whilst explicitly sharing Charter’s 
concerns regarding the constitutionality of the subpoena mechanism due to the 
possible invasion of “power of the judiciary by creating a statutory framework 
pursuant to which Congress, by statute, compels the clerk of court to issue a 
subpoena, thereby invoking the court power”, limited its judgement to obiter or in 
this respect.912 The court also somewhat instructively on this issue, to make good 
regarding the disclosure, issued several options to the district court regarding 
RIAA’s options to return, delete, disuse the information.913 
These matters were also considered in In Re Subpoena to University of NC at 
Chapel Hill, in which the court followed the above reasoning in Verizon and 
without attributing Nimmer “paraphrased” his views.914 The court however also 
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stated that whereas the relevant section may allow a relevant person to seek a 
subpoena from any district court, this does not mean that every district court has 
jurisdiction to issue a subpoena compelling action from persons outside the 
district.915 
 
8) Termination of Repeat Infringers 
 
S.512(i)(1)(A) requires OSPs, as part of the conditions of eligibility for safe harbour 
protection, to adopt and reasonably implement policies to under appropriate 
circumstances terminate repeat infringers. Unfortunately that is the remit of the 
guidance the statute provides. Several commentators have noted that this is an 
unsatisfactory situation, leading to unnecessary legal uncertainty.916 It can only be 
presumed that when the statute was negotiated it was preferred to leave this 
matter up to the courts since consensus could not be reached. This has prompted 
commentators such as Nimmer to provide sample policies.917  
 
9)  Conclusion & Comparison 
 
It is difficult to answer the question posed at the beginning of the section, namely 
whether the DMCA “provides certainty for copyright owners and Internet service 
providers with respect to copyright infringement liability online”. The above does 
however make clear concerning this question that the opposing industries, namely 
the content providing and producing industries, will likely have different but 
variable answers, depending on the particular circumstances and situations certain 
market actors find themselves in. This naturally reflects the complexity of the 
section. 
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It should be noted that it is a hallmark of the DMCA that each of the four bases 
operates independently, as noted above, for example in relation to Napster. 
Moreover, as Field has shown, where an OSP seeks to avail itself of a safe harbour 
and fails, it may nonetheless defend itself using other recognised defences, such as 
fair use or implied license. One commentator has shrewdly observed that in 
circumstances where an OSP has failed to engage safe harbour protection this may 
not count against the OSP in terms of the operability of any other defence, which 
should be applied, without prejudice, with reference to general jurisprudence. This 
is straightforward given s.512(l) specificity: “Other Defenses not Affected”. 
Conversely, however, in a situation where an OSP almost manages to activate safe 
harbour protection the statute does not offer guidance as to the benefits to the 
OSP in terms of other defences and it would therefore seem that such an 
argument would not be forestalled.918 This seems logical if only because the facts 
are likely in such circumstances to support such an outcome. 
In terms of a comparison to the UK, in particular the E-Commerce Regulations and 
to a certain extent s.28A CDPA 1988, represent the equivalent of spirit of 
protection for the acts of OSPs in relation to information passing through or 
present on their systems.919 This means that both regimes contain defences 
relating to OSPs exhibiting characteristics of mere conduits, caching and hosting in 
relation to information/works. An individual comparison in relation to the 
definitions and operation of the three classes of defences present in both 
jurisdictions reveals that those corresponding to each other are substantially 
similar, with the exception that in the UK OSPs may avail themselves also of s.28A 
CDPA 1988, concerning acts of temporary reproduction, which could be viewed as 
supplemental to the defences of mere conduit/caching, if recently in effect 
somewhat diminished in scope, as observed in Part 2. Moreover it is worth 
reiterating that in Viacom the Second Circuit’s judgement is eagerly awaited, given 
that the district court’s opinion effectively enlarged the scope of the hosting 
defence by holding contrary to the statutory requirement, but arguably in line with 
the legislative history, that ‘awareness of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activities apparent’ does not suffice; only actual knowledge meets the 
requisite standard, as discussed above. 
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D. Relevant Defences to Claims of Copyright Infringement 
 
Having examined in-depth both primary and third-party infringement in Chapters 
B-C, including exceptions specifically tailored to the latter immediately above, it  
now behoves to analyse relevant defences. In doing so, the important category of 
fair use is examined in-depth and is followed by, given its significance an 
immediate conclusion and comparison to the UK equivalent. The following raises 
an appropriate awareness of other legal and equitable defences. Such may apply 
to OSPs, either directly or indirectly, and thus have a bearing in delineating the 
scope and applicability of 3PCL. The discussion in this Chapter particularly 
references this fact in D(I)(4). To the extent that these defences lessen the 
applicability of US 3PCL theories, this could have a bearing on the validation of the 
comparison which is being carried out, but also aids in testing the theories so as to 
judge their operability for incorporation or modification of UK 3PCL, which is the 
object of the secondary research question. 
 
I. Fair Use 
 
In broad terms, the doctrine of fair use can be described as a doctrine which allows 
a third party to defend itself in an action the copyright infringement that was 
developed by the courts, and later codified to a certain extent in the 1976 Act.920  
 
1) Origins & Delineation 
 
The doctrine of fair use was developed by case law in the US, most notably in 
Folsom v Marsh.921 Story J identified several criteria in assessing whether the 
inclusion of the letters had been fair use; “the nature and objects of the selections 
                                                          
920
 17USC107. 
921
 Folsom v. Marsh,9F.Cas.342(CCDMass.1841)(No.4901). 
265 
 
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the 
use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the 
original work”.922 It will be observed that the fair use factors embodied in s.107 can 
be said to be similar. 
Despite the doctrine of fair use having been described as akin to an exclusive right 
in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v Random House, Inc., it only operates as a result of a 
claim by a copyright holder of prima facie copyright infringement.923 It is logical 
that the defendant must prove that the alleged infringing use was in fact fair use, 
which is a mixed question of law and fact. It has been noted in respect of the s.107 
factors that “courts balance these factors to determine whether the public interest 
in the free flow of information outweighs the copyright holder's interest in 
exclusive control over the work.”924 
Section 107, as indicated above, now requires that for a determination that the fair 
use exception applies at least four factors must be considered: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. 
The statute precedes these by setting out in a type of preamble examples such as 
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research”. Recorded legislative intent indicates the 
                                                          
922
 Leaffer,(n464),470-471, citing Ibid,348. 
923
 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,366F.2d303,306-307(2
nd
Cir.1966) citing 
Ball, Copyright and Literary Property,260(1944). Rec.viewing: Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted 
Works, Study No. 14, prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,86thCong.,2dSess.(Comm.Print1960). 
924
 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc.,796F.2d1148,1152(9
th
Cir.1986) citing DC 
Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc.,in 696F.2d24,27(2
nd
Cir.1982). 
266 
 
non-definitive nature of the preamble and the flexible, open application that the 
four factors.925 
 
2) Productive and Reproductive Use 
 
Scholars and courts alike have in respect of the above noted two diverse strands of 
categorisation of fair use.926 The first may be termed ‘productive use’ and the 
second, ‘reproductive use’. The former is most notably espoused and defended by 
Seltzer;927 such uses, as the name suggests, build upon the original work thereby 
creating added value. This may also be termed ‘transformative use’ of the original, 
on that creates “new information, new aesthetic, new insights and 
understandings”, an example of which is this very thesis.928 The appeal of this 
theory lies in the ideal of direct subsequent public benefit, which is consistent not 
only with the general if somewhat ephemeral modern policy of copyright law, but 
arguably also the justification for copyright in the Constitution, as identified above. 
The opposing school of thought, is represented by Lawrence and Timberg,929 and 
recognises so-called “reproductive uses/non-productive uses” of works, where 
copies of such are used in more or less the same manner as the original.  
Some commentators have decried the attempted splitting or narrowing of the fair 
use doctrine as being baseless in terms of both the statute and the legislative 
history.930 A persuasive argument presented by Leaffer is that multiple copies for 
classroom use do not fall within the concept of transformative use, but arguably 
do “advance the progress of science and useful arts”.931 However the most 
persuasive and important, also for this thesis, source of support for the school of 
thought rejecting a limitation of fair use to so-called “productive uses” in Sony, in 
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which the Supreme Court supported private non-commercial home taping of TV 
programmes for timeshifting purposes.932 Despite being reproductive it upheld the 
defence, focusing instead on the negligible commercial impact of the fair use. 
Whereas the courts especially since Sony explain and justify fair use in economic 
terms, this has been questioned. Yet to understand why this is the case, the 
economics must be rationalised first. One presumed aim/purpose of copyright law 
is the trade off between the provision of monopoly rights to encourage or 
incentivise the creation of original works and the wide dissemination of such, 
benefiting society. Fair use, clearly falls into the latter category of optimal 
dissemination, detracting from the monopoly right at issue, where ‘optimal’ is 
defined as a state of affairs where users would be deprived of the benefit of 
certain works were they put in a position where they had to acquire licenses and 
incur transaction costs are access to such. It has been stipulated that given that 
under certain circumstances users would rather avoid such transaction costs, 
which encompasses not only the license costs but also the opportunity cost 
inherent, such would not be socially desirable in particular since, it is alleged, this 
particular type of dissemination does not have a negative commercial impact, but 
may, in fact, at times have a positive one. Commentators have termed such 
situations where users may make use of copyright works as long as he above 
described market failure is inherent in such use and negative commercial impacts 
on the copyright holder lacking as insufficient.933 Critics have suggested that the 
economic analysis school of thought has a wrong angle on social benefit in leaving 
cultural development out of the equation.934 Thus a wider policy base for the fair 
use doctrine is advocated, one that possibly even takes negative commercial 
impact into account. 
 
3) The Four Factors in Context 
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Before going on to examine the doctrine of fair use in the context of the content 
providing/content using industry and the intersection with 3PCL in this regard, the 
discussion will benefit immeasurably from briefly analysing the precise remit of the 
fair use factors individually. 
 
a) The Purpose and Character 
 
A significant distinction is drawn in the courts between, non-commercial, for 
example non-profit educational use935 and, on one view, the economic impact that 
unavoidably comes hand-in-hand with commercial use, even for-profit educational 
use.936 It is thus submitted that it is more difficult to establish fair use in the courts 
where such is the result of commercial transactions for profit,937 the reverse 
presumption is true for non-profit use.938 The derogation from this comes in the 
form of use of a “work which contains unfair, inaccurate, or derogatory 
information”939 as applied in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc..940 
 
b) Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
 
The second fair use factor distinguishes between types of works; some works 
require greater public access than others.  
The situation concerning what have been termed “informational works” is 
arguably no longer determinatively affected by the question of whether the 
alleged fair use occurred prior to publication or not. In circumstances where a 
work had not been published the crucial right of an author to control previously 
considerably tipped the balance against a finding of fair use, as for example in 
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Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.941 It was arguably the holding 
in Wright v. Warner Brothers, Inc.942 that some unpublished works are more equal 
than others, that sparked the amendment of s.107 that “the fact that a work is 
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use is such finding is made upon 
consideration of all the above factors”.943 
 
c) Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
 
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole, implicitly examines the link between what has 
been used and the necessity for the relevant fair use objective. The examination 
includes qualitative and quantitative aspects. It may, for example suffice to use 
verbatim excerpts to prejudice application of the fair use doctrine, even in very 
long works, on a qualitative basis, as noted in Craft v. Kobler.944  
 
d) Negative Impact on Market or Value 
 
As was stated in Sony, the fourth fair use factor is the most important. The lack of 
an impact on the market for or value of a work most directly ties in with the 
systemic justification for fair use. Commentators have noted that the fourth factor 
is circular in its reasoning and that policy dictates its application. Courts will 
consider whether the incentive to create original works is threatened by use that 
might impact on potential sales, marketability or replaced demand for the original, 
as in Hustler.945 As held in Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., where use is made of a work 
                                                          
941
 Harper&Row,(n454),554. See also Salinger v. Random House, 
Inc.,650F.Supp.413(SDNY1986),rev’d,811F2d90(2
nd
Cir.1987). 
942
 Wright v. Warner Brothers,Inc.,953F.2d731(2
nd
Cir.1991). 
943
 102Pub.L.No.492;106Stat.3145(1992). 
944
 Craft v. Kobler,667F.Supp.120,128(SDNY1987). 
945
 Hustler,(n924),1155-1156; citing respectively Meeropol v. Nizer, 560F.2dat1070; Elsmere 
Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,482F.Supp.741,747(S.D.N.Y.), 
aff'd,623F.2d252(2
nd
Cir.1980); Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript 
Corp.,558F.2d91,96(2
nd
 Cir.1977),cert denied,434U.S.1014,98S.Ct.730,54L.Ed.2d759(1978); 
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,329 F.2d 541,545(2
nd
Cir.),cert 
denied,379U.S.822,85S.Ct.46,13L.Ed.2d33(1964). 
270 
 
such as reproduction which complements a work, such as more likely to the 
harboured within the fair use doctrine.946 
The type of harm to the market may logically be potential harm, as in Meeropol v. 
Nizer.947 However, as always a plaintiff must submit evidence of quantifiable harm. 
In this context this is most easily done by pre-existing goodwill or contractual 
frameworks that are already in place.948 However, a plausible showing of the 
potential future availability or option of such will also suffice.949 
 
4) Affectations: The Content Using Industry 
 
Given the focus of this thesis it would be remiss not to examine how the fair use 
doctrine interacts with the content using industry’s reproductive technologies. This 
will be done by first examining older technologies, which then affords in 
perspective and in-depth analysis pertaining to a particular subset of OSPs, which 
in turn enables the identification of the precise bearings of the fair use doctrine, 
leading to a promulgation of certain predictions concerning the future. 
 
a) The Past and Present 
 
Technological developments have meant that just as copyright has struggled to 
adapt, the fair use doctrine has remained steadfast. One possible explanation is 
that technological development to date, for example from piano rolls to MP3s, 
evidences two aspects; the first is that copying by such means is, generally, not 
productive use, and the second, that works are increasingly copied in their 
entirety, which should according to intrinsic logic tend to take such copies outside 
of a fair use consideration.  
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Another view is however that as Sony showed, the doctrine may be stretched to 
apply in circumstances where there is non-commercial use and no presumption of 
harm to the market due to an “insufficient” proof of future potential harm. Many 
would question this, just as Justice Blackman in Sony, noting that it was Congress’s 
intention to limit fair use to productive use. However such a view is to a certain 
extent at least, obviated in light of the above discussion referencing Encyclopaedia 
Britannica Educational Corporation v. Crooks; the case despite the unfortunate 
name, stemming the concept that commercial videotaping of films in copyright 
even though for educational use will not be covered by the fair use doctrine. 
In Napster, as mentioned above, the defendant argued that there was a clear 
analogy to Sony in that the software was capable of substantial non-infringing 
uses, such as sampling before buying, and permissive distribution by official 
sources. Moreover it was argued in Napster that “space-shifting” had occurred.  
The court however rejected Napster’s fair use defence; concerning: a) the purpose 
and character of the use it was noted that such was reproductive and commercial; 
b) & c) the nature and amount copied it was held that creative works were copied 
in their entirety; d) the effect on the market was deemed to be negative, since 
such use discouraged CD sales. 
Concerning the defence of “space shifting” and sampling, the court noted that the 
latter negatively impacted the market for online music downloads under that the 
former was to be distinguished from the leading case at the time on space shifting, 
RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, where works were legitimately copied onto 
MP3 players.950 This position markedly differs from that in the UK, where such 
space shifting is still not excepted, despite being on one view, unenforceable. 
 
5) Conclusion & Comparison 
 
It may broadly be summarised that the above discussion of fair use exhibits the 
outcome that in most cases the courts will consider two issues as determinative; 
social benefit of the use of the work in terms of whether it is productive or 
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reproductive; and the harm to the market of the copyright work, factoring whether 
a use is commercial/non-commercial. It is also clear that the most problematic 
uses claimed to be fair use are: 
a) reproductive non-commercial uses combined with new technologies. Here, not 
only will public benefit in disseminating the work or the market impact/failure be 
relevant but also the impact/chill on the “protected category” of new technology; 
and 
b) productive commercial uses. Here, the nature and amount of the use will be 
determinative. 
It is also clear that in terms of OSPs and 3PCL, the above reproductive non-
commercial uses combined with new technologies category is more relevant. 
The opposing industry interests have been delineated in Part 1, and the stand-off 
finds itself replicated concerning fair use.951 The content using industry and its 
customers naturally support the fair use doctrine and infer a basis beyond the 
purely economic or as described above. The content providing industry discounts 
the notion of market failure; ironically due to the fact that the fair use doctrine and 
market failure were concepts of a “low tech marketplace” where such failures 
were prone to arise. It is argued that such failures less likely to occur nowadays 
due to technological advances that reduce transaction/opportunity costs. 
The development of fair use can be said to be organic in respect of the above 
difference of opinions but entirely inorganic concerning the use of content 
management/technical protection measures. It is concerning this development 
that fair use, as noted above, is being affected by the targeted counter 
development to technological advances in reproduction equipment. Due to the 
fact that technical measures enforce rights and by creating a form of “para-
copyright” in that works are no longer primarily protected by the exclusive rights 
granted to the rights holder but rather by technological methods and systems; the 
exceptions to the previous methods of protection are forcefully circumvented. 
Whereas it has been previously assumed that the answer to the machine was the 
machine in this respect, the market has proven this to be somewhat illusory, 
particularly regarding space shifting. This is however not to detract from the fact 
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that the use of anti-circumvention measures has been codified in 17 USC 1201.952 
Yet s.1201(a)(1)(c) preserves fair use in unlikely instances where tech-savvy users 
are able to circumvent the TPMs, accessing the work, and using it.953 It is entirely 
feasible that the content providing industry may yet successfully support a 
resurgence in the use of TPMs, no matter how unlikely this seems at present. 
Given the emphasis on the “monetisation” of access to non-permanent copies of 
works in the content providing industry, reproduction, and thereby the classical 
concept of fair use in this respect, is likely to fade somewhat. Moreover, given that 
commentators have noted that the US stands alone in providing specific 
exceptions to copyright as well as the broad category of fair use, which is broader 
than the example in civil law countries like Germany, most notably due to the fact 
that it is dynamically case law driven, instead of reliant on legislation for its 
evolution, could lead to calls by the many countries that have adopted the latter 
approach for harmonisation in this respect.954 In terms of a comparison to the UK, 
it is obvious that the concept of “fair dealing” as examined in Part 2, despite 
fulfilling similar functions, falls far short of the concept of “fair use” which is much 
broader in scope and again, does not rely on legislation for its primary 
development. 
The recent Hargreaves review of the UK intellectual property system955 notes, 
following a comparison to other EU neighbours generally that “the UK does not 
currently exploit all the exceptions available” and acknowledges the above 
observations concerning the US fair use doctrine.956 In particular, UK reticence to 
similarly broad adoptions is characterised as an apprehension of legal uncertainty 
following the court-based development of the doctrine in the US, and a 
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comparative disapproval of the linked necessity for litigiousness.957 It is stated that 
the doctrine permits risk-taking, which implies pushing legal boundaries on the 
part of the content using industry, but it is argued that this is mainly appropriate 
elsewhere inter alia given American business risk and investor culture. Moreover, 
the report admits not seriously considering adopting ‘US style fair use’ due to UK 
government lawyers’ ‘advice’.958 The review however proposes both the adoption 
of some exceptions which are feasible within the current EU law framework and 
the exploration of future exceptions at an EU level. It proposes “enabling new 
research tools” meaning immediate UK interim measures for non-commercial “text 
mining” accessing databases for such purposes, and pursuance of a commercial 
counterpart at EU level.959 The second stand-alone category discussed proposed is 
“private copying/format shifting”, given present EU permission, if coupled with 
compensation.960 A limited private copying exception proposal was expected, and 
its adoption long overdue owing to widespread disregard for the law.961 
Lastly must be remarked that, despite the above observations, the UK however 
came close to, or was on course for a “fair use style” private/domestic use 
exception concerning the previous cable programme right covering Internet 
transmissions in the 1990s, as discussed in Part 2.962   
 
II. Other Legal and Equitable Defences 
 
In addition to the fair use doctrine there are other more general defences available 
to a defendant in a copyright infringement action. These will be briefly discussed. 
Regarding the legal defences, these include the fact that the plaintiff must 
establish jurisdiction and prove by a preponderance of the evidence ownership 
and unlawful copying, that the term of copyright has not expired, compliance with 
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statutory formalities where relevant and the plaintiffs work may be subject to an 
exemption or compulsory license.963 
Statute of Limitations 
For civil copyright infringement actions s.507 specifies that the limitation period is 
three years, running from the date on which the claim accrued.964 In general terms 
the date on which the claim accrued is the date on which the copyright holder 
learns of the tortuous wrong or could have learned of it through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. Concealment by the defendant or a connected party will 
mitigate.965  
Laches 
For the equitable defence of laches to succeed, the defendant must show that the 
action is untimely, there was negligence in failing to act sooner, and that this 
failure has prejudiced the defendant.966 The defence of laches does not have a set 
time period of limitation, unlike the 1976 Act specified above, but that plaintiff’s 
claims of laches whilst the claim is within the set statutory period, is 
problematic.967 Laches runs from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known 
about actual or impending infringement, irrespective of whether ownership has 
been claimed or not.968 Finally, laches bars monetary recovery. 
Estoppel 
As Carson v. Dynergy, Inc., shows, a defendant may also rely on the equitable 
defence of estoppel where the: 
(1) plaintiff knows the facts of the defendant's infringing conduct; 
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(2) plaintiff intends that its conduct shall be acted on or, must so act that the 
defendant has a right to believe that it is so intended; 
(3) defendant must be ignorant of the true facts; and 
(4) defendant must rely on the plaintiff's conduct to its injury.969 
It follows that this particular defence may be utilised where the plaintiff aided or 
regarded the alleged infringement as non-infringing, or that there was no 
copyright at issue.970 Depending on the length of the acquiescence, the defence 
can be operable against past, or continuing infringement.971 
Other defences 
Ownership of copyright may be challenged by the assertion of either abandonment 
or forfeiture of copyright. Both are distinct from each other. Forfeiture has 
occurred in cases as a result of improper motives upon publication. The defence 
does not relate to the copyright holders intent. Abandonment requires intent to 
surrender rights residing in the work, as evidenced by overt acts.972 
Misuse of copyright, related to the doctrine of “unclean hands”, but adopted from 
patent law, where it was almost statutorily terminated,973 may be allowed as a 
defence where the plaintiff has committed serious misconduct such as the 
example, fraud.974 In a similar vein, a defendant may claim the defence of “fraud 
on the copyright office”, having its origins in also in the doctrine of “unclean 
hands” and patent law. In such a defence it is usually required that the plaintiff 
wilfully misstated/failed to state facts upon knowledge of which the Copyright 
Office would rejected the application the copyright.975 As a result the Copyright 
Office will usually hold the registration invalid, thereby withdrawing its support 
from infringement action. 
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Lastly it should be noted that innocent infringement does not operate as a 
defence, except for the very narrow scenarios.976  
 
E. Remedies 
 
Given that this section is intrinsically intended for reference, the basis for 
comparison being Part 2, the issue of remedies under the 1976 Act will be 
examined as befitting this fact. As stated in Part 2, it is logical to examine remedies 
at this juncture, having analysed categories of works, primary and 3PCL, and 
defences by OSPs, which have failed partially or completely. 
Sections 502-505 of the 1976 Act specify the remedies available to copyright 
holders, or potentially, licensees, for the infringement of their copyrights. The 
most relevant will be dealt with sequentially in this Chapter. Moreover, specific 
provisions contained in Title II DMCA will also be identified. 
 
I. Injunctions 
 
1) General Provisions 
 
In civil actions both temporary and final injunctions on any terms that are deemed 
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement are governed by s.502(a). 
As in the United Kingdom, with American Cynamid, there is a somewhat similar 
test, which has been developed by the courts over the years. A contemporary 
interpretation of this standard is that what is required is the: 
 [S]howing of possible irreparable injury to the copyright owner and 
either (1) probable success on the merits, or (2) sufficiently serious 
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation 
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and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly towards the party request 
in the preliminary relief.977 
In respect of the above test, it has been noted by observers that preliminary 
injunctions are usually granted in the instance where delay would deprive the 
plaintiff of relief and cause potential irreparable harm.978 However in instances 
where damages would be sufficient injunctions are not granted. Moreover, the 
standard also favours copyright holders to the extent that a showing irreparable 
harm will be taken to have occurred where the plaintiff exhibits evidence of prima 
facie copyright infringement.  
 
2) Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 Provisions 
 
As has been mentioned above, an OSP that finds shelter under one of the s.512 
safe harbours may nonetheless be subject to limited injunctions.979 These 
limitations break down into several categories. The first split is between the first 
safe harbour, TDNCs, and the other three categories. 
 
a) Transitory Digital Network Communications 
 
Under this category, in the DMCA specifies two types of injunctions, the first is 
directed at infringing subscribers to an OSP and the second is what can be 
described as a blocking order, one or both of which may be granted.980 Under the 
former, the OSP is obliged to cease providing access to a subscriber engaging in 
infringement by terminating the account.981 In the latter instance the OSP must 
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take reasonable steps, as specified in the order, to block access to specific, 
identified, online locations outside the US.982  
 
b) Other Three Safe Harbours 
 
Concerning the last three safe harbours, three types injunctions are specified 
which may be granted individually or combined.983 The first concerns infringing 
material, and again requires the OSP to restrain from providing access to such.984 
The second, as above concerns providing access to the OSPs network to 
subscribers infringing copyright by terminating relevant accounts.985 The third and 
additional category, unique to the other three safe harbours, permits the court to 
order injunctive relief necessary to prevent/restrain infringement concerning 
specified online locations in the event that such is least burdensome to the OSP 
when compared to the other categories available, or other relief.986 
 
c) Mandatory Considerations 
 
Section 512(j)(2) specifies four considerations much the court must take into 
account in granting an injunction. The considerations are concerned with the 
appropriateness and proportionality of the relief. The court is therefore first asked 
to consider whether an injunction would “significantly burden either the provider 
or the operation of the provider’s system network”; secondly, “the magnitude of 
the harm likely to be suffered by the copyright owner in the digital network 
environment if steps are not taken to prevent or restrain the infringement”; 
thirdly, whether implementing the junction considered would be technically 
feasible and effective and “would not interfere with access to non-infringing 
material at other online location; and lastly, whether there are other 
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comparatively effective means which are less burdensome with a view to 
preventing restraining access to infringing material. 
Concerning the last criterion, despite the legislative history not providing any 
insight into the proper functioning of the considerations, they may nonetheless 
defeat injunctive relief under many circumstances.987 Therefore the provisions 
support the contention that, no matter how counter intuitively, the more 
widespread certain infringement manifests itself, the less likely it is that injunctive 
relief would be granted. This policy clearly supports the content using industry, 
and is in line with the stated intent of the safe harbours, providing a clear 
counterpoint to the balancing exercise referred to above for injunctions granted 
under the 1976 Act. 
Lastly it should be noted that injunctive relief against OSPs protected under the 
safe harbour provisions is only available in an “on notice” procedure. S.512(j)(3) 
specifies that the OSP must have an opportunity to appear, except where the 
injunction concerns the preservation of evidence or would have “no material 
adverse effect on the operation” of the OSPs network. The last part of the 
prohibition of ex parte orders is open to interpretation, despite the scope of such, 
being limited. 
 
3) Conclusion & Comparison 
 
In comparatively concluding concerning injunctions, despite general similarity, 
remarkable dissimilarity concerning the functioning of injunctions in both 
jurisdictions may be found concerning OSP activities. The standard for the grant of 
in particular injunctions in the US on a general basis is substantially similar to the 
UK test espoused in American Cyanamid. In both jurisdictions specific relatively 
recent legislation has come into effect that governs the grant of injunctions. 
Whereas in the UK the Enforcement Directive aims to shore up the availability of 
for example interlocutory injunctions, the Commission has identified a general 
insufficiency in the ease of availability. It is to be expected that concerning in 
particular interlocutory injunctions more precise standards concerning evidence 
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and standards of proof will be legislated for EU wide. The same directive also 
requires effective preservation of evidence, seizure, and identity of alleged 
infringers as well as the freezing injunctions, which for the most part had already 
been in place prior to the introduction of this piece of European legislation, where 
and as indicated in the relevant sections. However, as also highlighted in Part 2 
concerning injunctions, particular problems arise concerning OSPs given the 
concomitant requirement of availability of injunctions by Art.8(3) EUCD and Art.11 
Enforcement Directive, and the unresolved interplay of Art.5 EUCD concerning OSP 
exemptions such as acts of temporary reproduction. There is therefore at present 
uncertainty of scope in the UK concerning injunctions in this regard. 
Whereas most UK provisions concerned with injunctions govern positive 
availability, it is remarkable that the DMCA contains provisions governing/limiting 
the availability and moreover the scope of such. In particular as regards the precise 
delineation of any injunctions for particular acts by OSPs, this is without parallel in 
UK jurisprudence. This can be said to logically be a result of the protection 
afforded by the DMCA safe harbours, despite the fact that the equivalent UK E-
Commerce Regulations safe harbours do not speak to or exempt from injunctive 
relief in this respect. 
It may therefore be observed that the injunctions regime in the UK, despite its 
problems, is overall stricter and favours the content producing industry more than 
that in the US. 
 
 
II. Damages and Profits 
 
Having examined specific relief targeted at preventing infringement, pecuniary 
recompense for the violation of copyright can now be turned to. There are 
generally two types available; the copyright owner’s actual damages and any 
additional profits of the infringer; or statutory damages.988 It will immediately be 
apparent that the section is quite generous in offering both actual damages and 
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profits. Later examination, below, will reveal that the statutory damage provision 
can be said to be equally if not more generous. The plaintiff must choose the 
category before final judgement.989 
 
1) Actual Damages and Profits 
 
In the computation of actual damages and profits the plaintiff can only recover 
profits which have not been included in the computation of actual damages.990 In 
practice however plaintiffs must choose between actual damages or profits due to 
the fact that these will to a very large extent represent the same harm. Actual 
damages are computed considering the loss of market value of copyright work and 
profits are computed by the showing of the copyright holder of the infringer’s 
gross revenue subject to any deductible expenses and any profits attributable to 
other factors. It is up to the defendant to prove deductible expenses and elements 
of profit due to other sources.991 Moreover, the court is permitted to reject a 
party’s measure of damages as being too speculative, as in Stevens Linen Assocs., 
Inc. v. Mastercraft Corporation.992  
In the choice between actual damages and profits, most plaintiffs focus on 
recovering the defendant’s profits, due to the fact that actual damages are difficult 
to prove,993 but it is also worth considering to what extent indirect profits are 
recoverable. The question arises due to the fact that s.504 states that any profits 
attributable to the infringement may be recovered. It follows that indirect profits 
are within the remit of the specification. This was affirmed in Frank Music 
Corporation v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc..994 Yet this naturally depends on a 
plausible computation, 995  as echoed in Rainey v. Wayne State University. 996 It is 
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therefore submitted that there must be some logical, immediately quantifiable, 
nexus between the indirect profits and the infringement. 
 
2) Statutory Damages 
 
Statutory damages may be elected at the pleasure of the plaintiff which has 
complied with the registration requirements of the 1976 Act.997 The level of 
statutory damages is assessed concerning all the infringements in the requisite 
action and “concerning any one work to which any one infringer liable individually, 
or for which any two or more infringers the liable jointly and separately”.998 It was 
held in Feltner v. Colombia Pictures Television, Inc., that upon the election of 
statutory damages a jury trial is constitutionally mandated. Commentators have 
noted that the statutory damage remedy provides a “reasonable prospect of being 
paid” and limits expensive and time-consuming modes of proof including the use 
of expert witnesses when proving the profits.”999 Yet high output content providers 
such as photographers or foreign copyright holders are unlikely to register their 
copyright due to uncertainty of exploitation and/or lack of means.1000  
It remains to be noted that there are three statutory damage “bands” as specified 
in s.512(c). The first band consists of damages between 750 and 30,000 USD in the 
absence of wilful or innocent infringement.1001 The second band allows, on a 
discretionary basis, for an increase to 150,000 USD, given a finding of wilful 
infringement as proven by the copyright holder.1002 The third band allows the court 
to reduce the statutory damages to 200 USD, where the infringer was not aware or 
had no reason to know that an act of copyright infringement was taking place.1003  
Several things must be noted concerning the statutory bounds. Firstly, the Act 
does not define wilfulness for the purpose of increasing the damage award. 
However, in NAS Import Corp. v. Chenson Enters. Inc., the court found wilful 
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infringement in cases where the defendant knew or had reason to know or 
recklessly disregarded the fact that particular conduct would result in the 
copyright infringement.1004 Prima facie evidence of such would be a defendant’s 
disregard of the plaintiff’s proper notices of copyright infringement. 
The statutory damage award is per work, irrespective of the number of 
infringements. Concerning the question of what constitutes a work for the 
purposes of the statutory damage award, the general rule is that a separate award 
may be granted for individual elements that are economically separate,1005 such as 
individual episodes in a TV series.1006 Concerning compilations or collective works it 
was held in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3. Com that statutory damages may not be 
calculated on a per song basis, but rather on the basis of the compilation CD.1007 
It lastly remains to note that commentators have identified a problem concerning 
the aggregation of statutory damage awards in certain cases where awards may 
congregate to exhibit constitutionally excessive characteristics.1008 
 
3) Conclusion & Comparison 
 
In concluding and comparing damages and account of profits, the emphasis of this 
thesis is on the establishment of liability and only to a lesser extent of the 
consequences of it. The above nonetheless affords the opportunity to 
appropriately conclude and compare on this matter. It is immediately obvious that 
the regimes in both jurisdictions vary to the extent that in the UK the plaintiff must 
elect between damages and profits, whereas in the US not only in is this not the 
case, in certain circumstances statutory damages which may also be claimed. This 
means that copyright holders successfully establishing liability are in a stronger 
position to reap pecuniary recompense. It must be stated that that is the general 
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overall position, given that plaintiffs may have difficulty establishing one or the 
other category for the reasons outlined above, and in particular both together, as 
representing different harm, evidentially. Additionally, the election of statutory 
damages requires the compliance with registration requirements, and is at times 
open to an argument of excessiveness via aggregation. It would, generally 
speaking, be inappropriate, particularly given the lack of a robust fair use regime in 
the UK, to adopt an abandonment of election of compensation or indeed statutory 
damages. 
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PART 4 – CONCLUSIONS & PROPOSALS 
 
A. Introduction 
 
This introduction fundamentally delineates the aforegoing discourse in Parts 1-3; 
thus providing a logical transition to the explanation of the discussion in this Part. 
The primary and secondary hypotheses of this thesis were introduced and 
contextualised in Part 1.1009 
 
I. The Discourse in Parts 2 & 3 
 
The discourse in Part 2 has meticulously and systematically delineated and 
examined the primary hypothesis and laid the foundation for the secondary 
hypothesis; which was continued in-depth in Part 3. Part 2 analysed UK third-party 
copyright liability intrinsically and extrinsically within the UK copyright system, 
incorporating legal, policy and business perspectives; Part 3 analysed US third-
party copyright liability intrinsically and extrinsically within the US copyright 
system, incorporating legal, policy and business perspectives and then proceeded 
to compare and contrast findings with those documented in the preceding UK Part.  
 
II. The Discourse in Part 4 
 
The discourse in this chapter has two purposes. It summarises the conclusions and 
comparisons in Parts 2 & 3, which allows for a logical shift to arguing and proving 
the secondary hypothesis. Thus having proven the need for reform and established 
the viability of the mode for reformulation, tailored discussion leads to a 
promulgation of fused and novel third-party copyright liability concepts. Therefore, 
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Part 2 will be concluded, then Part 3, which will be followed by the final reform 
discourse including recommendations. 
 
B. UK Intrinsic Conclusion (Part 2) 
 
I. The System of Copyright Protection  
 
An essential taxonomy of basic aspects pertaining to the copyright system and 
works in the UK was undertaken in A(I), including the relationship between EC, 
International and UK law, formalities and the term of copyright. This has aided the 
referenced ‘building block’ approach of this thesis, since without delineating what 
the subject matter of protection is, linked rights cannot later be discussed. 
The work of the Copyright Committees was introduced in A(I)(2), allowing 
appropriate referral in D(VII)(1) concerning the incorporation of authorisation into 
the conceptual class of secondary liability. It may be observed from A(I)(3), as 
noted in A(I)(6) that the subject matter of protection has expanded and at times 
amalgamated. It is clear that technology was the main driver. Two opposing views 
of this expansion were presented in A(I)(6); one more aligned with the content 
producing industry and one with the content using OSP industry: Targeted 
protection and legal certainty versus insufficiently balanced expansive automation. 
Irrespective of whether the expansion of the applicability of restricted acts into 
previous terra incognita is to be applauded or decried, it has in itself deepened the 
potential liability of OSPs, naturally including on a third-party basis. 
 
II. Primary Copyright Infringement 
 
A tailored examination of the most important aspects pertaining to the acts 
restricted by copyright has been carried out in B(I-III). Specifically, within primary 
copyright infringement, the communication to the public and reproduction rights 
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have been analysed. This has been particularly important since it has provided the 
basis for 3PCL, but also a template for contrasting 3PCL in as explained in B(I) and 
particularly relevant to D(I-IV). 
 
1) The Communication to the Public Right 
 
Chapter B(II) examines the communication to the public right in detail, including its 
background and history as well as its International and European development. 
This leads to a discussion of the highly important finding that the right, particularly 
at EU level is uncertain in scope.1010 It has the potential to apply in a manner that 
would severely prejudice OSP interests, more so than it would actually benefit the 
content providing industry. The possibility of a broadly applicable access/para- 
copyright would potentially bringing many more acts within its remit in OSP 
contexts and thus makes OSP 3PCL much more likely. This highlights the need for 
legally certain and situationally appropriate theories of 3PCL – thus feeding into 
the calculus of this thesis’ primary hypothesis. 
Very interestingly, this Chapter also provides proof that with the previous cable 
programme right, UK copyright law in the 1990s was more proximate to theories 
of ‘fair use’ than might generally be assumed.1011 Thus, a shift broadly inuring to 
the benefit of the content industry may be identified, notwithstanding the ‘new’ 
and narrower definition of ‘broadcaster’.1012 
 
2) The Reproduction Right 
 
The section examining the reproduction right, B(III) begins by demarcating such 
and then explains transient forms as well as ‘little & often’ and the concept of 
‘substantial taking’. The aspect of transient reproduction is without doubt 
important and noteworthy.1013 It is moreover concluded that recent definitions 
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inure to the benefit of the content using/OSP industry due to defining ‘substantial 
part’ narrowly requiring reproduction in each transient copy rather than 
cumulatively.1014 
 
III. Relevant Defences against Copyright Claims  
 
Having covered both relevant protectable subject matter and rights pertaining to 
this, relevant defences are analysed. These are split into permitted acts/fair use 
and E-Commerce Directive Regulations. It was seen that the former are narrow 
and generally less relevant in film and music OSP contexts, but that the latter’s 
tripod of defences were specifically crafted to protect OSP activities. The exception 
to this generally accurate statement comes in the shape of s.28A CDPA 1988, 
which being part of the regimen of ‘permitted acts’ purports to allow under certain 
circumstances the making of temporary copies. The difference between s.28A and 
Reg.17 was discussed. It was noted concerning s.28A that recent interpretation of 
the constituent element ‘independent economic significance’ tends to favour the 
content providing industry.1015 Moreover, the remit or applicability in OSP contexts 
has been diminished to a certain extent by recent CJEU jurisprudence.1016 It may 
thus be stated that recent jurisprudence has tended to contract the tailored 
defences, which stands to benefit the content providing industry rather than, 
specifically, the OSP industry. As such this tends to enlarge the importance of inter 
alia, the clarity of scope of 3PCL theories. 
As C(II) and (III) have explained, it can be observed that the E-Commerce defences 
are exceptions and thus function differently to the permitted acts in Ch.3 CDPA 
1988, which provide complete defences not permitting courts to use Remedies 
outlined in Chapter D(V)(2)-(3) to end alleged infringements.1017 Remaining 
compliant with what are in effect ‘safe harbours’ is paramount for OSPs, for 
example once notice is served of infringement, action must be taken, or such 
protection potentially lapses. 
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Whereas it is clear that legislators have with great foresight adopted a regime 
permitting OSPs to thrive, it is clear that this is limited,1018 specifically so for a 
finding of ‘authorisation’ or ‘control’.1019 For this reason again, it may be 
underlined that the importance of the primary hypothesis cannot be overstated. 
UK 3PCL must be clear and efficient, taking into account the balance of the regime 
it resides in. 
 
IV. Third-Party Liability for Copyright Infringement 
 
Following the delineation of subject matter and primary rights pertaining to these, 
including defences, Chapter D examines 3PCL, the central subject matter of the 
thesis, in detail, as well as logically directly connected subject matter. After an 
examination of the two UK 3PCL theories, authorisation1020 and joint tortfeasorship 
for procurement and common design,1021 available remedies1022 and the DEA 
20101023 were discussed in depth. The Chapter concludes with the justification for 
revising 3PCL, proving the primary hypothesis.1024 This allows for the subsequent, 
in Part 3, foundational analysis for aid in ultimately reformulating 3PCL, below, in 
this Part.1025 
Chapter D(I-IV) and D(VII) make a very solid intrinsic case for reform. Following a 
delineation of the intrinsic situs of theories of 3PCL and interesting developmental 
boundaries, the two main categories are discussed. This examination not only 
defines the theories by reference to their own developmental derivation but 
immediately assesses their application. It is found that the common law concepts 
of both authorisation and procurement/common design are severely lacking. This 
is the case for several reasons. The initial problem lies with the fact that 3PCL 
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should not be left to the inadequate developmental arena of judge made law;1026 
the UK has seen and is likely to see too few cases to test and develop a well 
tailored approach.1027 Both the content producing and using industries however 
stand to benefit from and require tailored clarity of the highest order in this very 
rapidly evolving area;1028 it was submitted that increased misapplication is highly 
likely to manifest itself.1029 The reason for this was discussed in depth; the theories 
are much too general and broad, could swerve into the realm of facilitation to the 
extent they have not already done so, are at times conflicted.1030 Given the 
recognised value and thus need for the adequate preservation and evolution of 
OSP activities,1031 3PCL must be reformed. Yet this is not one sided, the content 
providing industry would thus also be able to conduct appropriate and legally 
certain risk assessments. It was suggested that the CDPA 1988 is amended to 
include statutory 3PCL definitions.1032 The conclusions thus provided the crucial 
justification of an examination of the largest most litigious and developed unitary 
copyright jurisdiction in the world; the US, with the aim, after having ensured 
sufficient compatibility, of benefiting from the rapid evolution of US 3PCL theories 
and the ideas behind them.1033 
It was also found that such a legislative reformulation of 3PCL could be taken 
advantage of with respect to the inadequacies concerning remedies cited in D(V). 
Most importantly in this area, the interplay between Art.8(3) EUCD and Art.11 ED 
could be clarified.1034 
Lastly it was found in ChapterD(VI) but in particular (VI)(6) and (VII)(2) that the DEA 
2010 will not have a significant direct impact upon considerations relating to the 
primary or secondary hypothesis of this thesis. However, it will create new 
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obligations and liabilities for OSPs generally. It was found that compliance with the 
Act could under certain circumstances aid in avoiding 3PCL by offering proof of 
standing apart.1035 It was recommended that ISPs scrutinise their subscriber 
agreements to check for any scope for liability for breach of contract, and that 
perhaps were it not for the DEA 2010, action could lie for procuring breach of 
contract on the part of the content providing industry.1036 
 
C. US Intrinsic & Comparative General Conclusion (Part 3) 
 
Following the affirmation of the primary hypothesis, Part 3 proceeds to both 
analyse 3PCL intrinsically as part of the US copyright system. Structurally Part 3 is 
similar to Part 2. This enables successive comparison of constituent parts to ensure 
a sufficient degree of systemic compatibility, validating the imposition of thus 
evolved theorems and legislative discourse. This means that, sequentially, the; 
statutory regime,1037 meaning evolution and subject matter; primary copyright 
liability,1038 meaning the primary rights attached to the aforementioned; 3PCL,1039 
including general delineation, theories and their application, including legislative 
exceptions; defences,1040 including fair use; and remedies1041 are analysed 
intrinsically and compared to the UK. 
 
I. Statutory Regime 
 
The statutory regime is discussed in A(I); this includes the evolution of the federal 
system, successive copyright acts, a taxonomy of relevant categories of works and 
matters pertinent to such, including fixation, originality, formalities and the term 
of copyright. This Chapter lays the foundation for the following Chapters. 
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It was found that overall the US now has a federal, unitary, copyright system.1042 
This allows for a valid comparison to the UK. Concerning the classes of subject 
matter relevant to this thesis, a tendency to broaden categories was also 
documented. As relevant; ‘sound recordings’ however being a late arrival,1043  
‘musical works’ include accompanying works, and ‘motion pictures’, separate from 
‘audiovisual works’ include sound tracks. 
Whereas other minor differences presented themselves, such as the approach to 
originality,1044 formalities1045 and term of copyright,1046 it was concluded that such 
differences did not preclude the system operating in a similar fashion, nor did they 
preclude an observation of similarity validating further comparison. 
 
II. Primary Copyright Infringement 
 
Having examined the federal system and subject matter of protection in A(I), 
relevant applicable exclusive rights are analysed; reproduction,1047 distribution,1048 
public performance1049 and display,1050 with close jurisprudential delineation 
throughout. As in Part 2, close attention is paid to focusing the discussion on music 
and film related infringement in OSP contexts. 
In concluding in D(VIII) it may be observed that US legislators have been translated 
their awareness  of the need to balance both industry interests, as evidenced by 
the DMCA or DPRSA, yet this has sometimes been difficult to achieve in 
practice.1051 
The detailed concluding comparison in B(VII) makes clear that 3PCL is situated 
differently, contrary to the UK, being termed ‘secondary liability’. Primary 
infringement is verified as being more targeted and detailed, as are the exceptions. 
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Concerning reproduction, the US system has directly implemented more 
innovative remuneration mechanisms.1052 This arguably lessens the likelihood of 
litigation. Regarding the distribution right, one important aspect concluded in 
B(VII)(2) is that there also exists a ‘making available’ controversy in the US, as to 
the satisfaction of the alleged right. As B(VIII)(3) concludes, the rights of public 
performance and display differ from the UK. The US right of public performance 
includes motion pictures (films) and sound recordings in a more unqualified 
manner compared to the UK.1053 The US right of public display was analogised to 
the UK right of public performance in OSP contexts; and the US public performance 
right in OSP and digital audio transmission contexts to the UK communication to 
the public right.1054 The AHRA 1992 discussed in B(VI) is noteworthy as an example 
how the lobbying for the DEA 2010 could have been handled more amicably; it is 
concluded accordingly.1055 
Concerning the above, in respect of the secondary hypothesis in this Part below, it 
is important to note that despite the differences highlighted, the US and UK 
systems thus far operate in a sufficiently similar fashion to allow for certain 
conceptual 3PCL transplants. 
 
III. Third-Party Liability for Copyright Infringement (Intrinsic) 
 
The central section of Part 3 on 3PCL first delineates 3PCL developmentally, 
intrinsically1056 and extrinsically,1057 also referring to other related theories of 
liability,1058 before analysing the categories of vicarious1059 and contributory1060 as 
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well as inducement liability.1061 Thereafter the provisions of the DMCA are 
examined, which operate as exceptions, or ‘safe harbours’.1062 
 
1) Vicarious Liability (Intrinsic Conclusion) 
 
The US 3PCL theory of vicarious liability is concluded in C(III)(2). Its expansion from 
early landlord cases,1063 or indeed from respondeat superior was charted.1064 US 
jurisprudence has dared to evolve the concept, which has so far mostly been 
refused in non master-servant/employment in the UK.1065 The theory adapted by 
shedding the requirement of direct financial benefit or physical premises. It was 
concluded in C(III)(2) that the theory has its limits and that OSPs may seek to 
circumvent the contol/supervision requirement. It is however submitted that this 
does not detract from the value of the theory in terms of the secondary 
hypothesis; this mainly occurring in P2P scenarios and vicarious liability not being 
the only theory at the disposal of aggrieved parties. 
 
2) Contributory Liability (Intrinsic Conclusion) 
 
In C(IV)(1) and (4) the theories of contributory and inducement liability are 
delineated respectively. C(IV)(2)(3) examines the constituent elements of 
contributory liability and analyses its application in jurisprudence. C(IV)(4) 
compares both theories and C(V) correspondingly concludes. 
It was an important observation in C(V) that the disparate strands of US 3PCL may 
coexist in an action for infringement. This heightens a likelihood of liability on the 
part of the OSP industry. Moreover it was observed that as vicarious liability has 
evolved, so has contributory/inducement liability. As indicated, the plethora of 
OSP related litigation has yielded to OSPs navigating the waters of 3PCL a vision of 
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a new safe harbour on the horizon; the logical separation of secondary and tertiary 
‘infringers’.1066 The theory of inducement most famously propagated in Grokster, 
could be seen to be the most recent, and perhaps given its expansiveness, last, 
pro-content industry stage in the evolution of US 3PCL. It however, as explained, 
was the result of a ‘war of definitions’ and it is concluded compliments vicarious 
liability from a content providing industry perspective quite well. This is not to say 
that contributory or inducement liability are perfect specimens of 3PCL,1067 but 
they have evolved considerably, as documented, and they can be said to shift the 
scales into a satisfactory balance between the content providing and using 
industries. This proves, intrinsically, their net worth for a pre-reformulation 
assessment of UK 3PCL and thus the secondary hypothesis. 
 
VII. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 
 
The Chapter on 3PCL includes C(VI) which examines the DMCA in detail; explaining 
the reasons for enactment, its limitations to claims for infringement and 
functioning in terms of ‘notice and takedown’, subpoenas and termination of 
repeat infringers. C(VI)(10) concludes and compares the DMCA to the situation in 
the UK. 
It may at the outset be concluded that the DMCA, as a precursor to a certain 
extent s.28A CDPA 1988 and to the E-Commerce Directive Regulations 2002,1068 
includes three remarkably similar categories of ‘safe harbours’ in which liability for 
copyright is limited.1069 This bears repeating. Liability is limited, this means that the 
legislation’s specifications for example designation of agents and procedures must 
be followed; moreover where liability is limited, an OSP may still have to comply 
with supplemental court orders.1070 It may however, unsurprisingly, broadly be 
stated that the DMCA’s categories function in similar ways to the E-Commerce 
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Directive Regulations and thus do not impede the fulfilment of the secondary 
objective/hypothesis of this thesis. 
 
IV. Relevant Defences to Claims of Copyright Infringement 
 
Having reached a point in the thesis at which liability may be produced in a 
number of ways, the general avoidance of such is discussed in Chapter D including; 
‘fair use’ which is delineated, examined in depth,1071 concluded and compared to 
the equivalent regime in the UK,1072 and other legal and equitable defences.1073 
It may be concluded that the US primarily case law developed doctrine of fair use 
is wider and more important than the seemingly equivalent doctrine of fair dealing 
in the UK. A debate, however, concerning reproductive and productive uses has 
been referenced;1074 the social benefit and determination in this respect affects 
the courts view of the applicability of the fair use doctrine. Moreover, even fair use 
plays no part in TPM “para copyright”. it has been concluded that the content 
providing industry emphasis on “monetisation”, meaning access and less 
ownership also means that the category of fair use is likely to fade in relevance.1075 
Section D(I)(5) also references the Hargreaves review of UK intellectual property in 
this regard, noting that the UK system does not exploit all available exceptions for 
example in able to by EU law. However, the “Review” tenuously rejects a broader 
fair dealing category due to the “risk-taking” and “pushing legal boundaries” which 
is viewed as an appropriate and more in tune with “American risk and business 
investor culture”.1076 The lack of risk taking and litigiousness in the UK is precisely 
the reason why the category of 3PCL is chronically under developed, not to 
venture to say the connected industries’ evolution. However, expansion to 
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ultimately allow “text mining” and the already de facto present category of 
“private copying/format shifting” are proposed.1077  
It is concluded that the discrepancy between fair use on fair dealing does not give 
rise to a significant incompatibility regarding the secondary hypothesis of this 
thesis. On the contrary, the fact that fair dealing in the UK is comparatively limited 
in scope, emphasises the need for reform of 3PCL to at the very least ensure 
greater legal certainty. 
 
V. Remedies 
 
The last Chapter in Part 3 examines the result of a finding of copyright 
infringement in terms of remedies; the discussion is split into an analysis of 
injunctions,1078 damages & profits1079 and includes intrinsic as well as comparative 
conclusions to the UK.1080 
 
1) Injunctions 
 
It was concluded in E(I)(3) that despite an overall general similarity between the 
two jurisdictions concerning the functioning of injunctions, differences in specific 
instances as to their functioning in particular concerning OSPs could be observed. 
For example, as the UK Part has referenced and as was comparatively concluded, 
the interplay of European legislation places the exact scope of injunctions in 
doubt.1081 Conversely, the DMCA contains provisions dissimilar to those in the E-
Commerce Directive Regulations,1082 which stand to exempt from injunctive 
relief.1083 
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As a result it may be concluded that whereas there are no inherent systemic 
incompatibilities perverting the grafting of US 3PCL concepts as proposed by the 
second hypothesis to this thesis. On the contrary, it has been shown again, as 
throughout Part 3, that the status of the law in the UK supports reformulating UK 
3PCL. The balance of the law in the UK is, comparatively, against OSP interests. 
This means that rebalancing UK 3PCL by reforming it to reflect greater legal 
certainty and allow appropriate risk analysis is also in this respect important.  
  
2) Damages and Profits 
 
The second part of the discourse on remedies analyses damages and profits in the 
US,1084 including statutory damages,1085 subsequently comparing and contrasting 
such to the UK.1086 
Whereas the emphasis of this thesis is clearly on the establishment of liability, 
what follows is relevant to the extent that if pecuniary remedies were non-existent 
this would detract somewhat from the importance of clear 3PCL. It was concluded 
in E(II)(3) that the approach in both jurisdictions varies most importantly in the 
choice of remedies. In the UK claimants must elect between damages and profits, 
whereas in the US this is not principally the case and statutory damages may be 
claimed; which are entirely absent in the UK. This is tempered by the fact that a US 
plaintiff faces potentially difficult evidentiary hurdles in establishing a case for one 
or the other, or indeed both categories of harm/recompense.1087 The fact that 
statutory damages may aggregate1088 further adds to a higher likelihood of higher 
pecuniary rewards payable by OSPs in the US compared to the UK. Whereas this 
would, somewhat unusually in UK contexts as shown above, on the whole, 
comparatively, tend to favour the UK OSP industry, it may nonetheless be argued, 
concerning the primary hypothesis, that it does not negate the need for clear 3PCL 
theories that afford safe risk management; not least because providing pecuniary 
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awards will always impact to varying degrees on cash flow and profitability. 
Concerning the secondary hypothesis it may be concluded that the shape of the US 
system in particular highlighting extensive limitations discussed warrants arguably 
such a range of remedies and thus, being within an acceptable margin of 
difference, does not cause an impediment concerning utilisation of US 3PCL 
concepts as per the secondary hypothesis. 
 
D. Third-Party Liability for Copyright Infringement: 
Comparative Conclusions and Proposals 
 
Following an examination of relevant aspects of copyright law in the UK and US, 
which has been concluded and contrasted in Parts 2-3 and Chapters B-C above, it 
now remains to specifically conclude, compare and make proposals concerning the 
secondary hypothesis.  
 
I. Authorisation/Vicarious liability 
 
As has become obvious, the UK theory of authorisation and the US theory of 
vicarious liability belong to the same genus, having similar roots.1089 However, the 
UK Part has identified an inability to expand vicarious liability in its traditional 
sense in the UK to include factual situations that have evolved beyond the classic 
employer/employee relationship.1090 In comparing both types of liability it is useful 
to first of all broadly summarise both types of liability.  
Vicarious liability consists of financial benefit and the right and ability to control. 
The aforegoing discourse has made clear that the financial benefit element has 
been whittled down by case law, financial benefit not needing to be direct, or even 
indirect, some would argue, it currently being so loosely defined.1091 Authorisation 
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on the other hand consists of, as reiterated throughout, several conflicting 
definitions and factors. It will however, for the sake of argument, be assumed that 
the current definition includes, as its most central elements, both the definition 
“grant or purported grant of the right to do the act complained of”, as well as “to 
sanction, approve, and countenance”.1092 Alternative definitions, mostly drawn 
from Australian cases were considered in pertinent UK case law, and factors 
considered in such Australian cases were recently imported.1093 It is not the 
purpose of this particular section to repeat or re-analyse; reference is therefore 
made to the relevant preceding sections. It will however be added that despite the 
fact that one might, prior to Newzbin have been able to formulate an exclusion of 
a requirement or consideration of ‘financial benefit’, this is given the “relevant 
factors” considered by Kitchin J no longer conclusively possible.1094 
The operation of the theory of authorisation in the UK is entirely unsatisfactory, 
mainly due to its amorphous definition, as repeatedly noted.1095 It may also be 
observed that the previous two ‘main’ definitions are also much wider than the US 
theory of vicarious liability, which it must be conceded retains some limits to 
applicability in some technological, mainly P2P, contexts, despite abandoning 
direct financial benefit due to the requirement of “control”.1096 As the discussion 
has made clear, particularly attentive OSPs are sometimes able to circumvent the 
second part of the test, and hence vicarious liability.1097 They are able to do this, 
for example, by adapting network architecture so that a shift from central server 
control to independent user hosted content can be identified. Naturally, this type 
of technical behaviour is mainly representative of only a particularly problematic 
subset of that of OSPs and not OSPs generally. 
What is needed therefore in the UK concerning authorisation, and the lessons 
learnt from an analysis of vicarious liability in context, is to start afresh. However, 
to start afresh does not mean to cast out elements which have proven to be either 
a useful common denominator between the two systems and/or valuable 
independently. It will be important that any definition despite providing legal 
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certainty also fits loosely enough so that it is technology neutral. Both the 
legislative history to the 1976 US CA, and the DMCA as well as to a certain extent, 
the Digital Britain Report recognise the value of technological, including OSP 
innovation, whilst seeking to protect content providers’ investment in new and 
creative music and film content, effectively, this industry’s R&D.1098  
 
1) Right and Ability to Control/Supervise 
 
For this reason, the inclusion of a control element is problematic since it is likely 
that in some evolving technological contexts such will, without of straining the 
definition, arguably be absent. As the previous discussion has made clear, this 
need not be the case solely with renegade P2P providers, but also with indexing 
services, online auction houses and payment companies, that due to the enormity 
of the scale of their operation, on one view, cannot be said to have sufficient 
control.1099 Definitions have included ‘right and ability to supervise’; here the 
allegedly inoperative part would be ‘ability’, that causes consternation in 
circumstances where there is an ongoing right to do so.  
This is not to forget that the opposing view could be, for example using Perfect 10 
v. Google, that OSPs in such or similar instances do evidence sufficient control, 
since it could be questionable to allow operators to hide behind the scale of their 
operations. On such a theory any infringer may simply argue that it has allegedly 
authorised infringements to such an extent, being part of an enormous digital 
online service, that the service is simply too large, useful and it would be too costly 
or disproportionate, as a result, to implement effective countermeasures, 
including termination of all or parts of a service. In other, more cynical words, 
since millions of customers around the globe use and rely on such a service, it is 
too late.1100   
The opposing views as to the finding of control should however not detract from 
the fact that a theory of liability based on such is legally and socially useful. It 
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discourages Napster like operations, has the potential to exempt larger, more 
socially useful and legitimate, OSPs some of which arguably, to draw on the idea 
proposed in Visa, fall into the category of ‘tertiary infringers’; being one step 
removed from, in some cases, another OSP that may legitimately be viewed as the 
secondary infringer.1101 Despite the fact that some would undoubtedly seek to 
argue that even ‘helpers helpers’ should be liable for prosecution in this regard, it 
is recognised that whereas in particular this category’s actions may spawn or 
immensely support current secondarily infringing OSPs, from a socio-legal 
perspective the damage caused by their actions is arguably too remote.1102 
Naturally, the precise calibration of the control element is key. What represents a 
sufficient nexus? Consciously in this regard, room has been left for a certain 
amount of fact specific judicial interpretation, keeping a possible definition loose 
enough, as recognised as a requirement above.1103 Perhaps use of the alternative 
term ‘supervision’ is instructive. To the extent that an OSP is permitted by law to 
‘supervise’ its users’ activities, it should do so. Yet any definition should not include 
language seeking to introduce specific monitoring requirements, since to do so 
would be too prescriptive and, with a view to future developments, inflexible, as 
for example even the terminology employed in Moorhouse.1104 Creating specific 
positive obligations should not be the role of the law here, as recognised for 
example in the DMCA.1105 The formulation espoused should make it clear that it is 
up to the individual OSP to assess how best to meet it’s legal obligations in this 
regard. 
 
2) Authorisation as Granting a Right 
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Several criticisms may be levelled at the definition of “grant or purported grant to 
do the relevant act”. 1106 Firstly, some commentators might argue that this 
standard comes too close to that of mere facilitation, given the addition in 
Newzbin of additional factors or “relevant circumstances” that “may or may not be 
determinative” such as the nature of relationship between the actors. Such 
factors, any of which which could conceivably even be more important that the 
general definition or each other, denigrate the already weak standard. This 
unacceptable widening further leads the definition astray into an indeterminate 
grey area.1107  
The instant definition as previously also noted has evidenced three further 
problems in its application.1108 The first is that the phrase is capable of falsely 
suggesting at times that the grantee perceived the grantor’s actions as a “grant or 
purported grant”. In circumstances such as those in Newzbin, it is clear that both 
parties were aware whether explicitly or by implication that their actions were 
unauthorised. Moreover in circumstances implicating more “legitimate” or dual 
use OSPs it is possible that the terminology of “granting a right” is misplaced as 
being too narrowly drawn, implying a non-existent actual or inferred hierarchy. 
Lastly, it is arguable that these problems have led to the “twisting” by Kitchin J in 
Newzbin of the classic definition referenced above as one of the main theories, 
into “purporting to possess the authority to grant any required permission”.1109 
The reasons and implications of this have been analysed more directly in context in 
Part 2,1110 but it suffices to say at that stage that liability, regrettably, could not 
have logically been produced without such. 
 
3) Authorisation Reformulated 
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When choosing between definitions and connected problems1111 and wishing to 
stay true to the legal heritage of the category of authorisation, it is better to err on 
the side of caution, meaning that it is better, or a lesser evil, to require an element 
of control. This is because to adopt a theory which relies either on providing the 
means to infringe and inevitable infringement, inducing by granting permission, or 
subsequent ratification alone, is too inaccurate and/or broad and must in some 
instances be refused as coming too close to facilitation, which has never been 
accepted as sufficient for liability to lie. Whereas this is a sliding scale, this is and 
should be so because of two sets of problems; what should be culpable behaviour 
in terms of a civil wrong and legal certainty.1112 It is preferable for the theory not to 
be operative in certain circumstances, especially since it is not the only theory 
claimants may rely on for third-party copyright infringement in the UK.1113 Despite 
this, it will be observed that a definition which includes ongoing control would still 
find the operators of Newzbin liable, but would exempt, for example Amstrad. 
Given that the theory of authorisation predicated upon the grant of authority has 
been refused above and also implicitly in Newzbin, both by the observed 
alterations as well as the combination with the ‘old’ test to “sanction, approve and 
countenance”, such will find no place in a new formulation of the theory. Some of 
the merits of the “old” test have been discussed in Part 2.1114 Liability is produced 
by “subsequent authorisation” which has been termed by this work, ratification, 
which despite being a general concept, thus allowing for necessary fact specific 
interpretations, provides equity to any formulation since it moves the test of 
authorisation half a step towards that of common design, however taking great 
care not to cross the line. The definition, being one-sided, and capable of being 
met without action, is also devoid of any element of a higher level of commonality 
between the actors than mere approval in connection with the utilisation of 
services provided. Moreover, the motivation behind any acts by the person so 
authorised remain irrelevant as concerns on whose account and for whose benefit 
such were carried out. 
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It seems therefore that at this stage an impasse may have been reached. Despite 
the fact that the ratification definition is to be preferred to the inducement-like 
granting of permission definition, both share a common design, and thus common 
fault, which it is perhaps not wise to ignore. It seems that despite swerving to 
protect rights holders interests with the advent of the 1911 Act, UK jurisprudence 
has previously stopped short of extending the definition of authorisation in 
contexts in which the relationship between an infringer and third-party does not at 
the very least exhibit a modicum of hierarchy, harking back to the agency master-
servant relationship, in so far as it concerns the passing of a legal right to act in a 
certain way.1115 Current disregard of this fact is less due to a reasoned and 
analytical approach, but more to an, at times, confused, search for content. 
As a result of the aforementioned facts, three outcomes may be considered. The 
first is that the ratification-like definition of authorisation is adopted as the sole 
definition, with the express formulation or incorporation of the requirement that 
the primary infringer believes that the third-party was in a position to transfer, or 
in a similar vein, to authorise such activity, due to being in a position to do so. This 
would, whilst being true to and required by legal history, restrict the operability of 
the theory of authorisation. The second solution would be to replace the previous 
UK definitions, problematic in particular in digital contexts with generally copyright 
aware users, with one centring on producing liability in the event of ongoing 
control by OSPs of the actions of its users and primary infringers. This despite 
being wider than the aforementioned solution, is narrower than the current 
definition of authorisation, but has its own problems as mentioned. The third 
solution is a hybrid approach; adding both definitions together, perhaps obviating 
the need for specific language incorporating the belief on the part of the user of 
being granted certain rights, since the control element sufficiently balances the 
equation for the OSP in this regard. This solution is to be preferred, providing the 
requisite systemic balance. Concerning the language for authorisation based upon 
ratification, it is suggested that the dictionary definition is replaced rather more 
simply with “ratification”. 
The following is proposed as a model for discussion for legislative adoption in a 
new s.21A CDPA 1988: 
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The copyright in a work is infringed by a party that retains or retained at the 
relevant time, control or supervision over the act(s) of one or more direct 
infringers, and expressly or impliedly ratified the act(s) complained of, falling into 
the acts restricted by copyright set out in this Act. 
Concerning the secondary hypothesis that the above formulation is all the previous 
definition of authorisation was not; namely more closely delineated, legally certain 
and balanced. As a result of having integrated concepts following a considered sift 
of US 3PCL evolution, an improved formulation for legislative adoption had been 
arrived at. The above sections D(I)(1-3) have led to the above formulation, which is 
to be viewed as thus distilled. 
 
II. Common Design/Procurement and Contributory/Inducement 
Liability 
 
Having identified the overarching issues presenting themselves in relation to 3PCL 
in the UK,1116 and having discussed the theory of authorisation in the preceding 
section, the second basis for 3PCL in the UK may now be turned to.  
As the discussion of UK common design/procurement1117 and US 
contributory/inducement liability1118 in the preceding Parts has made clear, there 
is similarity to the category of authorisation/vicarious liability discussed above, in 
that both also represent the closest predominant and functional equivalent of 
each other in their respective jurisdictions and moreover share a common 
ideological ancestry.1119 Both the UK and US categories of liability share, for the 
most part, what has been termed “assistance in pursuit of any infringing acts (...) in 
concert with the primary infringer”,1120 whilst bearing in mind that two broader 
categories each with one distinct subset, or on an alternative view, four 
independent but linked categories, are being compared. 
 
                                                          
1116
 Part4,ChapterB(IV);Part2,ChapterD(IV)(1). 
1117
 Part4,ChapterB(IV);Part2,ChapterD(II)(2),(IV),(VII). 
1118
 Part4,ChapterC(III)(2);Part3,ChapterC(IV). 
1119
 Part4,ChapterB(IV),C(III)(2);Part2,ChapterD(VI);Part3,ChapterC(V). 
1120
 Parker,(n770),499. 
308 
 
1) The Categories Delineated 
 
 It is first of all worth restating the requisite definitions to facilitate an immediate 
discussion. Liability in the US may occur due to the acts of an OSP falling into either 
the category of infringement by broadly termed contribution or inducement. The 
US Part has discussed at length the relationship between both categories.1121 The 
view is proffered here that they are neither mutually exclusive,1122 nor is 
inducement any longer a mere constructive subcategory as previously possible due 
to the Gershwin formulation of contributory liability for those who “with 
knowledge of the infringing activity, induce, cause, or materially contribute to the 
infringing conduct of another”;1123 due to the evolved formulation in Grokster 
centring around the subjective intent to induce: “one who distributes a device with 
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, shown by clear expression or 
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts 
of infringement by third parties.”1124 Material contribution and purveyance of the 
means to infringe has been discussed in Part 3 at length.1125 
As elaborated in Part 2, the definition of common design, being less strict than the 
definition of procurement, is also wider in scope and on one reading includes 
procurement.1126 Several alternative definitions have been acknowledged such as 
“concerted action” or “agreed on a common action” which are met at the lowest 
end of the scale by simple tacit agreement.1127 As has also been described, joint 
tortfeasorship may also be established by procurement or inducement, introduced 
as related if not synonymous concepts.1128 Equally, putting common design into 
context with procurement, UK case law has somewhat frustratingly failed to 
distinguish between the two, in bundling both, further, also including 
inducement.1129 This reticence leads to the above identified problem of legal 
uncertainty due to imprecise and open ended concepts. The most useful 
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pronunciation is arguably that by Templeman LJ which may be read to mean that 
procurement is an umbrella standard; “generally speaking, inducement, incitement 
or persuasion to infringe must be by a defendant to an individual infringer and 
must identifiably procure a particular infringement in order to make the defendant 
liable as a joint infringer”.1130   
 
2) The Categories Reformulated 
 
The standard of common design, as formulated, provides the least certainty, and 
also risks at least partially straying into the field of facilitation,1131 which is to be 
avoided.1132 It is undesirable for this area of the law to feature this very broad 
category and to use procurement, which is itself an umbrella term, to effectively 
define and bolster said. The intellectually courageous step must therefore be 
taken, as the secondary hypothesis demands, to redefine liability completely in this 
regard for both categories, yet staying true to the overall concept of a broader, yet 
then more relevant, and a narrower category, for arguably more culpable 
behaviour.  
 
a) Common Design Replacement: Contribution Amalgamated 
 
In the first instance, it will be important to note that the previously referenced 
need by US courts to “draw a line in the sand” concerning mere facilitators; in 
other words distinguishing between secondary and tertiary infringers is indeed 
quite valuable.1133 This is something that if taken into account prospectively will 
engender clarity and avoid unnecessary litigation. This means that it would be 
valuable for the UK to adopt both the standard in Amazon as well as adopting the 
central tenet in Visa that facilitation is to be excluded, as discussed at in Part 3, 
concerning the wider category of contributory liability to be adopted to replace 
                                                          
1130
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the current definition of common design.1134 It is however submitted that taking 
the approach in Visa further would be inappropriate, since it would indeed negate 
the functional principles in Amazon. In other words, it is important that facilitation 
is excluded, but that terminology rejecting “material contribution” including a 
requirement of being the “site of infringement” is not included. This would, as may 
be learned from the situation in the US lead to confusion and indeed a similar type 
of regrettable inapplicability that the theory of vicarious liability faced concerning 
peer-to-peer operators’ technical (d)evolution, negating control. This however 
does not mean that consultation reports or discussion in Parliament, evidenced via 
Hansard, could not reference the intention behind the inclusion of the exclusion of 
facilitation, that however goes no further, as being that to 3PCL to those 
secondarily liable and not those that would in effect, be tertiary infringers. 
 It is of course accepted that the focus of ‘common design’ lies more in a 
commonality of objective, focusing on the agreed intention of the parties; whereas 
contributory liability focuses instead on the actual acts taken in furtherance of 
such an objective. In one sense common design, despite being much broader, is 
thus closer to the US category of inducement liability. It is nonetheless submitted 
that it is logical and desirable to hold those accountable that thus aid and abet 
infringement, as measured by, concerning the broader category, their actions, and 
only in the more limited category examined below, taking into account 
inducement. 
Therefore, the following is proposed as a model for discussion concerning the 
broader category, replacing common design, with an amalgamated US influenced 
contributory liability standard for legislative adoption in a new s.21B CDPA 1988: 
The copyright in a work is jointly infringed by a party that; 
a)  with actual knowledge or general awareness of infringing activity (being the 
infringing nature of the result of the activity) materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another; and 
b)  fails, where possible, to take reasonable, proportionate and effective steps to 
prevent the incidence of such; 
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provided such a party’s actions rise above mere facilitation of the act(s) 
complained of, falling into the acts restricted by copyright set out in this Act. 
Concerning the secondary hypothesis, the above formulation has improved as 
required on the previous definition namely by being more closely delineated, 
legally certain and balanced. As a result of having integrated concepts following a 
considered sift of US 3PCL evolution, an improved formulation for legislative 
adoption had been arrived at. 
The above s.21B should be viewed as being a form of 3PCL, with direct 
infringements forming the basis (infringing activity). The relationship between the 
proposed s.21A and s.21B is much as that between authorisation and contribution 
and the differences between both concepts, as explored above. Both sections are 
targeted at these two broadly different forms of culpable behaviour, just with 
enhanced content. The above sections D(II)(1-2) have led to the above 
formulation, which is to be viewed as thus distilled. 
 
b) Procurement Redefined 
 
As has been noted, procurement in the UK is an umbrella term which has been 
said to include inducement, incitement or persuasion. 1135 As has also been 
clarified, the interplay with the common design category of liability presents the 
greatest area of concern.1136 However, the umbrella category of procurement itself 
would benefit from a more tailored delineation, which would serve to provide 
enhanced legal certainty in particular when adopted in tandem with the above 
proposed categories. This is the case since inducement differs from incitement or 
persuasion as to, in particular, the level of active influencing acts or omissions 
required. As a result the category of procurement encompasses an admittedly 
small, but present, scale in this regard. Moreover, the category itself is not defined 
in great depth. This means that the corresponding category of US developed 
inducement liability1137 could, being judicially tailored, beneficially influence the 
solution to be adopted in the UK, particularly bearing in mind that this would 
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function as the narrower category for more culpable conduct, in respect of the 
above proposed more general, wider category of liability. 
Therefore, the following is proposed as a model concerning the narrower category, 
replacing procurement, with an amalgamated US influenced contributory liability 
standard for legislative adoption in a new s.21C CDPA 1988: 
The copyright in a work is jointly infringed by a party responsible for the provision 
of goods or services whereby such affirmatively, by stated intent with acts or 
omissions induces the act(s) complained of, falling into the acts restricted by 
copyright set out in this Act. 
 Concerning the secondary hypothesis the above formulation improves on the 
design of the previous definition by being more closely delineated, legally certain 
and balanced. As a result of having integrated concepts following a considered sift 
of US 3PCL evolution, an improved formulation for legislative adoption had been 
arrived at. The above sections D(II)(1-2) have led to the above formulation, which 
is to be viewed as thus distilled. 
 
III. The Effects of the Reformulation 
 
Concerning the effects of the reformulations required by the primary hypothesis 
and proceeded with under the secondary hypothesis, these are relatively 
straightforward. As invariably repeated many times throughout this thesis, the 
perceived effects of the current provisions of UK third-party copyright liability have 
been sought to be remedied by cross pollination with more developed U.S. 
theories. It is intended that the results are more accessible, balanced, delineated 
and legally certain bases of liability which at the same time do not throttle 
customary and acceptable judicial manoeuvring on the facts in particular cases. As 
such it will be remembered that, as stated, the reformulations are a basis for 
discussion, arrived at following the process of distilled discussion in D(I)(1-3) and 
D(II)(1-2) respectively. Both consultation reports and Hansard should further 
provide a legislative backdrop, allowing for particular intentions and concepts to 
be further delineated. Concerning the “copyright wars” between the content 
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providing and using industries referred to in Part 1, it is expected that the 
proposals will benefit both industries concerned.1138 Benefits accrue from the fact 
that the enhanced logic, consistency and clarity may lead to a reduction of 
infringing business models, due to appropriate risk assessments, and where such 
are nonetheless in existence, the imposition of unambiguous liability. Importantly, 
legitimate OSPs are now in a better position to conduct appropriate legal risk 
assessments and stand to possibly avoid 3PCL. This may in fact lead to investment 
in and expansion of the content using industry, without unduly compromising the 
content providing industry, which may also benefit in similar ways.1139 
Lastly, it must be mentioned that the proposed legislative reform would cover 
3PCL more generally, meaning not only OSPs. This is intended and laudable for 
several reasons. Firstly, in terms of extrinsic positioning, the new categories fit 
within a wider framework of copyright protection in the UK. Their scope is thus 
limited. Secondly, the thesis has focused on the problematic interplay of 3PCL with 
OSPs, but these are not the only market actors that are affected by the highlighted 
problems with the current regime, and that would thus benefit from its reform. 
Thirdly, the fact that the focus of this thesis has been on OSPs and the internet has 
ensured that the reformulation of 3PCL is as technologically up-to-date as possible, 
the importance of which cannot be understated given the scope for infringement 
using new media. 
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